




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THE TIME OF THE APOSTLES.

VOL. I.



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A HISTORY
OF THE
NEW TESTAMENT TIMES.

BY
DR. A. HAUSRATH,
ORDINARY PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG.

THE TIME OF THE APOSTLES.
VOL. I.

TRANSLATED, WITH THE AUTHOR'S SANCTION, FROM THE SECOND GERMAN
EDITION, BY

L. HUXLEY, B.A.

WITH A PREFACE BY MRS. HUMPHRY WARD.



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PREFACE.

IN these four volumes the work of translating Dr. Hausrath's "Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte," originally undertaken by the Theological Translation Fund some seventeen years ago, has at last been completed. Vol. I. appeared in 1878; Vol. II., in 1880. Both dealt with "The Time of Jesus," and offered an instalment of the whole work sufficiently complete in itself to stand alone. But for those whose interest in Dr. Hausrath's work had been awakened by his clear style, his direct and vivid method, and his attractive personality, it still remained eminently desirable that the later parts of the book, dealing with "The Times of the Apostles," should be added to the earlier English volumes. And this has now been done by Mr. Leonard Huxley's translation printed in the following pages.

In these few words of preface I may perhaps be allowed to express some of the thoughts which Dr. Hausrath's brilliant picture of the first Christian times has stirred in the mind, not of an expert, but of a consenting and sympathetic reader. These later volumes, then, as it seems to me, have the same qualities as the earlier,—the same conspicuous merits, and perhaps, here and there, the same weaknesses. The admirable survey of Palestine with which the first volume opened—a piece of writing which had many of the qualities of Renan, and especially that quality which enabled the great French

critic to make literature out of the minutest and exactest historical or linguistic material—is paralleled in these later sections by the descriptions of Alexandria, Tarsus, Corinth or Ephesus, descriptions where all that literary or archæological knowledge has to offer is pressed into the service of a remarkable *visualizing* faculty, on the part of an author who is determined to make his reader also see the towns where Philo or Paul walked, as clearly as he sees them himself. The intelligent analysis of social and moral conditions, conveyed in a singularly flexible style, and carried through with the true historical freedom and courage, which gave value to the earlier sections on “The Sanhedrin” or “The Synagogue,” on “The Sadducees and Pharisees,” on “The Economical Condition of Judæa under the Romans,” or “The Messianic Expectation,” is here applied to the institutions and circumstances of a later day; while the same narrative power shown in the former picture of Herod the Great finds here ample scope in carrying on the stories of Herod Antipas and Herod Agrippa, in the reproduction of Philo’s vivid account of his embassy to Caligula, or in treating the drama of the Jewish War. And the same eager sensitive thought which spent itself in the former volumes upon the analysis of the parts played by the Forerunner and the Master in the vast transformation of the time, is here concentrated with equal ardour and patience upon the great figure of St. Paul.

At the same time—if one is to be allowed a perfectly frank opinion—these later volumes betray here and there, as I have said, the same weaknesses which might have been noticed in the earlier. These weaknesses are indeed the defects of Dr. Hausrath’s qualities. He is not only a *gelehrter*; he is also a writer and a man of letters; a South German besides, or at any rate a member of a great South German University which has always possessed

a wide and varied literary tradition. The result is that, like Renan, he writes not only for his *Fach*, but for the public, and obeys both an inner and outer need when he endeavours to make his narrative as living and as effective as possible. The temptations of the position are of course obvious. A man determined to make a *book* out of such difficult material as the relics of Christian antiquity afford, can scarcely avoid at times straining his points and forcing his authorities beyond what the strict historical spirit allows. Such a straining of points and forcing of authorities is the besetting sin of orthodox interpretation. And the critical school, especially when it wishes to be read, does not escape it. Every careful reader of these interesting volumes will make his own comments in this sense as he goes along. Especially perhaps will he notice that Dr. Hausrath's exposition of disputed matters is occasionally least satisfactory when he is most anxious to be fair to the arguments of opponents. For instance, there is a passage in the section headed "The Early Career of Paul" where the writer discusses the knowledge which Paul may be supposed to have possessed of the teaching and personality of Jesus. Evidently the thought in Dr. Hausrath's mind is that some critics have gone too far in minimizing or denying this knowledge. His instinct towards fair statement accordingly makes him admit all he can; and the result is a string of references to the Pauline texts which can only set a reader wondering that so vital a point should be even discussed—much less decided—on such evidence.

But it is certainly desirable, eminently desirable, that from time to time those who *know* should use their knowledge, not only for students, but also for the large public. In this country Dr. Hausrath's book, with all its learning and charm, and its occasional *parti pris*, ought to be read as an alternative to those

popular English lives of Christ and St. Paul which have learning and charm too no doubt, but also a *parti pris* of another kind, far more marked and less easily to be defended. For Dr. Hausrath's *parti pris* is, after all, the *parti pris* of history and science wherever they appear. He is trying to make his subject intelligible and organic, to bring it into connection with human experience as a whole. He proceeds, as he himself says in his Preface to the second edition of his book, on the conviction that "what is in Philo, Josephus, and the Rabbis, historical theology, cannot immediately become inspiration in the Apostles;" and in his dramatic picture of the thought-conditions whence Christianity sprang, this instinct for the unity of all experience—the predominating instinct of the historian—is perpetually leading him to that translation of ancient testimony into modern terms which distinguishes the Christian interpreter of his class from those of any traditional school, Protestant or Catholic.

On the many controverted points of perennial difficulty and obscurity on which Dr. Hausrath necessarily touches in the course of these volumes, it does not become me to say much. No doubt his particular way of conceiving the forces of personality and environment at work in the primitive Christian community is not the way which is at the present moment dominant in the liberal theology of Germany. A man of genius, Professor Harnack, holds the field; and his disciples find a certain Rationalist poverty and thinness in all that does not bear his stamp. Nevertheless, it is probable that the present book will reach and affect English readers who would not be reached by the great "Dogmengeschichte" which forms the text-book of the prevailing school. Dr. Hausrath's tone of sympathetic realism will on the whole be congenial to us; and in these subjects it is for the present what we want. As compared with

Baur's "First Three Centuries," or Baur's "St. Paul," the present volumes abundantly bear out Dr. Harnack's estimate of the progress made by historical theology since the great days of the Tübingen school. "Richer in historical points of view," he says of the knowledge of to-day as compared with the knowledge of 1835, "we have grown more realistic, more elastic; the historical temper has developed; we have acquired the power of transplanting ourselves into other times. Great historians—men like Ranke—have taught us this."

The words may very aptly be applied to this survey before us of a vast period and the rise of a mighty movement. The writer carries us from scene to scene, from the philosophic schools of Greece, Rome and Alexandria, to the Church of Jerusalem in its early days of ecstasy and passionate hope; from the streets of Alexandria and the study of Philo, to the first preaching of the crucified Messiah in the synagogues of Palestine and the Dispersion, or among the slaves and freedmen of Rome; from the court of Caligula, to the palace of Herod Antipas, or into the midst of the adventures, the successes, the hypocrisies of Herod Agrippa; from the atmosphere of spiritual majesty surrounding the tormented life and indomitable labours of St. Paul, to the carnival of blood and lust which at the same moment filled the palace of Nero; from those murderous days and nights in the Rome of 64, amid which the great Apostle's frail life passes from the sight and hearing of men, to the awful struggle of the Jewish War. The narrative dealing throughout with a mass of detail—endeavouring to make everything count—to leave out nothing, however small, that can help a reader to see or to feel—the work, moreover, of a man penetrated throughout by the human and dramatic interest of his subject,—will often, indeed, rouse our criticism or our protest. There are repetitions; the

note, as we have said, is sometimes forced; there is occasionally the same tendency as in M. Renan to make a certainty that history has denied. But through it all—in comparison with most of the books we read in England—there is, as it seems to me, a wonderful sense of life and reality. Men act, and things happen from intelligible causes; the personalities of the time stand out in true, or at any rate possible relations to what surrounds them; the developing subtlety and profundity of Pauline thought, the mixture of things exquisite and grotesque in the first Christian communities, the clash of interests, and the fusion of creeds—all these are treated with equal freedom and sympathy, with no controversial bitterness, and often with a shrewd plainness, which nevertheless passes easily into the language of “admiration, hope and love.”

This mixture of realistic insight with spiritual veneration is especially remarkable in the portrait of St. Paul in which the book centres. So vivid is that portrait that the reader is in some sort challenged anew by it, as he might have been challenged by the actual presence—the stirring provocative presence—of the living Apostle. As one turns away from it, yet still possessed by it, one asks oneself again the perennial question on which Paul's life and preaching turned, which confronts us to-day, as it confronted him on the agonized journey to Damascus—“*What is it that saves?*” What light did Paul's experience and Paul's thought throw upon the eternal problem? What light do they still throw upon it for us—the children of another age, and other disciplines of mind and feeling? At the risk of repeating much that Dr. Hausrath has said, and said better, let me try and work out something of an answer.

“*What is it that saves?*” Paul's original reply to this question, given in his capacity as Pharisee and Zealot, was of

course the national reply of the Jew. The Law was there on the one side, the history of the Chosen People on the other: these two complementary facts defined the spiritual path of man. The Law represented God's eternal demand on his creatures, and the history of Israel exhibited the sanctions behind the Law, the consequences in human history of man's acceptance or refusal of the Divine condition. Yet the legal conception must always in Paul have been a source of recurrent pain and difficulty. The pressure of fixed obligation, in the case of an organization so imperfect physically and so sensitive spiritually, must have constantly roused an almost intolerable sense of oppression and default. We see, in fact, from his later language, that it *did* produce this oppression; that although for years, the Law, together with Israel's prophetic and historical tradition, stood before him as the only beacon and guide vouchsafed to a travailing world, nevertheless there must have been many times, perhaps even long crises, when the mind of the devout Pharisee was torn with dissatisfaction and longings, with doubts and revolts, possibly not all unlike those with which the great soul of his Master must have wrestled during the silent years of his Nazarene youth before the Baptist movement began. There can be no doubt for any one who ponders the evidence that it was an age of widespread moral struggle and speculation. The new and vast experiment of the Empire, the intermingling of races and civilizations within the Pax Romana which it brought with it, seems everywhere to have quickened the pulses and sharpened the perceptions of men. Religion and ethics felt the swell of the wave no less than literature and art. St. Paul, with that extraordinary sensitiveness, that power of passionate emotion, that love of debate, that craving to influence and to be understood by his fellow-men, which are conspicuous in his

writings, could not possibly have remained unaffected by the impulse to greater inwardness and realism in the field of religious thought which was making itself felt all about him—in the Greek schools and mysteries, in the Hellenist literature of the Dispersion; above all, in the nascent Christian community. One is reminded of Newman in his Liberal period. The Newman of Tract 90 is there all the while. And so with St. Paul in the days of his Pharisaic fervour. The materials for his conversion must have been always there. Such a nature could never have lived with anything like continuous peace and evenness of mind under the yoke of contemporary Judaism, however profoundly, even fanatically, attached to it, as indeed the only visible and tangible stay for its own piteously-felt weakness. Men of thought and heart were everywhere passing from letter to spirit; everywhere groaning under the dualism of flesh and spirit, the earthly and the heavenly; everywhere asking, “What is it that saves?” Paul of Tarsus, weak and tormented in body yet rich in soul, subtle, pliant, imaginative, possessed by religion, and bearing within him those capacities for dithyrambic utterance which found their full scope later in the great Epistles, must have been very early marked by the New Spirit for its own. The probability is, that when he entered upon his persecuting mission in Jerusalem, the whole nature was already ripe for change.

What was the immediate cause of the change that did actually happen? The only answer that can be historically given is one of nescience. We do not directly know, because none of our authorities directly tell us. The vision described by the Acts, and spoken of in a few words by Paul himself, was the result and evidence, not the cause of his conversion. The conversion itself must be placed earlier, amid scenes that must have hap-

pened, that according to our documents did happen, though these documents give us scarcely any account of them. Paul himself tells us "how that beyond measure I persecuted the Church of God and made havoc of it;" while the Acts describe domiciliary visits paid by him at Jerusalem as the agent of the Sanhedrin to the houses of suspected Christians, whence he "haled men and women, committing them to prison," and declare that he went to Damascus specially to "find" any "that were of the Way, both men and women;" or, in other words, to bring doubtful persons to examination. What we have to imagine, then, is a series of personal collisions between Paul and the followers of Jesus, between a man capable of conceiving the picture of Love's inmost heart and life, as it remains to us in the 13th chapter of Corinthians, and some men and women at any rate who had gone in and out with Jesus of Nazareth, who already possessed, no doubt, an elementary "common tradition" of his sayings, who had learnt from and adored the living Master, and had then with broken hearts seen him suffer and die. On the one side, an ethical and spiritual susceptibility hardly to be matched in history; on the other, narratives, recitals, appeals to prophecy,—all of them, through whatever imperfections and mistakes of the reporters, echoing one voice and personality, and that the voice and personality of Jesus. The same novelty and poignancy, the same simplicity and inwardness, the same mastery of all that is most compelling and persuasive in the language of the soul, the same fusion of life with faith, of idea with fact, which a generation or two later began through the Gospels the conquest of the civilized world, must have spoken to Paul of Tarsus in these tumultuous and passionate encounters with the heretics he was pursuing.

And what a difference between these fragmentary sayings and

presentations, and the sayings and characters already known to Paul among the Rabbis of his time, even of the best of them—even, say, of the great Hillel! The earnest Jewish scholar of to-day dwells on what he conceives to have been the injustice of the Christian founders towards the higher sides of the contemporary Judaism whence they sprang; he tries to show us that this Judaism had in fact an infinitely loftier content than the student of the New Testament imagines. Nevertheless, on the evidence which the Jewish scholar himself supplies, nothing can be clearer than that the difference between the thought, expression and character of Jesus as represented in the most authentic sayings of the Gospels and the best of Rabbinic thought and expression as it can be illustrated from the Talmud, is a difference, so to speak, of “natural magic,”—the difference which exists everywhere between the finest and rarest things of life and literature, and the things which are not the finest, which, however good, belong relatively to the crowd and the average. In essence, it is the same as the difference between St. Francis and Brother Bonaventura, between Dante and any other mediæval poet, and depends ultimately, no doubt, upon a difference in *responsive power*—in sensitiveness, that is, to moral and natural impression. The delicacy of the instrument reveals to us some new energy of the divine force which plays upon us all, dull and sensitive, alike. Once conspicuously thrown into the forms of human speech and action by the natural gift of the one, the word or “logos” becomes by sympathy and assimilation the possession of the many; and so the founders of religion, the great writers and the great artists rise into their place. What they bring us is indeed “revelation,” but always of something through and beyond the instrument itself; and the amount or degree of

this revelation, this aid rendered by men to man, is as varied as the process itself is persistent.

But to return. To this "natural magic"—this note at once exquisite and practical, which was the note both of Jesus and of the devotion he inspired—Paul, who himself possessed it in large measure, must have been all the time yielding while he was still fighting on for the Sanhedrin. And the stoning of Stephen—if the story of Paul's connection with it, in spite of his own silence upon a matter so conspicuous and dramatic, is to be accepted as historical—may well have brought the whole overwhelming experience to a climax. The cruelty of one capable of the utmost subtleties of tenderness, the rigour of a conscience already half-captured by the enemy, led to natural reaction. The revelation of "the Son" in Paul must have been largely accomplished before he set out for Damascus; and the vision in which the journey culminated was but the physical result—made probable and intelligible by much else that Paul tells us about himself—of an agonizing spiritual experience. To-day we should inevitably describe a phenomenon of the kind in medical and subjective terms. In the first century A.D. and amid the prevailing conceptions of body and spirit, it could only have been rendered in the language of the Apostle and of the Acts.

But the testimony of his victims had not only stirred him ethically,—it had provided Paul with the first germ of his theology—indeed, of Christian theology. *Intellectually*, Paul's contempt for the new sect seems to have been subdued by the use made in the new preaching of the famous passage in the second Isaiah containing the prophetic picture of the Servant of Jahve. This fragment of high poetry has a unique place in the history of literature and the world. Originally the product of some

vivid personal experience working on the ethical and sacrificial conceptions of a Jew of the captivity gifted with a poet's insight and a poet's sympathy, the picture of the Suffering Servant showed itself possessed in the course of centuries of that vitality which belongs only to those utterances of literature which translate what is most intense, and at the same time most universal in feeling, into what is noblest in form. "*Alles grandioses bildet,*" says Goethe—all that is great, or sublime, *educates*, tends, that is, to form the spirit of man in its own image. That the picture of the Suffering Servant occupied the thoughts of Jesus in the later months of his life, as the description of the Preacher sent "to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord," drawn from the same sacred book, seems to have shaped his earlier conceptions of his Galilean mission, is probable from a good many indications. From the ideas of this sublime vision of patient and yet vicarious suffering, invested for him, as a Jew, with supernatural meaning, then appropriated and made his own by the sternest and intensest processes of experience, may have sprung some of the phrases and expressions which lie imbedded in our present accounts of the Last Supper,—and the disciple who seeks to understand his cross to-day may fain believe that they enwrapped and supported him in death.

But while he lived, conceptions of this sort had no place in the minds of his followers. In the great soul of the Master they moved at ease, while to the disciples absorbed in the current Messianic dream they were a bewilderment and an offence. After the death on Calvary, however, this mysterious text, recommended to them by some of their Master's latest words and charged in every line with the same profound agony, the same protesting and indignant pain as had now overtaken themselves, must have suddenly possessed some leading mind among them

with a dominating and illumining power. Here was the key—the explanation. They had been blind to it while the Master lived. But *he* had known—he had pointed them to the truth. One of the most remarkable coincidences of history, aided by that special belief of the Jews which made *the letter itself* a living and divine thing—working also through the central and impelling reality of all, the effect of human personality at its greatest on human love and memory—produced a marvellous, but still natural fruit. The transformation of the Messianic idea was accomplished with a rapidity only possible under such conditions of spiritual temperature. A few days or weeks of absorbed communing, discussion, research, carried on, whether during the return-flight to Galilee, or amid the familiar scenes of the Master's early preaching, and accompanied by, perhaps closely connected with, the first visions of the risen Christ, were no doubt enough. Within a very short time the whole Messianic proof from Scripture had assumed a new order and aspect. The writings of the Old Covenant had been ransacked for proof-texts which could be brought to bear upon this new conception of the Lord's death and office, a conception that had produced at once both moral deepening and intellectual conviction of the most critical and fruitful kind in the minds of the primitive community. From the three great divisions of the Hebrew Bible, Law, Prophets, and Hagiographa, literary remains covering a wide variety of individual and national life, a large number of phrases and passages to which—if the historical meaning and context were left out of count, in the manner familiar to the exegesis of the time—a Messianic meaning in the new sense could be attributed, had been eagerly and readily collected. Such a collection—as we are able to perceive it through the *media* of the Epistles, the

Synoptics and the Acts—made, when complete and brought into connection with the life and death of Jesus, a very singular and, to the Jewish minds responsible for it, a very cogent whole, which, from the moment when the idea which brought it into being had been fully grasped by the Master's mourning followers, seems to have excited in them an ecstatic certainty of faith, and to have been one of the two chief weapons of their preaching; the other, the Resurrection, being indeed intimately connected with the new Messianic proof. This proof, which explained the Crucifixion, and merely postponed the fulfilment of the Messianic triumph-texts to the *return* of the Lord, became the source of Christian theology, and also the parent, by a very natural process, of a certain amount of pseudo-biographical tradition still to be traced in the lives of Jesus.

To the effect, then, upon St. Paul of the personality of Jesus as it expressed itself in the minds and memories of those who had learnt of him, must be added the effect of this nascent theology. It is clear, indeed, that to the majority of his Jewish contemporaries the Christian proof from Scripture appeared unreasonable and untrue. Even under the conditions of thought prevalent at the time, it offended the average man who knew nothing of the Galilean Teacher except by report, as contrary to common sense. But Paul was not an average man. He was at once poet and speculator, sensitive to the deepest things of feeling, and taking pleasure at the same time in all that exercised the logic of his day and training. His love for subtle interpretation, for the unexpected and the obscure, appears abundantly in the Epistles; and it is probable that a paradox, commended by some accompaniment that touched his moral sense, was at all times more likely to win him than a truism. Again, his constant mental activity, carried on under the conditions of Pharisaic thought and

life, combined with the spiritual unrest of one formed for greatness but not for happiness, must have always made him the natural prey of religious speculation. Brought suddenly, and in a state of heightened feeling, into the midst of the new world of Christian love and faith, it is not too much to say that he became, by the mere necessities of personality, its captive instead of its judge.

But the first stages of conviction achieved, and the great experience of Damascus undergone, the needs of Paul's nature carried him inevitably on. He was a man of greater range of thought, and probably of higher culture, than any of the primitive disciples. That the Scripture had predicted a crucified Messiah, and that Jesus of Nazareth had fulfilled the prophets, was not enough for him. His mind projecting itself further back into the causes of things, and accustomed to work in solitary passion and meditation, demanded not only a Scripture proof, but a philosophy, and demanded it more than anything else, and before anything else. "But when it pleased God to reveal his Son in me,—immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood, neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were apostles before me, but I went into Arabia—then after three years I went up to Jerusalem."

In "Arabia," then, that is to say amongst the scattered cities of the Hauran, on the great route from Damascus to the South, St. Paul, during the years that followed his violent breach with his former habits and associates, plied his trade and thought out his religious system. He "conferred not with flesh and blood"—or, as we should say, he felt no pressing desire to learn the details of the Master's earthly life and preaching from the lips of the eye-witnesses; the need that drove him into silence among strangers was a speculative need, a compulsion of thought

—the desire which such a nature was sure to feel for a new wholeness of view, a new logical understanding of life and the universe.

To this new understanding, as it was ultimately preached to the Gentiles, two modes of thought contributed—a Jewish and a Hellenistic. On the one hand, it was Messianic and sacrificial, conditioned, moreover, throughout by Jewish Theism and the Jew's ingrained beliefs about his own Scriptures; on the other, it was influenced by the current dualism, the "flesh and spirit" philosophy of the time, essentially, so far at least as Paul and his age were concerned, a Greek product—and especially by the doctrine, ultimately Platonic, but made accessible to Paul through various Græco-Judaic *media*, not now to be certainly traced, of the "typical" or "heavenly" man, the spiritual man, that is to say, made in the image of God, described in the *first* account given of creation in the Book of Genesis, and clearly distinguished by Paul's contemporary Philo from the natural man or earthly Adam of the second account. The identification of this "heavenly man" with the Jewish Messiah, and again with Jesus of Nazareth, marks the second step in the developing Christology of the Church. The third was to be taken when the unknown author of the fourth Gospel, reaching out again, as Paul had done, beyond the thought of his predecessors, in search of intellectual harmony, wrote the imperishable words, "*Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο.*"

When Paul went up to Jerusalem after this three years' interval, it is probable then that his main task—the task of constructive thought—was already achieved. Thenceforward we have but to trace out the ever-developing effects of these conceptions, first upon the Apostle's own life and career, and then upon the thought and life of Christendom. We become

familiar with the whole system that starts from the doctrine of the "heavenly man;" the magnificent elaboration thus given to the primitive Messianic conception of the Master's death; the elevation of that death to the rank of a great cosmic transaction between God and the world; the ideas of "sin," "grace" and "justification" flowing from it; the interpretation forced upon the law, upon the history both of Jews and Gentiles. Difficult as Paul is in the details of language, it can hardly be said, after the critical labour of the century, that the general lines of his thought are any longer obscure. Broadly speaking—these pages of Dr. Hausrath are one demonstration of it—we know the sources and foundations of that thought, the conditions that prepared it, and the influences that developed it. It has been brought back into its true human relations, and made a part of human history.

But, this being so, the further question remains, What is it *now* worth to *us*?

To this question may we not give two answers? In the first place, the thought of St. Paul as he has embodied it in his undoubted Epistles has, in spite of all technical defect, the value of great literature. His letters must be read, and will be read so long as literature lasts, for the light they throw on the history and ends of the human soul. They express what are on the whole the central facts in the spiritual experience of men, with a passion and a realization which will always make them the source of similar passion and realization in others—surely the highest function of the highest literature. The forms into which Paul threw the fundamental experiences whence all religion springs may be no longer our forms. He—lost in gratitude to the "heavenly man," Christ Jesus, who had stooped to death, even the death of the cross, that so he might deliver the bond-

servants of the Law, and by the communication of his own *pneuma* or spiritual principle to them raise up in them a new seed, the children and heirs of another and life-giving Adam,—lost in gratitude also to the Father who had sent the Son to redeem and re-create those who were “yet sinners” when Christ died for them—passed through his later life the “prisoner of Christ Jesus,” absorbed in a devotion and a hope which made hardship and torture and death itself mere dross in comparison. He had “died to live”—died—so far as it is ever possible to humanity—to the natural man, with his affections, lusts and ambitions, that he might live to an idea—to love—to something not himself; above all, to an indomitable faith in God’s ultimate triumph. The self-surrender had been absolute. “Henceforth it is not I that live, but Christ that liveth in me.” And from that self-surrender there had but arisen a fuller life, even for this world and all his human powers.

But go where you will, seek where you will, *this*, and nothing else than this—though it be told in a hundred diverse ways—is the ultimate secret of man’s moral life; this is *what saves*. St. Paul says: “Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.” The modern speaks of “the infinite spirit so communicating itself to the soul of man as to yield the idea of a possible perfect life;” or describes the “ultimate good” as “that complete devotion of himself,” whereby “man becomes, what it is his innate vocation to be, the organ and manifestation of God.” The same moral passion, springing in the last analysis from moral experience, speaks in both utterances; and when the modern, to whom it is natural to speak in the latter way, ponders with freedom and understanding the writings and personality of Paul, he feels the inevitable contagion which belongs to all great spiritual experience, through whatever differences of philosophical or historical

conception the progress of time has developed between him and the Apostle to the Gentiles. He rises from what he reads Paul's debtor and spiritual son, just as, in lesser degree, the man who has felt the spiritual passion of Dante carries away from him, not his Catholic philosophy, not his political conceptions, but the "honey" of a quickened spiritual insight.

But this is not all. The identifications which may be made all over the field of religious thought between the ultimate *spirit* of things outwardly diverse, become wholly empty and worthless unless strong account is taken at the same time of the historical difference itself. St. Paul's thought may be translated with more or less ease into the thought of English Hegelianism, as Professor Green translated it; or into the language of practical ethics, as Matthew Arnold translated it. But let us never forget that if such interpretations could have been offered to and understood by Paul himself, he would have rejected them with passion as "words of man's wisdom." In his own belief, the occurrence of an actual external transaction between God and man in the coming, death, and resurrection of Christ, was the source in himself and others of faith and of salvation. Let us never for an instant minimize that marvellous joy and certainty of an age which believed that it had indeed "touched" and "handled" the Word of life, and drew from its certainty an exaltation which the civilized world will never know again. But what then? Are we—in whom another philosophy of history obtains—are we merely to regard this belief of St. Paul and his converts, this Christology of which he was the founder, as something to their disparagement, something which must be regretfully put aside in our endeavour to place ourselves into sympathy with what we feel to be morally great? Surely no. The debt of the modern who accepts none of its special propo-

sitions, to Christian theology and to its first founders, is still great beyond his paying, whether he recognize it or no. For what, in truth, has this theology done for him? It has lifted a human life—and that a life of spiritual effort and conquest—into a place of pre-eminence, a place above all other lives, where it becomes capable, by virtue merely of this isolation, merely of this historical setting, of new uses indefinitely fruitful. To the most sceptical of us it is natural to speak of Jesus of Nazareth in ways which would be unnatural and unfitting in the case of any one else, however saintly, however famous, however congruous to our own personal taste and love. We may reject and withdraw ourselves from the Christian tradition; we cannot escape a shock of pain when a certain type of secularist tries to show his detachment of mind by a rough handling of the Christian story, nor an instinct of secret sympathy when we touch, in the simple and sincere, on that grateful love for “the Lord” which stretches back through myriads of Christian lives, to the love of Paul of Tarsus, of Peter, of Mary of Magdala. Why, then, instead of rating ourselves for a sentimental inconsistency, not recognize in our shrinking and our sympathy the traces of an indelible reality, of a past which it is our task to utilize, not to resist? What a possession—this common human ideal, this common image of the good—if we could but use it aright! The travail of centuries, directed nominally to quite other things, has in the end given us just this—a *story of love, holiness, death*—so lifted out of all cramping and distracting relations that it becomes transformed into idea and symbol, and capable therewith of all the far-reaching uses that belong to ideas and symbols.

Not that the freest interpretation and analysis of the life and death itself are thereby forbidden us. In the struggle against

dogma, which has been the special product of our own century, the human reality on which dogma was built up has been divested of wrapping after wrapping, only to emerge with an ever greater freshness and enchantment. That the Master's sad or sweet clearness of soul was chequered by some few—but how few!—of the illusions and ignorances dependent on his place in history; that his “lesson,” supreme as it is, touches only part of our lives, and has no *direct* answer for some of our worst difficulties, or no *direct* sympathy for some of our keenest and noblest interests—may be true. But there is no other noble life known to human record encumbered with so little that is earthly, transitory and local; no other that can be put to purposes so high and universal. Those who, with a full understanding of what it is that modern knowledge calls them to put aside in dealing with it, still accept it as man's best reminder of what it most behoves him to love and to remember, have in their hands an instrument, a spell, which may yet prove of incalculable social good. “Without a parable spake he not unto them”—and the method of the Master was but the method of the teaching Spirit itself as it has worked in human history. The spiritual life hangs on parables,—learns from them, most of all, *what it is that saves*. We draw our daily inspiration, not from the chains and sequences of abstract thought, but from the things we see and feel—from a story here, a glimpse of character there—things which can be told to a child, and yet for the wise contain all mysteries and all knowledge. And of these parables, by which we all live, so far as morally we live at all, there is no other so widely illuminating, so broadly serviceable to us Europeans as that parable which we call “The Life of Christ.” Here it is among us at this hour, our present and inalienable possession. We have but to discern it afresh, in its relations

to God and to man, to make of it a new social bond, a new link between rich and poor, a new peacemaker between creed and creed. And this in virtue not only of what this life actually or originally was, but still more perhaps in virtue of the part which it and the forces working through it have already played in human history, in the actual making of each one of us.

And that it has played so great and so imperishable a part is due in large measure to that passionate thought of St. Paul which, while it seemed to be obscuring the reality, was in truth preserving it for a remote future, in the only way, so far as we can see, in which it could have been preserved. The Gospels and the Epistles represent twin elements, both indispensable, of one great movement. To-day it is the gospel, freshly conceived—the pure parable—that holds our hearts. But it is very possible—paradox as it may sound—that we should not now possess it but for the life and labour of one whose glory it was not to know Christ after the flesh, and in whose hands what had been image and story became for the first time dogma and philosophy.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
PREFACE BY MRS. HUMPHRY WARD	v

First Division.

THE CONDITION OF RELIGIOUS LIFE IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

1. Stages in the Development of Polytheism	3
2. Monotheism and the Dualistic View of the World	14
3. Subjective Morality and the Development of the Sense of Sin	34
4. The Need for Redemption	46
5. The Theology of Mediation	64
6. The Mysteries	75
7. Foreign Cults	83

Second Division.

THE RELIGIOUS MISSION OF THE JEWISH DISPERSAL.

1. The Jews in the Dispersal	101
2. The Propaganda	108
3. The Proselytes	123
4. The Jews of Alexandria	136
5. The Alexandrian Religious Philosophy	145
6. Philo	161
7. Moses as Saviour of the World	189
8. The Religious Strife in Alexandria	201

ERRATA.

P. 45, note, for "Vol. iv." read "Vol. ii."

P. 52, note, before Vol i., insert "Time of Jesus."

First Division.

THE CONDITION OF RELIGIOUS LIFE IN THE
ROMAN EMPIRE.

THE CONDITION OF RELIGIOUS LIFE IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

1. STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLYTHEISM.

RELIGION is one of the primary faculties of human nature. It is a normal, not an abnormal, function of the human mind; it always has existed and always will exist. What we denote by this name is the sense of the absolute, the consciousness of the eternal, the sensitive contact of the human soul with the everlasting; and the universal meaning of this sense is that all finite being is in the infinite, and exists through the infinite; all temporal being is in the eternal, and exists through the eternal. The sense that we are nothing and can effect nothing in opposition to the everlasting order of the universe, while we can effect everything by following it and uniting with it—that is to say, with the Deity and through the Deity—this is religion.

So long as men derive all their impressions from the senses, the form which this inner perception necessarily takes is the religion of Nature. Man regards himself as one natural object among many, and Nature, beyond which his spiritual vision does not reach, is to him the universal power on which he feels himself dependent. However, as Nature, in her relation to man, displays the most various contrasts, the religion of Nature is always polytheism. The contradictions of Nature could not arise from one and the same being. So religious feeling lost its unity; as life grew richer and experiences more varied, so did heaven grow richer in gods, for new experiences gave rise to new gods.

Now the content of religious conceptions is primarily determined by the conditions of national life. Among the HINDUS, religious feeling attaches itself to Indra, bearer of the lightning; to the cloud-god, Britra, and Ahi, who scares away the clouds; besides other phenomena of atmospheric activity, on which the welfare of man in this climate depends. Among the BACTRIANS, MEDES and PERSIANS, the contrasting aspects of nature in their native Iran are reflected in the religious dualism of Ormuzd and Ahriman. In Egypt, the whole cult turns upon the life of the Nile, Osiris, whom the yearning Isis, the thirsty land, seeks and finds, and again mourns. In the CHALDEAN plain the sun-god Bel was worshipped as the engendering principle, and Mylitta, the fruitful, moist bosom of the earth, as the goddess who conceives and brings forth.

In common with the mainland, the foreigners who had settled on the PHENICIAN coast have Baal for the sun-god, and Ashera as the goddess of fertility. Like Egypt in the worship of Osiris, they celebrate the rise and fall of their river in the cult of Adonis. Here Baal is the youthful god Adonis, the life-bringing, engendering sun. Against him, the fierce and deadly heat of the Syrian summer appears in Moloch, the god of scorching fire. And as Moloch stands opposed to Adonis, the dispenser of life, so does the fruitful Ashera to the cruel and deadly Astarte, the restless wandering moon-goddess, who is served with chastity and self-mutilation.

Thus we find the religion of nature universal in the earliest home of civilization. By means of it, man links his sense of dependence with the powers of nature which enter into his life to bless or to destroy. But the common fate of these religions was stagnation, paralysis. The everlasting sameness of the course of nature, the coming and going year, the rising and falling Nile, bloom followed by decay, gave rise to no new thoughts. The religion of nature did not grow with the growth of humanity. It gave the descendants no wider impulse than it had given to their ancestors; till at last the world's monotonous regularity,

regardless either of propitiation or neglect, was met with mere indifference.

With higher culture, too, man emancipates himself from these isolated deities. They no longer inspire him with fear. He takes them into his service; they are dependent upon him, not he on them. Then it is vain for a powerful priesthood to introduce a newer, deeper meaning into the old symbols and myths. The only result is that the simple thought of the religion of nature is artificially and laboriously obscured, and thereby completely loses its power over the mind. The symbol—for thinkers an exercise in acuteness, if not an intellectual puzzle—becomes for the populace a mysterious hieroglyph, reminding them of the great and everlasting riddle of existence, but not explaining it. The worship of the masses therefore becomes crass superstition; while for believers, the symbol has ceased to be an object of religious veneration.

Such is the state of paralysis in which we find the religions of Asia as early as the time of Herodotus, with whom begins any connected history of this subject. The masses in general hold absolutely aloof from their gods, to goad themselves up to spasmodic and fanatical observances in times of distress. The priests are no longer venerated ministers of religion, but despised outcasts of humanity, purchasing an existence of idleness and comfort with their bloody or bloodless sacrifice of self—priests whose oracles proverbially understand but one thing, the art of ambiguous reply. Clearly the East was weary of its gods before it was overthrown by Alexander.

The cult of the Olympians spread over Asia Minor without meeting any particular opposition. It was not until it reached the frontiers of Syria that its advance was checked by the catastrophe known to us as the war of the Maccabees—a war full of significance for the history of the world by its reaction on the consciousness of the Jews.

However, the expansion of Greek religion was no sign that the Hellenic cult had obtained any special new power over the

mind in the time of the Diadochi. In contrast to the "barbarous usages," it had settled along with the Greeks everywhere, as a matter of nationality and in the interest of the newly-created dynasties; but the inward process of dissolution had already advanced further in it than in the crude religions of nature in Asia itself. And yet, even in its beginnings, the Greek spirit had shown itself far more independent than the Asiatic in its treatment of ancient religious conceptions.

The GREEK OLYMPUS showed, from the outset, a richer individualization than the Oriental view of religion, the latter approaching more closely to the old Aryan. The quick-witted Greek of the Archipelago had nothing of the resigned and fatalistic temper of the Oriental in his attitude towards the gods. He shaped the traditional myths and symbols so as to transfer them into the realm of the beautiful, in accordance with the strong bent of his genius. Just as the beginnings of Greek art among the Æginetans consist in the Greek spirit vivifying the antique images of Egyptian gods, releasing them from their cramped rigidity, and elevating them to individual figures, so from the traditional divinities of Asia the Greek imagination creates a family of gods, each with characteristic differences, and busily places them in human relationships in its midst.

Heaven and Earth, the two fundamental divinities which we meet with everywhere, because mankind first feel dependent upon them, here appear as the cloudless Zeus and Demeter (γῆ μήτηρ) or Hera.¹ But while these characters lost their clear outline with the Oriental, they presented themselves to the Greeks in concrete human form from the first. The Greek god of heaven has for shield the ægis, the grayish-yellow storm-cloud, like a goat-skin, which he shakes to produce the thunder; and for weapon of offence, the lightning, forged beneath the earth by the Cyclopes, the spirits of the elements. As among other nations, his connection with the earth was conceived of

¹ Vide Max Müller, *Science of Language*, ii. p. 366; Pfleiderer, *Das Wesen der Religion*, 2, 108, seqq.

as wedlock, heaven making earth fruitful with rain and sun. But, as the Earth-goddess received various names in various local cults, Hera found many rivals through the union of local legends, and thus arose the myths of the loves of Zeus and Semele, Danæ, Io and other mortals.

But the Greek spirit, possessed of finer discernment, was quicker also to separate distinctive attributes of the old divinity as independent beings; so that new gods arose and a hierarchy was created. Zeus, as supreme, is removed from the domain of strife, and gives away the ægis to Pallas (i.e. the Brandisher); the thunder-storm and far-shooting bow to Apollo and his sister Artemis, the maiden goddess of the cold moonlight. Hermes (the Vedic Saramayas), among the Hindus the watch-dog of heaven, here becomes the messenger of the gods. The fertilizing attributes of the deity are individualized in Dionysus, Zeus' son, god of the growth of vine and tree, and in Demeter, goddess of agriculture, and Hera's other self. She, though, as Hera, rising with Zeus above the basis of nature and becoming the representative of the order of wedlock, is, as Demeter, essentially the goddess of agriculture. This is the capacity in which she and her daughter Proserpine are connected with the Eleusinian festivals that celebrate the growth of vegetation, now flourishing, and now swept away into the under-world.

While this advance in specialization was taking place, the fertile imagination of the Greek people created gods for each natural object. In proportion as the eye of the Hellenes was keenly awake to every shape and shade of colour in the external world, their imagination was fertile to people this world with personal beings. Thus the infinite variety of ocean is reproduced in a world of gods unparalleled amongst other nations. Thalatta, goddess of the Mediterranean, is enthroned beside Poseidon, girdler of the earth. Galene, goddess of calm, rules over the level surface, but on the white flecks of foam appears the dreaded Leucothea, who yet sometimes conveys the shipwrecked mariner to the succouring arms of her son Palæmon,

god of harbours. So, too, Poseidon's whole retinue of Tritons, with their various musical instruments, correspond to the shrill or deep or melodious tones of ocean; and the fifty daughters of Nereus, king of the sea-depths, Halia, Hippothoe, Galatea, Amphitrite, Glauconome, Euarne and so on, to some particular aspect or another of this bright and restless element. It was the same with the gods of the woods and hills, the springs and valleys—Oreads, Dryads, Naiads and Sileni. Men felt a vague sense of the presence of divine beings on every side, who interfered in their lives with benevolent or malevolent intention.

But the awfulness of divinity cannot fail to disappear in this subdivision of functions. To venture on distributing the gods into great and small, shows the sense of dependence to be no more than relative. The believer stands in a different position towards the nymphs who drew down Hylas into the depths, or the woodland god who leads the maiden astray, than towards the dark and gloomy power of Moloch or Astarte. But the mobile Greek imagination did not rest satisfied with dividing the gods and giving each his rank. Gods are involved in strife with gods. Craft, love and violence, are imputed to them, and their world becomes a mirror in which the national levity sees itself. Now although this anthropomorphism from the very first involved the danger of giving a frivolous character to the gods, the first consequence of the freer handling was, on the contrary, to infuse greater morality into religious conceptions. The Hellene recognized not only that nature was governed by powers upon which he was dependent, but also that man's moral relations are governed by everlasting laws which none may transgress with impunity. He knows that his dependence upon these differs both in kind and degree from his dependence upon the sensible elements. Herein lies the difference between the Oriental and the Hellenic sense of dependence: the latter have a dawning presentiment of a moral order in the world. What the Phœnician worshipped in Ashera was only the strength of natural impulse acting upon the senses, and followed with blind

obedience. On the other hand, what the Hellene sees in Hera is the holy bond of marriage—domestic chastity and fidelity, breach of which avenges itself according to everlasting ordinances. Indra, Bel, Baal, Ptah, only represent the beneficent action of the light, the sun, the clear sky. Cloudless Zeus, however, represents the lord of the world, not only in a physical, but in a moral connection, as the vindicator of right, the all-seeing eye, the unfailing punishment. He wields the thunder-bolt, not, as Indra, to set free the heavenly kine, the water-springs, but to crush every moral delinquency and Titanic presumption. Similarly Pallas, originally goddess of the purifying storm, passes into the representative of clear reason and triumphant prudence, who even restrains the rude Ares; while the god of light, Apollo, becomes the god of revelation in Greek religion, the god who illumines obscurity, who discloses guilt, gives absolution, and is the principle of poetry and prophecy.

In these respects the Greek religious conceptions as a whole were undoubtedly richer, more capable of development and more moral, than the monotonous, unreflecting, Asiatic religion of nature. But they never exercised such power over the mind as had been obtained by the Asiatic conceptions of God. Long before the Greek Olympus set out upon its career of conquest against the East, the philosophers of Greece complain that the poets degrade the gods; while, on the other hand, the people murmur against the philosophers who would introduce purer conceptions in place of the traditional deities. It never occurred to the Phœnician or the Egyptian to alter their sacred symbols, because they were filled with awe of the powers they worshipped. They stand under the constraint of their divinity, and have not the hardihood to adorn it with new features. The man who, like the Hellene, makes images, myths and legends of his gods, by so doing gets rid of his own sensitiveness.

So it remained for a time, and the man of reflective temper recognized the gods as images projected by his own mental vision, as indeed Herodotus, in the fifth century B.C., expressed

it plainly: "Hesiod and Homer made their gods for the Greeks."¹ Indeed, a generation before, Xenophanes had spoken ironically of how each people made its gods in its own likeness: the Negroes think of their gods as black and flat-nosed; the Thracians, as blue-eyed and red-haired.

"Had but the lion or ox been given hands
To work like man the portraiture of art,
Their sculptured gods would have received such form
As is the growth and figure of themselves."²

Another saying of the same philosopher shows no less freedom of thought:

"Homer and Hesiod fasten on their gods
All that with men merits reproach and shame,
Theft and adultery and treacherous fraud."³

It is not until her political life begins to decay that we find the religious life of ITALY in the same career of dissolution as that of Greece even before the age of Alexander. This is connected with the fact that the relation between the state and religion was closer here than anywhere else. The gods of Rome were originally the same as those of the other Aryan religions; but the Roman genius, with social life as its real object, had laboured earnestly to raise the religion of nature to a higher and a moral potentiality.⁴ Thus the nature-meaning of these gods vanished entirely before their reference to the ethical relations of human life. Jupiter (in the Veda *Dyaûs pitar*, in Greek *Ζεὺς πάτερ*, i.e. "Father of Heaven") is no longer the bright god of heaven, the cloudless Zeus, but the invisible sovereign of the Roman state. Juno, the feminine deity, extends her original signification of the fruitful earth-goddess beyond Hera. She is the divine type of human womanhood, guardian

¹ Herod. 2, 53.

² Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiii. 13, 36. In Brandis, Comment. Eleat. 1, 68. Fr. 1, 5.

³ The well-known passage in Sextus adv. Mathem. 1, 289.

⁴ Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Religion, p. 155; Pfeleiderer, Das Wesen der Religion, 2, 162, seqq.; Döllinger, Heidenthum und Judenthum, 457, seqq.; Holtzmann, Judenthum und Christenthum, 277, seq.

of wedlock, and patroness of the wife and mother. Janus, the Italian sun-god, becomes, as gate-keeper of heaven, the god who must bless all ingoings and outgoings, the lord of the gate and the streets, of the beginning and the ending. Thus the Romans' sense of dependence was far less closely related to nature than to the powers which direct the life of the community. The Roman gods are gods of the state. What we call the idea of justice, morality and honesty, on whose validity the good of the individual and the whole depends in accordance with eternal order, was elevated to divine rank by the religious sense of Rome. In this direction, then, we find the Latins as prolific as the Hellenes in investing the external world with living persons and divine spiritualities, but they reflect a less poetical apprehension of life in these religious conceptions. The old Latin gods are dry abstractions of civic conditions and communal regulations. Fides protects honour in public life; Terminus, the boundaries of the fields; Semo Sancus, the sanctity of oaths; Juno, the fidelity of wives; Vesta, domestic purity; Pecunina, Æsculanus and Argentarius, honesty of trade in great things and small. Just as the Greek's fine discernment established a special divinity for every play of colour in nature, so the keenly observant Roman arrived at an equal multitude of spirits which merely owed their origin to intellectual distinctions.

There is Vagitanus, who teaches children to cry; Levana, who raises the new-born child and lays it before its father; Cunina and Rumina, who watch over the cradle and suckling; Nundina, to whom the naming on the ninth day is holy; Potina and Educa, who accustom the untried child to eating and drinking; and Ossipaga, who sees to strengthening the child's bones. Then Statanus teaches it to stand; Abeona and Adeona, to come and go; Fabulinus and Locutius, to lisp and talk; Iterduca and Domiduca guide it to and from home; Numeria teaches counting; Camena, singing; Strenua grants bodily strength; and Catius, Consus and Sentia, bestow intelligence.¹

¹ Augustin, *Civ. Dei*, 4, 11, after Varro.

In like manner, every situation in the life of the individual, the family, and the state, was the province of some protecting divinity, whose favour had to be implored according to definite prescription. Hence, then, the severely religious cast of public life, seemingly conscious of divinity on every side; hence, too, the superstition, in form Etruscan, with which every extraordinary event in nature or daily life was fastened upon as a divine manifestation. Not only was the will of the gods signified by the flight of birds, by red lightning or blue in the east or west, and by the situation of the viscera in the victim; but even abortions, earthquakes, showers of stones, or fire, or blood, strange sounds in the air, the rattling of the temple doors and the movement of images of the gods, were omens through which heavenly beings spoke.

Theology was thereby given a wider scope, and theologians of every kind—augurs, haruspices, pontiffs, vestals and Sibylline duumvirs—perfected a problematical science, in order to forecast the meaning of these omens and avert their significance by means of ceremonies. In consequence, the characteristic method of Roman religion departs entirely from the worship of Nature. It is the state, war and civic life, not Nature, for whose inner laws the Roman feels reverence. The gods before whom he bows are the powers upon which the welfare of the state depends. Jupiter Capitolinus is therefore the central idea of Roman religion, in himself representing no more than the majesty of the state. Next after him, however, the power most worshipped by the Roman is Mars, in conjunction with his favourite child Victoria.

So long, therefore, as the feelings which these gods represented were strong among the people, the gods were believed in and worshipped, and this belief was healthy and produced the mental effects which are the object of religion. But with the degeneration of the state, belief also decayed. Estrangement began with the gods of peace. Fides was of no avail to protect contracts, nor Vesta to guard domestic morals; and people

unlearned their belief in gods that seemed to be set at nought with impunity. Besides, the narrow religious morality of their forefathers no longer suited their wider circumstances. The commander in the field joined battle when strategy demanded, whether the sacred chickens ate or not, and whether birds flew to right or left. No political party certain of a majority broke off the *Comitia* because an ill omen was observed. The very circumstances that secured religion a certain length of existence, namely, its close connection with the life of the state, tended in turn to its destruction, when politicians trampled its forms underfoot or abused them for their own ends.

Thus, in particular, the deification of the *Cæsars* of the latest period is simply the direct consequence of this development of religion. With the establishment of the monarchy, the genius of the monarch had as good a claim to worship as *Jupiter Capitolinus*, who after all had never been anything more than the genius of the republic, the invisible head of the state.

Moreover, the expansion of Rome to a world-wide empire was the end of its national religion. At Rome, as elsewhere, there appeared the natural tendency of the religious man to find his own gods in the gods of foreign nations, and to explain the one by the other. Ever since the extension of the frontier over Greece and Asia Minor, there had been a growing conviction of the identity of the Greek and Roman pantheon. That the Roman gods were merged in the Greek was only one more sign of the superiority of the Greek spirit over the Roman. Individual Greek and even Asiatic divinities were introduced directly by decree of the Senate, especially on the authority of the Sibylline oracles, and finally the Greek and Roman cults seemed completely interfused.

At the same time, all the doubts which perplexed the faith of Hellas were transported to Rome, and the wanton tales related of Zeus and Hera were transferred to Jupiter and Juno. Thus the downfall began with the mingling of Greek and Roman mythology, which shook the earnestness of Rome and stirred up

criticism. Moreover, the ancient and venerable forms and usages both of state and home, in which public morality consisted, lost their religious import. They sank into empty formulas after a new order of gods had usurped the place of those they originally referred to. In sale and purchase, in marriage and divorce, in peace and war, meaningless forms were gone through, and augurs and haruspices smiled when they came to their sacred duties after the custom of their fathers.

The *horror vacui*, however, rules in the spiritual as well as the material world. The empty place in the soul had to be filled with something else; or rather, since nothing, strictly speaking, disappears from consciousness, there is only displacement before some new influence, offering a higher spiritual satisfaction. That which now entered into the consciousness of the period in place of the old belief in the gods, was a philosophic monotheism and the belief in a future world.

2. MONOTHEISM AND THE DUALISTIC VIEW OF THE WORLD.

Long before the people at large felt the need for the purification of religious conceptions, individual thinkers of Greece had inquired into the principles of the world and existence, an inquiry which had in its first beginnings achieved nothing higher than to show everywhere a natural connection of cause and effect, instead of divine powers. This oldest Hellenic philosophy was fundamentally physics—natural science, if one can give the name to speculations upon nature which rest neither on exact observation nor experiment. The Ionic philosophers had explained the world on the basis, now of one element, now of another, from which it was supposed to be produced by condensation or rarefaction. Then the Eleatic XENOPHANES abstracted from the individual elements, and, as the principle of the world, propounded pure being, substance without attri-

butes, the one and universal, which has neither beginning, middle nor end. Real being belongs only to this, the infinite, unchangeable basis of things, while the visible world is a semblance, deceitful and unreal. This unity Xenophanes calls God.

This was but a logical consequence. If the manifold elements are not the basis of the world, and Nature is comprehended in its ultimate essence as Unity, man feels himself also dependent upon this single cause of the universe, and upon this alone. If there exists only one basis of the universe, there is only one God. This was the meaning of Xenophanes' polemic against Greek anthropomorphism, of which we have spoken.¹ His divinity is not in human likeness, it is "all eye, all intelligence, all ear; unmoved, indivisible, ruling all things without effort by his thought, and resembling man neither in figure nor in intelligence."² Here, then, during the classical age of belief in the gods, a pure monotheism arises in opposition to the religion of nature and its polytheism. "Surveying the world as a whole," says Aristotle, "Xenophanes called God the One."³ The time of Pisistratus, Anacreon, Darius and Tarquinius Superbus, naturally was not ripe for such a view. Nevertheless, it had one or two points of contact with the popular consciousness, so that the saying of the great Eleatic did not pass away wholly misunderstood by his time. The interdependence of phenomena as established by experience, and the necessity for a firm moral order of the universe, compelled even believers to combine the multiplicity of their gods into unity, and, unlike the good-natured anarchy of the Homeric Olympus, to insist upon the monarchical power of Zeus, or to recal a higher order to which even Zeus is subservient.

So among the great poets of the following generation we see Pindar, Æschylus and Sophocles, work out the monotheistic thought of the Eleatic, at least in the claim for unity in the

¹ Cf. above, p. 10.

² Fr. 7, b. Sext. 9, 144.

³ Metaph. 1. 5.

order of the world, for a monarchy of the universe. The many gods, especially among the great tragedians, became mere representatives of the one "Divine." They are subordinate to a higher law; the wilfulness and perversity that Homer delighted in have vanished from their actions. While Homer found an inexhaustible theme in the cleverness of the Olympians to thwart the will of the Father of the gods, and the power of their opposition to inflict an *Odyssey* of wandering upon a mortal, Sophocles rather asks:

"What froward will of man, O Zeus, can check thy might?
Not all-enfeebling sleep, nor tireless months divine,
Can touch thee, who through ageless time
Rulest mightily Olympus' dazzling height."¹

But the essential point still remained, that Greek philosophy, advancing along the lines of the Eleatics, constructed a view of the universe esoterically independent of the traditional myths, and making no greater concessions to popular belief than to label its individual principles with mythological names. The most genial of the pre-Socratic philosophers, HERACLITUS the Obscure, acknowledged his philosophical monism as religious monotheism, by naming the life of the world Zeus, while others could find the name of a god for each principle.² By the middle of the fifth century, freedom of thought had gained so much ground that the assumptions of his cosmic speculation seemed far more certain than the traditions of religion; while the leaders of the enlightened movement, generally known as Sophists, made some parade of their maxim, that they had nothing to say about the gods, neither that they existed nor that they did not exist; for the whole matter was too obscure, and human life too short to fathom the mystery.³ Indeed, the most resolute head of their whole school, Prodicus, discloses the secret of nature-worship plainly when he says: "Sun and moon, rivers

¹ Antig. 600—606, trans. L. Campbell.

² Zeller, *Phil. of the Greeks*, 3rd ed., 592, 755.

³ Protagoras in Diog. Laert. 9, 51, and in Plato, *Theæt.* 162, D.

and springs, and in general everything that is of service to us, were held as gods by the men of old, just as the Egyptians regard the Nile. For this reason also bread was worshipped as Demeter, water as Poseidon, fire as Hephæstus.”¹ The Sophists, then, left it an open question whether there was an objective divinity behind these popular conceptions, since they denied the objectivity of human knowledge in general.

Now while the speculations of the Eleatics had for the most part penetrated but little among the people, the Sophistic was especially a popular philosophy. These popular philosophers, living on success and happy only when applauded, naturally found on their ostentatious visits and their life of wandering in the cause of science, no more grateful theme than ridicule of the gods, with which they everywhere roused the astonishment of the masses. Common folk, too, had begun to adopt the materialistic view and its explanation of the universe. At the time of the Peloponnesian war, it passed for old-fashioned, at least in the towns, to believe any longer in the gods.² Even a man of so earnest and fundamentally religious temper as Thucydides, the great historian of this epoch, consistently refuses to interrupt the course of events by the intervention of the gods. He ascribes every occurrence to finite factors. On the stage, Euripides makes his Hercules reflect whether the gods who persecute him actually exist, and his Orestes ask himself whether the Eumenides who hunt him are not after all products of his own imagination.³ Thus Euripides is the sophist among the tragedians, and, in his plays written with a purpose, he has solved the question of guiding the Greeks on their way from the pleasant twilight of credulity and prejudice to the clear day of consciousness, enlightenment and subjective freedom, with all the certainty of a practised playwright. When the Pythia

¹ In Sext. Adv. Mathem. ix. 18, 51, seq.; Cic. Nat. D. i. 42, 118.

² Aristophanes, Clouds, 398, seqq.

³ Orest. 248, seq., 387, seq., 410; Herc. Fur. 1250, &c.

declares him to be wiser than Sophocles, the very gods that he denied bear witness that herein he understood the spirit of his century.

Indeed, the time of the Peloponnesian war is the chief period of the decay of Greek tradition. Sophistic and Democracy played into each others' hands. Both schools, the philosophic and the political alike, represent the destruction of the basis of tradition; both give up conventional rules and make rational objects their standard. Doubt once awakened finds the old objects of worship merely foolish and delusive. The state, universal morality, and above all worship, prove to be based upon vain hypotheses. Other proofs, other aims of existence, must be established. A complete revolution is effected in the conditions of spiritual life. It is a revolution that presents itself connectedly as the endeavour after a new conception of the universe.

Enlightenment comes from philosophy, from the stage, from the tribune. Euripides, the friend of enlightenment, is impelled to the drama, not by the force of genius, but of deliberate choice, seeing the people crowd to the theatre in greater numbers than even to the open streets where Socrates taught. The theatre, once a form of worship among the Greeks, sinks to an office for the spread of enlightenment. The later tragedy gives instruction; and the middle comedy strips off the impudent garb of its lively parent, the old comedy, and becomes wise and didactic.

Aristophanes, however, the greatest and last representative of the old comedy, is himself one of the most signal representatives of the enlightenment he incessantly derides; his loose pictures of manners, together with his blasphemous orthodoxy, are a stronger proof of the universal corruption and atheism than all the tirades he delivers against both.¹ Thus in the "Clouds" he declaims against the atheism of physical investigation, which would wrest the thunderbolt from Zeus; but his own belief in

¹ Zeller, l. c. J. G. Droysen, *Introd. to the Comedies of Aristophanes*.

the Shaker of the *Ægis* seems notwithstanding to make him out no better than an assassin, when he makes Socrates venture to say :

“Why! how now! O you fool! you old-fashioned owl! retailer of old wives’ fables!

If perjury’s punished by Zeus with the stroke of the lightning, how comes it he has not smitten

Cleonymus or Theorus or Simmon years since, arrant perjurers all, I warrant,

But instead of them strikes full oft his own temples, and strikes the holy headland of Sunium,

Strikes, too, the mightiest oaks? Well, what is he fighting with? Find me an oak that is perjured.”¹

In the “Frogs” he abuses his rival Euripides in the same strain as a renegade from the old beliefs; “to the atheist,” he cries, “nothing is divine; all is the mechanical power of Nature.” But the kind of burlesque in which he drags men and gods alike through the mire is a more noticeable sign of the wide-spread moral confusion than the most enlightened tirades of Euripides. Even if he praises the godliness of the old times in sober earnest, he commends what he has not himself. A development which generally needs centuries to ripen, had been compressed into a few generations, and this feverish process had thrown men’s minds out of traditional grooves. This is the situation confronting us in the plays of the two great poets. The acid of the enlightenment has corroded the whole of life; men have emancipated themselves from custom and prejudice, and have reasoned themselves out of all tradition and actuality. Democracy has created a grovelling, swarming individual life, ever toiling confusedly in greater stir and variety.² Such is the life, such the tremendous realization of liberty, viewed by Aristophanes and Euripides; the painful, mad laughter of the one, the eloquent melancholy of the other, do but express the same rending of the spirit and the same decay.

It may indeed seem remarkable that belief in the gods dominated the masses for six centuries more, if it was already a

¹ *Clouds*, 338, seqq.

² *Droysen*, l. c.

defeated theory in its classical home at the most flourishing period of Greek democracy. But the negation of an old form of belief is always complete long before any new one is agreed upon, and it requires several generations before a new theory of the universe becomes intelligible to all. Not till then, however, can the religious faculty mould new material into its own forms. Nor indeed do the religious processes of our own epoch seem to have undergone the slightest change for the last two hundred years. The only difference is, that the doubt which from the commencement of the eighteenth century assailed a few thousand men, to-day rules millions.

Meanwhile, in spite of the apparent immobility on the surface, great advances were made within. For the essence of the religious process consists, not in the negation of old, but in the construction of new forms for the sense of dependence. The outcome of the conception of the universe based on materialistic philosophy had been religious nihilism. The gods were denied; reality was explained by finite and fortuitous causes. But the human mind could not rest satisfied with this. From the chaotic ferment of the Greek age of enlightenment, we see two religious movements arise; one, progressive, starting from the principles of the Socratic school, and with a further development as a spiritual religion; one, reactionary, seeking in the antiquated forms of the past, or in grosser Oriental nature-worship, a religious satisfaction no longer given by the Olympus which philosophers had torn to shreds and sophists desecrated. So in this period of unbelief, faltering religion, once so rich a creative power, found shelter in the mysteries, with their antiquated nature-worship and the miracle-working of their Orphic and Eleusinian initiations. Some even, unmindful of the Persian wars, bowed to the once-despised barbaric customs, the cults of Asia and Egypt—cults that in their original homes were now shrunken and shrivelled, succumbing even there to the Hellenic worship, which in comparison with them was undoubtedly a spiritual advance.

So began a period of fusion even before the time of Alexander the Great, and through this amalgamation of old and new, of native and foreign, the conceptions of the gods begin to lose their distinctness. By a continual comparison and commingling of the forms of belief, there grows up the vague conception of a universal "Divinity," which replaces belief in individual gods with an abstraction, in itself still lacking any religious distinctness, but offering the multitude a transition to the monotheism of the Socratic school, which, from the fourth century onwards, becomes more and more the universal conviction of educated men.

Even the age of the Peloponnesian war had its redeemer. It was none other than he whom Aristophanes travestied, and the Forty condemned to the hemlock draught. Starting from his practical philosophy, that we are only concerned with virtue, SOCRATES had philosophized as little over the ultimate essence of godhead as over the fundamental principles of nature.¹ But, as one of the earliest physical theologists, he believed he recognized the mark of divinity in the order of the world, and on this he based his description of the deity as an omnipotent, benevolent, all-wise, omniscient being.² The deity is the reason of the universe, and this reason in the universe is as much greater than our reason as the universe itself is greater than our body.³ This was fundamentally monotheism; but Socrates never expressed himself against the official belief in the gods. Just because the deity seemed transcendent, he was content that each nation should worship its gods according to native custom. But the physico-theological view of the world started by him, and the conception of the deity as the reason of the universe, tended to the downfall of polytheism. He who sees harmony in creation is not likely to adopt many gods, but one sole deity creating all and comprehending all. Hence we see the Socratic schools either succeeding to the tenet of the Cynics that there is only one god, and that the multiplicity of gods springs from

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 11.

² Mem. i. 4, iv. 3.

³ Mem. i. 4, 17.

the popular imagination ; or returning with the Cyrenaics and Megarians to complete identity on this point with the Sophists.

In this direction, however, Socrates' greatest pupil, PLATO, had raised the idea of God from what it is in the Socratic doctrine of knowledge, to an expression whose theoretical purity and elevation have never been surpassed—an expression which did not even lose its significance when the religious genius of Jesus established the living experience of the divine in place of a theoretical abstraction. This Platonic idea of God, however, stands in abstract antithesis to the idea of matter, and therefore is closely connected with that dualistic view of the universe which Christianity found supreme, and indeed adopted.

The origin of conceptions so utterly opposed to the plastic unity of the ancient view, lies at some distance back. One of the results arrived at by the Eleatics had been the denial of objectivity in the world of phenomena. The conception of pure being, the universal basis of things, devoid of attributes, involves unchangeability, the impossibility of any part of it coming into existence or passing away—in brief, the denial of motion. "There exist only being and not-being ; becoming has no existence whatever."¹ It is evident that absolute being, which is the ultimate basis of the universe, cannot alter spontaneously. But the world of phenomena, motion and change, does exist, and it is important to deduce it from the presupposed immovable cause. The Eleatics, PARMENIDES and ZENO, answered the problem in the negative, explaining all motion, and with it the whole world of phenomena, as a subjective illusion, a human phantasy. Every one knows their famous logical quibbles about Achilles, the arrow, and the heap, by means of which they sought to analyze dialectically the ideas of beginning, motion, increase and decrease ; that is, to show them to be self-contradictory and impossible.

The ulterior object of all these sophisms was to prove that motion is a subjective conception of the human mind, but has

¹ Aristot. *De Xenoph. Zen. et Gorg.*, chap. iii.

no part in the absolute itself. Thus the Eleatics paved the way for that denial of all objective knowledge which by the fifth century takes shape in the tenet of the Sophists:—Things are as they appear to the subject. If the very thing, viz. the fact of motion, of which the optical appearance seems to give clear proof, rests upon an illusion of our subjective organization, then there is absolutely no sort of objective knowledge, no truth. But as each individual has different sensations, and the same subject has different sensations at different times, everything is a matter of subjective presentation, opinion and volition. What I hold to be true, need not be so for you, and to-morrow perhaps will not be so for myself either.

Intoxicated with this new discovery, the Sophists took a childish pleasure in pulverizing all objective definitions with their subjective dialectic. "Man the measure of things" is their watchword. If there is no objective truth, then there is no objective duty either. The good is that for which subjective reasons can be found, and to find reasons for everything is the occupation of the Sophists. So they teach the Athenian youth to make the worse seem the better cause; teach them to dispute, to harass, to dazzle, to dupe. Nothing stands firm any longer; the world is as I see it. The pleasurable is the permissible.

Such was the condition of spiritual life when there appeared that great reformer, from whom dates one of the most momentous revolutions in the realm of thought. SOCRATES' problem was simply—Does knowledge exist? "I know that I know nothing," is the starting-point of his philosophizing. But his serious purpose is *to know*, to discover some reliable knowledge.¹ No conclusion about the objectivity of our knowledge can be drawn from the world of phenomena—"The trees and the country teach nothing."² The question is rather, whether there are

¹ Plato, *Apol.* 21 b, seqq.

² *Phædrus*, 230 d; *Xenoph. Mem.* i. 1, 11; Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte Philos.* i. p. 67, seq.

perceptions in which all rational thought must agree; whether there are ideas in every mind, laws of thought universally valid? If that is the case, then there are truths independent of the volition of the Sophists.

Accordingly, to clear up the question whether there are forms of objective knowledge, Socrates inquires, not into the external world, but into his own and others' perceptive faculties. Starting from the most every-day and trivial phenomena, and comparing particulars one with another, he eliminates the accidental and fortuitous, and so arrives at the idea which comprehends the particulars, the truth which all recognize, the principle which none contradicts.¹ Now this is a matter he prefers to thresh out in conversation with others. Dialogue is the form of his philosophizing.² He enters into another's train of thought with outward irony, of course. He follows him assenting, even where his interlocutor's thought digresses, until he reaches a knotty point, on which he convinces his adversary of having thought wrongly, and compels him to admit the definition and principle discovered in advance by the great thinker.

These ideas, then, Socrates laid down as the categories peculiar to the mind, through which it comprehends in thought the existence of things. It is the mind that brings truth into things and recognizes it in them. These ideas have so strong an objective value, that the Platonic Socrates at least set them up as distinct entities. The real Socrates can hardly have gone so far;³ yet with his doctrine of knowledge he had in any case refuted the acceptance of the old philosophy of nature, namely, that our act of knowing is a process of nature, the source of which must be looked for in the objective itself.

A generation before, Empedocles had explained the process of thought as purely materialistic. For him, all knowledge rests on the fact that the material of our bodies enters into connection with the kindred material of the outer world. The fiery eye is

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 5, 12; 6, 1.

² Plato, Apol. 28 e, 38 a.

³ Cf. Arist. Metaph. 13, 4.

connected with its kindred light, the water in the eye sees moisture; for the soul itself consists of the totality of the surrounding elements:

“Water with water, earth we see with earth,
With air the air divine, hot fire with fire,
And love with love, and strife with grievous strife.”¹

Socrates was the first to perceive within himself something different from the repetition of the external elements. The deeper meaning of his “Learn to know thyself,” uttered to the youth and citizens of Athens, was simply that he wished to show them what was the essence of the mind. His inquiry into thought and the mind brought him face to face with the great discovery that burst upon him and possessed his soul with the presage of another world, that the mind is not merely one object of nature among the rest, but belongs to a very different order of things. This was the novelty that enchained the youth of Athens; he showed them the inner world, neither subordinated to the compulsion of Nature, as the ancients thought, nor a realm of arbitrary incidents, as the Sophists say, but obedient to an objective order. The truth is not what we see, but the necessary notion of this in the mind. An intelligible world arises in contradistinction to the sensible world; the former is indubitable, everlasting, certain in itself; the latter is illusion and appearance.

Here, however, is the origin of that little rift which was soon to widen into a gaping chasm and rend asunder the ancient world. As yet the spiritual world is concealed in the human heart alone; but soon the whole universe divides into body and soul, matter and form, nature and mind, the present and the future. This was an antithesis of which the ancient world had lived in happy ignorance. It thought of gods and men, nature and mind, life and thought, heaven and earth, as combined in harmonious unity. The deepening of the inner life, the autonomy

¹ Arist. *Metaph.* 3, 4; Sextus *adv. Math.* 7, 92.

of the mind, the antithesis of the moral and natural, expressed by Socrates, were the beginning of the breach.

The course of naive directness was reversed. Ancient morality consisted in letting Nature run her course and in realizing her gifts in forms of beauty. Now, nothing more was to be done without reflection, and only self-conscious action has worth and moral meaning. Objective ethics and traditional propriety are displaced by morality based on personal consciousness.¹ But yet this thought, that made an end of the ancient objectivity, was in turn considered entirely antiquated by Socrates. It was not in antiquity to conceive of a force without a material substratum. In opposing mind to sensation, Socrates conceives his moral *ego* in turn as something objective. It is not only that the soul is an independent entity,² but, in his view, notions also are something absolute, and in the last resort even his moral consciousness appears to him as an independent subject. His own genius at times appears to him as a second *ego*. He embodies it as a dæmon, and hearkens to its revelations and oracles.³

Such, then, are the factors which determine the transition to a complete separation of an invisible yet real mental world of ideas and concepts, from a visible, material world of individual phenomena,—a separation such as Plato established by the elevation of the general ideas of the Socratic philosophy into metaphysical substances, so establishing a special region of souls, soaring above this visible world.

PLATO had brought a poet's genius to his intercourse with Socrates, and this intercourse had made a philosopher of one whom Nature had moulded as a poet. But nature will out; and the imagination in Plato suggested such problems to the intellect as could only be answered by the poet in the philosopher. The form, too, of these answers was that of poetry.

¹ Kuno Fischer, *Gesch. d. Philos.* 1, 68, seq.

² Plato, *Phædr.* 105 c, seqq.; *Apol.* 40 c, seqq.

³ *Sympos.* 174 d, seqq., 220 c, seqq.; Hegel, *Hist. Philos.* 2, 77; Zeller, *op. cit.*, 2, 62, seqq.

Plato invested them in myth such as had been the atmosphere of the oldest philosophy of religion. The dialectical movement is clothed in narrative form; the thoughts become figures, and their conceptual development history. Filled with a vague instinct, the poet had his own way of approaching riddles of existence for ever inaccessible to the methods of logic. At the same time, however, his philosophic discussion not infrequently trenches on the province of religious belief; and here in part lies the great significance of Plato for the religious development of future centuries. For the axioms of the philosopher's belief, thus invested in a garb of myth, do not demand exact knowledge; while belief in a supersensuous world is by nature religion.

In this garb, then, Plato was able to give a representation of the world beyond in terms of sensible perception, so making his philosophic meaning comprehensible to all, and therefore popular. The general notions which Socrates had discovered in the mind, and which Plato also held firmly as the principle of knowledge, appeared to his artistic and plastic thought as special beings with an objective existence above the sensible world. If the possibility of knowledge rests solely on these notions, they cannot exist merely through us and for us, but must possess a certain share of reality themselves. So they exist for Plato in a supra-mundane spot, the sole domain of truth, where gods and spotless souls dwell and delight themselves in the contemplation of these ideas.¹

Here the dualism of the sensible and intellectual worlds was first completed. Matter, as an infinitely divisible, indeterminate mass, has no reality. It is continually changing, continually becoming, continually perishing; but it never exists. Hence it is also called Not-being. Consequently, our knowledge cannot rest upon this, for what is in a state of flux cannot give knowledge.² But amid all this change, one thing is ever fixed, con-

¹ Phæd. 247 c, seqq.; Tim. 28 a.

² Arist. Metaph. 13, 4; Plato, Crat. 386 d, 439 c, seq.

stant and essential, and this is the general idea. In the change of sense-perception, always involved in the transition from the "was" to the "will be," nothing is left but the universal notions of permanent and transitory, living and dead, genus and species, and the qualities of the good, the beautiful and the ugly. Accordingly, these are the enduring elements, and are therefore the real basis of the universe. Earthly things in their transition are only the shadows and images of these universal ideas, which exist in the region of truth in perpetual self-identity, undisturbed by the alterations of earthly things, which partake of them.¹ Thus the idea is the reality of the universe; without it, phenomena would not exist. The world of phenomena owes homage for its very existence to the world of ideas appearing within it. Its existence is conditioned, not by the material substratum, but by the form, which defines it from the remaining nothingness. Therefore, before the creation of the world, two realms stood in absolute antithesis to one another; on the one hand, the world of ideas, reposing on self-identity as the eternal type; on the other, a chaotic, formless mass, fluctuating irregularly, and incapable of acquiring form and consequently true being.

Now the reason why the eternal beauty and lucidity of the ideal world produced a faint impress of themselves in the sensible world, was that the Demiurge or Creator, under the sanction of God, fashioned this world with his gaze steadfastly fixed upon the world of ideas. He takes the world-soul or scheme—that is to say, the unseen, dynamic principle of the order and motion of the world—as the image of the eternal idea, and spreads it out like a vast network or scaffolding over the whole expanse of space destined to be occupied by the sensible world. Then he divides space into two spheres, the firmament of the fixed stars and the firmament of the planets, and gives the chaotic mass existence by separating it into four elements. Next he shapes the organic world out of these, still regarding the ideas and following their forms. In this the world-soul

¹ Symp. 211 a.

dwells as its vital principle, so that even the world is called a living creature.¹ Here, then, Plato returns to the questions of cosmogony, deliberately passed over by Socrates, and presents his myth almost in the poetic style of the ancient bards.

He is no less ready to raise questions with regard to the spirit of man, that only can be answered by the poet, not the philosopher. How, he asks, did the soul that Socrates watched for and recognized as a thing of nature apart, enter into this material body? Once more this question of the imagination finds in imagination its answer, viz. the assumption of the soul's pre-existence. After the fashioner of the world, we are told in the *Timæus*,² had created the walls of the universe and the gods (the constellations), he required the gods to produce mortal beings. So the gods created the human body and the perishable part of the soul, while he himself prepared its immortal part in the same vessel in which he had prepared the world-soul before. Now he made just as many immortal souls as there are constellations, and set each on one star, so that from thence they looked forth upon the whole universe, and then were to be implanted in human bodies. In the first place, all were to enter the world in the highest form of human existence, as men. Then, whoever in this first life on earth overcomes his passions, may return again to happy life on his star; he who does not achieve this must, after a second birth, complete a second pilgrimage, but in a less perfect form, as a woman; by persistence in evil, however, he must sink down to the level of the beasts. In the *Phædrus*,³ Plato has more definitely described the enclosing of the soul in the body as a punishment for previous sinfulness. The car of the soul was drawn by two winged steeds, one lofty spirit striving upwards, the other, desire, dragging downwards. With this car the soul mounts aloft to the fields of truth. "The chariots of the gods (the constellations) drive in order, with Jupiter, the leader of all, at their head. So the soul beholds reality and lives in the contemplation of truth, as she

¹ *Tim.* pp. 30, 31.

² *Tim.* 41, seqq.

³ *Phædr.* 246, seqq.

follows the revolving courses of the gods. She beholds justice, temperance and knowledge, absolute, not in the form of created things or of things relative, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute." "When the soul returns from this contemplation, the driver, putting up the horses at the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink. This is the life of the gods. Other souls, however, through some fault of the driver or the horses, fall into confusion; they come out of those heavenly regions with torn plumage; they cease to see truth, and feed upon opinion, and fall to earth. In proportion, then, as a soul has seen more or less, it reaches a higher or lower position."

Yet some vague feeling, some remembrance of its higher origin, some longing after its heavenly home, still remains in the soul. Its pinions grow anew and gain strength. Recollecting what it has once seen, it is carried away by enthusiasm, as often as it gazes on any form of beauty or justice. Its very reasoning and knowledge are but a reminiscence of the ideas that once it saw in the fields of truth. When the thinking man develops the general notion from perceptions, and advances from individual objects to the concept, then his soul beholds the idea; that is to say, the soul, reduced to perplexity by the consciousness of her ignorance, recollects herself, so that for a moment the remembrance of the archetype awakens within her. Hence, too, anamnesis, or reminiscence, is the Ariadne's clue by which the soul at last finds her way back to the fields of truth. Should she plunge deeper in ignorance, should she wholly lose the remembrance of her eternal home, she will be drowned in sensuality. Punished after death with a thousand years' incarceration, she must choose herself another body; but can only return to those blessed fields which were her home before she sank down to earth, if she has thrice chosen the life of a philosopher.

We are now on the line taken by the after-generations of Plato's followers. All life, all light, all clearness, are laid up in

that other world; here below is nothing but shadow, seeming and death. Above are the ideas—here, the shadow of the ideas; above, blessedness—here, the soul confined in the prison of the body; above, the deity that brings us to happiness—here, matter that draws us ever deeper into its slough. This fatal dualism, introduced into Greek thought by Socrates, had consequently not stopped at the separation of mind and body, but had rent the whole world asunder. That antique view of the world, in which man thought himself at one with nature, was left behind. A sense of estrangement from the world had come over man. His soul, he grew conscious, sprang from another world; his true home was not here; the problems of life did not end with the duties of a citizen, but bade him aspire to things above.

Now while Platonic philosophy became more and more the view of all thinkers, there grew out of it certain fundamental views concerning natural religion—a religion, that is, resting purely on philosophical premisses—agreed to by most of those who had emancipated themselves from the established worship. The corner-stone of this was a moral monotheism. If Plato's "ideas" are the essential, the lasting, the good, then the Highest Idea, in which all things are comprehended and have their being, is the only real reality, better than the good, fairer than the beautiful. God consequently is the absolutely perfect being, to which all good owes its existence. That there can be only one such God, is implicit in the conception of the Highest Idea.¹ This deity, moreover, is unchangeable, because perfection can only change for the worse. Further, God is the absolute truth, as he knows all and deceives none; almighty, as everything exists through him; all-benevolent, as he has provided all for the best.² In other words, since God, according to the conception of him as the Highest Idea, is the absolutely real and good, all predicates of perfection are transferred to him in their highest potentiality.

One of the fundamental premisses of the Platonic schools, then, was monotheism. Although the Academy, properly speaking,

¹ Polit. 269 e.

² Timæus, 28, seqq.; Rep. 380 d, seqq.

had no experience of God, still it was from the first endowed with the noblest theological conception of God ever produced. Plato had come to terms with the popular divinities so far as to identify them with the stars and elements, and to this the religion of Nature willingly lent its aid. He makes the world-soul Zeus, the sun Apollo, the moon Artemis, and so forth. However, this took away from his monotheism no more than in later times belief in angels and worship of saints did from Christian monotheism, there being the greatest conceivable distance between the all-embracing primary idea and created spirits. Thus monotheism could count as being firmly established among all thinkers, in spite of the continued existence of polytheistic worship. From this time, too, the belief in the future life of the soul and its relation to the present life, gains a deeper foundation and fuller meaning. The obscure tradition of the mysteries attaches itself to the dualistic view of the new school and is supported by it. Even Homer had perhaps conceived of a life of the dead in Hades; and in Sophocles, Antigone consoles herself with the approbation of the dead whom she is soon to meet:

“My time for pleasing men will soon be over,
Not so my duty toward the Dead. My home
Yonder will have no end.”¹

In place of the wide-spread belief thus hinted at, Plato could now establish a thoroughly popular conception of the fate of the soul after death, based upon his whole scheme of the universe, and connected also with the cult of the mysteries. Thus in the Republic we find phrases about the existence of the soul after death which have passed almost unchanged into universal eschatology. “After their departure, souls come to a spot where they are judged; thence the just are conducted on the right hand to heaven, and the unjust on the left to earth. Both, in tenfold retribution for their actions, have to complete a journey of a thousand years, which for the latter is full of woe, for the

¹ Antig. 74, seqq.

former full of blessed contemplation, and only the very greatest sinners are cast outright into Tartarus."¹

Now in proportion as later thinkers come under Plato's influence, reflections upon the immortality of the soul, the day of judgment and the life eternal, become a favourite subject for their meditations. In the "Dream of Scipio,"² Cicero, who reckons himself of the New Academy, gives a visionary description of the life and progress of the blest in the form of a symposium. Among the Stoics, Seneca especially, who in many other respects was dominated by Plato, describes the temporal life in almost Christian terms as a mere prelude to a better, the body as a harbourage for the soul, and heaven as the true home. Just as with the early Christians, he calls the day of his death "the birthday of eternity," and this body a wanderer's shelter and a burden,³ so elsewhere he passes into truly religious meditations upon the freedom and blessedness of the heavenly life, where all the secrets of nature stand revealed in the light of knowledge. All the elements of our belief in immortality, including re-union after death, communion with departed souls, enjoyment of divine glory in sight of the constellations wheeling below Elysium, are to be found in Cicero and Seneca, as well as the conception of death as a day of judgment when sentence is passed on each, and which man therefore meets with fear and trembling.⁴ In the same way, Plutarch gladly lingers awhile over the thought of the life to come, in which "God is our guide and king, to whom we attach ourselves, that with full hearts we may gaze upon the unutterable, and for men unnameable, beauty."⁵

¹ Rep. x. 614, seqq.

² Rep. vi. 17.

³ Ep. 102, 14, seqq.; 65, 16, seq.; cf. Baur, Seneca and Paul, *Zeitschrift für Wissensch. Theol.* 1st yearly vol., pp. 65, 221; Zeller, *Philos. der Gr.* iii. 1, 187.

⁴ Cic. l.c.; Seneca, *Consol. ad Marc.* 24, 5; 19, 6; *Consol. ad Polyb.* 9, 3; 8; Ep. 102; 28, 79, 12. The *hora decretoria*, Ep. 102, 24; 26, 4; 108, 2.

⁵ Plut. *De Is.* 79.

We can therefore point to the belief in a holy God, an eternal life, and retribution after death, as the essential and primitive root of religious conviction in the Platonic schools. True, these abstract convictions had not strength to grow into a positive popular religion. Still, the first to become the germ of a secret church would have been the belief in immortality, already appearing as a cult in the mysteries, with its hierophants and mystagogues, had it not been too arbitrary a combination of crude nature-worship and speculative thought to satisfy advancing culture on the one hand and religious needs on the other. Without an actual impulse in history, the new view of life could not have crystallized into a firm and comforting religious conviction; but assuredly, should the impulse be given, the lines on which consolidation must proceed were already laid down. Here was the blank outline, only needing to be filled up with living colours by the genius of religion, in order to offer a conception of the universe that could satisfy alike the cultivated and the common man. To raise religious need to such a level that the quickening impulse necessarily awakens in unsatisfied aspirations, and the mind becomes creative, was the task of those last two centuries B.C., which were granted such scant measure of earthly happiness.

3. SUBJECTIVE MORALITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSE OF SIN.

Great minds often create a new epoch in the world, not so much through the problems they set themselves to solve, as by breaking down the barriers of conventional ideas and clearing the ground for the development of future generations. Socrates proposed to cope with the scepticism of the Sophists; but the outcome of his philosophy was very different from what he proposed. In fact, the principle he advanced to combat the

Sophistic denial of all knowledge, did far more to destroy the foundations of the ancient views than did Sophistic itself. For him, absolute truth lay not in actuality, but in the mind and the ideas and principles contained in it. These were to be the standard and measure for every tradition and every postulate. This self-conscious action alone is moral, and hence virtue is a science. Man had taken himself as a principle; he appealed from the external world to the laws of his inner being. No greater revolution could conceivably have occurred in the ancient world, than for personal conscience to take the place of traditional morality as the standard of life.

This involved the re-consideration of all the common thoughts of mankind, the alteration of all conceptions of merit, the re-adjustment of all ends of human exertion. In former times it was a current axiom in Hellas, that the whole is prior to the part, the state to the individual; the individual is a member of the state, is contained in the state, and exists for the good of the state. Consequently ethics and politics were identical in the eyes of the Greeks, since the individual had no duties for himself, but only for the state.¹ He owed everything to the state; but the state owed nothing to him, any more than the body owes anything to the member. Therefore political ingratitude is a matter of course to the Greeks, and ostracism a natural function of political life, against which individual merit has no claim. As mind is a part of nature, so the individual is a part of the state.

Socrates had really upset these ancient views by bidding each individual, on the contrary, seek the principles of thought and action in his own mind. Ethics, or popular custom, becomes morality; in other words, the individual agent acting according to principles is set up in opposition to custom. The standard of good is no longer Athens, but each individual. The agent is to become independent, and no longer an atom of the state. The

¹ Cf. Kuno Fischer, *Gesch. d. Phil.* 1, 51, seq.

final aim of mankind is not the well-being of the state, but the virtuous life of the individual.

Starting from such a point of view, Socrates' immediate disciple Antisthenes, the father of the Cynics, had forthwith laid down his principle of setting little value on public life, and seeking virtue "by the shortest way," that is, to shape one's life according to one's own inner light, careless of state, law and custom. While he, however, saw the ideal condition of men in their release from every claim upon them, the founder of the Hedonists, Aristippus, sought the problem of life instead in the greatest possible and most serene enjoyment. The agent is to subordinate circumstances to himself, not himself to circumstances, and everything to the end of obtaining personal pleasure, which is the highest object of life. Thus the subjective principle of Socrates degenerated even with his earliest disciples into philosophic egoism and anti-social tendencies.

Plato, too, although denying the right of the individual in contradistinction to the state, still exercised the most searching criticism upon the existing state, and practically withdrew from it altogether. If Greek civic life had still been able to satisfy the better sort of men, such a tendency, perhaps, would never have prevailed. But ever since Cleon the tanner dominated the model Greek state, there was no place left in Greece for Socrates' disciples. The state had deservedly become the object of Aristophanic comedy. With the ruin of Greek autonomy, the time had come for the philosophy of the Ego. The states of Macedon, of the Diadochi, of Rome, were no longer the actual foundation of individual life. The Roman state is no longer the whole that existed before the parts; it is an aggregate in which the part preceded the whole.¹ The sum of private rights made up the legal Roman state.

Ethics, then, or conduct as a member of the state, gives way to morality—that is to say, the conduct of the individual. The motives of ancient conduct have disappeared from history; the

¹ Cf. Kuno Fischer, *Gesch. d. Phil.* 1, 69.

agent regards himself in his private position. For the most part, when the Roman monarchy completely put an end to the public life of the individual citizen, thought was driven inward upon itself, and sought in itself the laws of justice, goodness and morality, which had long since vanished from common life. "To transform oneself without regarding any others," is now the only problem of the wise man.¹ "The tender character, not yet set firm in goodness, must be kept far from the world; it is easy to join the majority," says the great philosopher of the Neronian age, characteristically.² "Never," he complains, "do I return home in the same moral condition as when I went out."³

Thus the centuries between Philip of Macedon and our period are the most flourishing period of the Socratic schools, which no longer make the good of the whole, but the happiness and virtue of the individual, the subject of their philosophy. The problem of the wise man is to bring his Ego, as opposed to the world, into a right condition, so that nothing can break his resolution, nothing disturb his repose and peace. *Autarkeia*, *Ataraxia*, *Apathia*, are the watchwords of the new schools.⁴

The whole world is referred to the individual in systematic form. The philosophy of the morally intending Ego is Stoicism; that of the self-indulgent Ego is Epicureanism; that of the perceptive Ego is Scepticism. Virtue, enjoyment, doubt, each by itself, was now the tendency of the schools, which do not so much treat metaphysical problems as seek rules of wisdom in life which shall help the individual towards happiness.⁵ At bottom, both the Stoic and Epicurean schools were at one in their object. Both desired repose, peace, freedom of mind. Only the method was different. The Stoic seeks it in a right condition of himself; the Epicurean, in knowledge of the means of felicity. The one seeks a strong self, that nothing can tempt; the other, a secure self, by avoidance of evil. Both problems, however, expand into endless casuistry, and whole tomes are filled with

¹ Seneca, Ep. 5, 6.² Ep. 7.³ Ibid.⁴ Ep. 9, 14.⁵ Kuno Fischer, *Gesch. d. Philos.* 1. 68, seq.

the question, how the wise man is free even in the greatest pain, or can actually change the pain into pleasure.

The essential meaning, then, of the Stoic inferences is, that the wise man may do nothing derogatory to himself, that he must maintain the same equanimity and indifferent bearing towards outward things, and must guard his honour all the more jealously as external conditions become more hostile. Rules of conduct for each and every case are set forth, and Cicero praises it as the special superiority of the Stoic school that, from the highest problem of knowledge down to the merest particular case, it does not leave its disciples without rule and counsel, as in fact all human pains, from the limitation of knowledge to gout and chalk-stones, find notice here. The conclusion of these diffuse considerations, then, forms the ideal of the wise man, in which the school embodied their abstract conception of virtue. Instead of the concrete virtue of the classical period, as it existed in the grand figures of the ancients, a pale ideal had been discovered, including all possible perfections but one, namely, reality.

It is to the honour of the Porch that in a period of corruption it clung firmly to the moral idea. The fact that it set up a wise man in himself, an abstract ideal, distinct from all national and political elements, simply corresponded to the universalism of the Roman period, in which national peculiarities had disappeared. But it was this very abstraction from the actual world that turned the doctrine of virtue, as taught by the Porch, into empty rhetoric. The wisdom of the Stoic is a dissertation on his own lofty sentiment; but as he turned away from life and renounced the improvement of life and the world, his wisdom perforce remained for ever an empty and unfruitful dissertation. Thus there is no finer reading than Seneca's moral works; but the virtue of Nero's minister did not satisfy the empire, for the highest principle of Stoic virtue was "self-sufficiency."

Similar results followed from the Epicurean wisdom. The knowledge that aimed at securing the highest amount of pleasure

for life was, in fact, another doctrine of virtue, since the master said, "Without virtue, no pleasure"¹ only this also becomes an egoistic system, with its casuistry as to what pain is outweighed by what pleasure, and what pleasure is to be avoided by reason of what pain; a system in which things signify nothing except in their relation to the wise man. The world has interests only so far as it concerns him; and he troubles himself about the world just so far as his pleasures require. But it is perfectly futile to inquire how many pleasures can be created out of art, knowledge or wisdom, for art and knowledge do not exist for our gratification. It is not in this way that the desired happiness is to be found. Whoever strives to win the world for himself will always be unhappy. Happiness comes only to those who forget themselves, who give themselves up to things. Then only it is possible to feel the harmony of the whole, and to be swept along with it in bliss; but so long as a man makes himself the fixed point round which everything else is to revolve, he will find the world discordant. This was the fundamental error of the Stoic and Epicurean schools.

The same practical ground was taken by the New Academy, and, in succession to it, by the sceptical school, which sought the principles of the happy life in right knowledge. This meant, we must know what things are, if we would live happily. But do we know this? To know whether a phenomenon corresponds to some reality, the thinking subject would need to separate himself from himself, in order to compare the representation and the object, and to be assured of their agreement. Thus the inquiry leads back to the doubt of the objectivity of our perceptions, and the sceptical school sought the supreme calm of the thinking subject in the very certainty that we cannot get to learn the reality of things.

The old scepticism does not doubt about the truth of its per-

¹ Clamat Epicurus non posse jucunde vivi, nisi sapienter, honeste justequē vivatur. Cic. De Fin. 1, 18; Tusc. 3, 20; 5, 32.

ceptions; it is certain of their falsity.¹ The sceptic knows that his perceptions are only the reflex movements of his organization, not the things themselves; and this certainty gives him inward calm and certainty. His doubt is not touched with grief nor infinite longing; it gives him, so at least he says, rest and peace; for why should he let himself be troubled with things which appear evil, but perhaps do not really exist? We should needs hesitate and shrink before an objective consciousness. The sceptic, however, who has delivered himself from the illusion of the objective, is superior to apparent pleasure or pain. "For," says Sextus Empiricus, "as the wise man cannot discern what is good and what is bad, he reaches equanimity by reserving his approbation. For should he consider anything as good or evil by nature, he is always disturbed, whether it be that he does not possess what he considers good, or that he imagines he is tormented by the natural evil. He, however, who is undecided as to what is good or bad by nature, draws back and pursues nothing with eagerness, and thus remains serene."² Thus Pyrrho, the contemporary of Alexander, during a storm that terrified his pupils, called their attention to a pig that remained unconcerned and went on eating quietly, to show how only uncertainty produces the serenity in which the wise man should rest.³ Fundamentally, then, this school also, which apparently took up again the purely theoretical question of the possibility of objective perceptions, had only to shape the practical aim, the freedom of the thinking subject, the serenity and spiritual calm of the wise man. Like the rest, the problem of the sceptical school was not knowledge, but happiness conditioned by knowledge.

Thus we see all these movements urged on by the strong desire to find the individual soul a new centre of gravity to rest at. The security and equilibrium, formerly lent by the connec-

¹ Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. 7, 287, 293, seq.

² Sext. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. c. 6, § 12.

³ Diog. Laert. 9, 68.

tion with the state, had to be obtained by the Ego from the Stoic doctrine of duty, the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure, and the sceptical renunciation of objective knowledge. Oscillating from this side to that, and fallen from their connection with the whole, men seek their own centre of gravity in order to stand firm again—but do not find it. For beneath all the conclusions of the Stoics that nothing troubles the wise man, beneath all the Epicurean reflections that the sting of pain is broken by philosophy, beneath the desperate reasonings of Scepticism that the objective is nothing but a product of our own thought and hence cannot harm us—beneath all this logic, runs the same under-current of melancholy, indirectly confessing that this belauded *ataraxia* and *apathia*, this vaunted pleasure and enjoyment, do not exist. When peace with oneself and nature becomes a philosophic problem, we may be certain that it is lacking. It belongs only to the times that do not talk about it.

Here, however, we have whole centuries filled with treatises as to how the “I” is to behave in all imaginable situations so as to be happy, and the upshot is a *non liquet*. Stoic self-sufficiency and Epicurean egoism, solitary virtue and solitary enjoyment, reach the same result, viz. that human nature is far too weak a vessel to sail contrary to the whole world. Scepticism, however, the sovereignty of the thinking subject, has likewise gained nothing but the supremely destructive unrest of everlasting dialectical movement. It had sought the rest of the Ego, the insensibility of the wise man, and had found the necessity of the unceasing opposition to every positive assumption. Thus the Porch comes to the knowledge that man is too weak for happiness; the Epicurean confesses, the world is too bad for happiness; and the Sceptic says angrily, man and world are too problematic for happiness.

The moral self and the pleasure-seeking self struggle with the world to conquer it, but their opposition converts the world into a hostile power, a thing of evil. The last resort, therefore, both of the Stoic and the Epicurean was suicide. The wise man

can never succumb; he can never be unhappy, for he can at least kill himself.¹ *Patet exitus*. The nominal victory over the world consists in flight from it; the salvation of one's personality is self-annihilation. "Do you see," cries Seneca pathetically, in the treatise on Anger, "do you see yonder precipitous height? There is a way down from thence to happiness. Do you see that ocean, that river, that well? Down in those depths lies freedom. Do you see that stunted, withered tree? There hangs freedom. Do you see your neck, your throat, your heart? Those are the places of salvation from bondage."² These were performances that soon became popular in every school. "Death is no evil," was the meaning of it all; "for if we exist, it is nothing; and if it exists, we are nothing."³ Consequently it is always in our power to exchange what is evil for what is no evil.

In this, however, both the Porch and Epicurus proclaimed their philosophy bankrupt, for suicide is no virtue, and still less a pleasure—no conquest of self, but its overthrow. With the attempt of the Ego to rise above itself, all the non-ego became evil for it. Life is an evil; the world is an evil; and finally, individuality itself, too weak for this self, is an evil also.⁴

Here the Græco-Roman world had reached a point from which Judaism had started. Joy in personal nobility was left behind. From generation to generation rose a louder wail over the frailty of human nature, the weakness of mortals, the natural sinfulness of man, who can in no way please the gods, and on whom therefore the anger of the gods weighs heavy. The complaint raised by Hebrew conscience in the dawn of history, becomes the evening invocation of Hellenic philosophy. Sin and the misery of sin surround the wise man on every side. Immediately it is the body, "the flesh," that bears the blame for the disproportion between our will and our performance. "This body," says Seneca, "is the soul's burden and

¹ Seneca, Ep. 4, 12.

² Seneca, De Ira, 3, 15.

³ Seneca, Ep. 4.

⁴ Seneca, Ad. Polyb. 9, 6: *omnis vita supplicium—nullus portus nisi mortis*. Ad Marc. 11, 1; Ep. 102, 22.

penalty; it weighs heavy on it and holds it in fetters."¹ "That which is visible, these limbs set about with muscles and the skin stretched over them, and the ministering hands and all else that envelops us, are fetters and darkenings of souls. By them the soul is hidden, clogged, and tainted; turned from the truth and all that belongs to truth, and cast into illusions. Its whole struggle with this oppressive body is to avoid being led astray or becoming attached to it. It strives to reach the point whence it was sent forth. There eternal peace awaits it, and there, after the confused and material, it beholds the pure and clear."²

Perhaps we might think that Seneca looks for the seat of sin solely in the flesh, and in fact the philosopher exclaims most pathetically in one of his letters: "I am greater and born to greater ends than by any possibility to be the slave of my body, which I simply regard as a fetter put on my liberty. I abandon it to fate, and let no wound pierce through it to my real self."³ But this writer of letters has hours of greater insight, in which he perceives that sin has its seat deeper, in the very soul; and that the discourse he offers about its freedom is no more than words. "I toss upon a sea of mere imperfections," he exclaims dolorously.⁴ "The human spirit is by nature perverse, and hankers after the forbidden and the perilous."⁵ Then in impressive words he utters a warning against the error that he himself committed: "Only let no one deceive himself. Our error is not external to us, it is within and clings to our inmost parts. The reason why we are so slow of cure is that we do not know we are ill. One must begin the moulding of character before it is hardened in perversity."⁶ "Cast from thee what rends thy heart; and if it can be removed in no other way, the heart itself must be torn out."⁷

Accordingly, Seneca goes beyond Plato in realizing that sin has

¹ Ep. 65.

² *Ad Marciam*, 24.

³ Ep. 65.

⁴ *De Vita*, 6, 18.

⁵ *De Clementia*, 1, 24.

⁶ Ep. 29, 8.

⁷ Ep. 51, 13.

fixed its seat in our soul itself; and while he does not mistake its inward action, he recognizes that outwardly it dominates all mankind. "We are one and all slaves to sin; only the wise man drags at his cross, the fool drives more nails in."¹ It sounds like a Latin version of the well-known passage in the Psalms, when Seneca says: "How many judges are there who do not themselves fall under the law; how many complainants free from guilt? We have all of us erred, one more grievously, another less; one deliberately, another impelled by circumstances or even seduced by the wickedness of another. Sometimes we have not been firm enough in good resolutions, and have lost our innocence against our will and in spite of resistance. And not only have we transgressed—we shall stumble to the uttermost end of our life."² "It was the complaint of our forefathers, it is our own complaint, it will be the complaint of posterity, that morals are perverted, that corruption reigns, and that mankind is degenerating and everything holy falling into decay. But this always is and always will be the same. Only from time to time there is an inclination to this side or that, like waves of the sea that continually bear the incoming flood further back, and hold back the ebb closer to the shore. Vices do not remain fixed in one and the same place, but move and vary in constant unrest, and follow or fly one another. However, we shall always be able to say of ourselves, we are evil, we have been evil, and, I must actually add, will be so in the future as well."³

So cheerless, hopeless and dispirited, was the outlook of Nero's companion upon his own time and upon futurity. The mood as of a day of repentance had come over the world and its thinkers, ever since they had laboured in vain to find within themselves some support and consolation against the ills of the world without. Doubt and infinite pain are the impress of the time; but it is the strong pain of an unbroken generation, not the sickly sentimentality of feeble souls. Heathendom had recognized human nature for the first time as sinful, and this world as a vale of

¹ *De Vita beata*, ch. 16, 19.

² *De Clem.* 1, 6.

³ *De Benef.* 1, 10.

tears. But the consequence was the further question: To what end is this corrupt state of the world and human nature, if the Deity is the world-reason, according to the Stoics, or, according to the Platonists, wiser than wisdom and better than goodness?

The assumption that matter opposes an insuperable resistance to the divine actions and the realization of ideas, no longer sufficed for advanced pessimism. Thus the greatest thinker of the first century, Plutarch of Chæronea, in whom Platonism and Stoicism were balanced, rather to the advantage of the former, was driven to the assumption of a principle of evil, since to make God the primary cause of so bad a world is to destroy the very idea of God. In his own forcible expression, he cannot picture God to himself as a vintner, who pours good out of one vessel and evil out of another;¹ but beside the principle of good stands a principle of evil, hostile to God. This alone gives the key to the disparities and contradictions which distract the sublunary world. "Since nothing exists without a cause, and the good cannot become the cause of evil, evil, no less than good, must have its own peculiar cause." Plutarch, then, seeks this cause of evil in the evil god who opposes the good, and he expressly testifies that this belief in a devil is the view of "most and best philosophers."² Some call this evil being the Dæmon, others Ahriman, others Typho, others Hades and Ares. Plutarch thinks he has discovered this belief in an evil being even among the ancients, and the assumption, ascribed by him to Plato, that an evil world-spirit stands beside the good one, seems to him most correct.

It follows that matter is no longer the hindrance of the good, but that there is a destructive spiritual power that wills evil and contrives harm, whether known by the name of Typho or Hades. Thus the pagan consciousness of sin was not without the concrete religious representation of a diabolic power, in which the intenser consciousness of evil personifies evil itself. Whether or not frequent contact with the Jews led Greek thought to this

¹ Plut. De Is. 45.

² De Is. 46. See further, Vol. iv. Part 1, ch. 3.

view, the appropriation of it at once establishes a radical breach with all presuppositions of Greek thought, which considered man good by nature, and opposed this cheerful world of light to gloomy Hades.

4. THE NEED FOR REDEMPTION.

The fruitless search of practical philosophy to find in its own power all conditions requisite to the "happy life," had engendered the need of an objective redemption. The longing after help from above, which runs through this time so strongly, was the result of higher self-examination as cultivated by the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. Yet it was unmistakable that, since the beginning of the empire, the mere need of the time had contributed much to sharpen this sting of self-knowledge. Humanity was exhausted by its efforts in the conquest of the world and the civil wars, enervated by vices that were restrained by no fear of God or man, afflicted by a despotism that had placed the sword in the hands of a single family in which madness was hereditary. There was nothing but helped to heighten the feeling that individualistic philosophy was a failure. The world had been recognized as an evil by the Epicureans; men as sinners by the Stoics; and the history of each day confirmed this knowledge. Thus philosophy of the imperial age soon had no other problem than the redemption of man from the vices of the time and from the sinfulness of his own heart.

According to Epictetus, philosophizing means learning what to desire and what to avoid. The beginning of philosophy is the consciousness of one's own weakness and need of help. He who would become good must first be convinced that he is bad. The philosopher is a physician to whom the sick come, and not the sound; he does not teach, he heals; and his problem is to bring his disciples to a sense of their own wretchedness and ignorance.¹

¹ Cf. Zeller's remarks on him, *Phil. der Griech.* iii. 1, p. 662.

The confidence of the earlier Stoics in the excellence of our nature had now been left so far behind, that "wise" no longer means "living according to nature," but curing nature, improving her, and remedying her deficiencies as far as possible. Stoic self-sufficiency is deeply, nay irremediably, shaken. The cure of morally sick mankind is now regarded as the chief object of philosophy, and with ardour far different from that of Zeno's or Epicurus' time, the young men come to the teacher with the prayer, "Deliver us from evil."

In one point, however, the end of the school reverts to the ethics of its beginning. The philosopher becomes simply a physician of the soul, like Socrates. Philosophy limits itself at the outset to ethical problems, and the aim of the pupil is individual improvement.

Now just as the Stoic school was formed from the Cynic, so the name and the methods of the Cynic school spring anew from the Stoic at the beginning of the imperial age. We see numerous apostles of freedom from all necessities, physicians of the soul and midwives of virtue, as Socrates termed himself, who preach principles of self-improvement to the masses, and gather the youth around them for practical courses. Preachers of morality and moral inspectors of others according to their vocation, they come in contact with the wide-spread need of salvation. Persons of high reputation, like Seneca's friend Demetrius,¹ seek to set straight this time of moral laxity with all ideals of the life that is free from necessities.

But the age of Socrates was past. The philosophy of the street soon became a public scandal. By importunity, impudence and self-advertisement, these younger Cynics all too soon brought the whole business of professional virtue into disrepute, so that in Lucian's time the Cynic was regarded exactly as the mendicant friar is to-day. The old schools of philosophy rose in comparison with these vagrant philosophers; moreover, the desolation of public life brought them many disciples. But deliver-

¹ Senec. Benef. 7, 11.

ance from evil, not truth, is the special problem which the better sort were striving to solve.

First of all, the Stoic and Epicurean schools sought this saving hand entirely within the existing world. Granted that the individual is too weak to evolve the right system of life from himself, then the friend, the teacher, the wise man, is there to set his life right after the model of his own. "We must seek out for ourselves," says Epicurus, "some noble man, whom we have continually before our eyes, so that we live as if he regarded us, and ever act as if he saw the action."¹ Yet since the halo round the friend's head vanishes all too soon, and that mournful hour never fails to come when we recognize that the other was no stronger than we were, the *Porch* refers to the heroes of old or to the ideal of the wise man, of which the school had much to say. "Keep one in your heart," cries Seneca to a friend, "to honour him with a reverence that can sanctify your inmost being. Happy the man who improves not through his circumstances, but through his thought first. Happy, too, the man who knows how to reverence another so that he can at once rule and mould himself by his memory of him. Then choose yourself a Cato; or should he be too austere, choose a man of more gentle temper, a Lælius; choose some one whose deeds and words please you, who bore a lovable soul in his demeanour; him keep ever before your eyes, your guardian and your model. I tell you, we need something upon which to mould our character. You cannot make the crooked straight without a levelling-line."² And the school sought diligently enough after such patterns. The worth of Aristides, the praise of Themistocles, Epaminondas' virtue and Cato's glory, were the never-ending theme of the schools of rhetoric, and a Plutarch devoted his life to setting chosen heroes before the souls of youth for all time.

But the very wealth of exemplars revealed the deficiencies of each. The quarrel as to which was greatest, made them all little; and soon Diogenes was not poor enough for the students,

¹ Seneca, Ep. 11.

² Ep. 11.

nor Epaminondas brave enough, nor Cato enough of Cato.¹ It went with the historical as with the living ideals; and so the final conclusion of the matter was, that even the wise man was only human.²

Thus men found themselves finally thrown back upon supernatural aid in order to escape from the state of weakness and dissatisfaction that was felt with so much pain. The demand for salvation consequently became religious. From the purely theoretical side, the Stoic school stood nearest to the thought that man could only be reconciled to the world if first reconciled to the Deity. The reason why they were so nearly concerned with this knowledge was, that they defined the happy life as life in harmony with nature, and on the other hand conceived of God himself as the essence of the world, the moving principle of nature. As Aristotle had once more incorporated Plato's ideal world in the visible world and denied it separate existence, it necessarily followed that the highest idea, God, was only to be sought in the world.

Thus the Stoics had identified God and the soul of the world. God is the active and formative power of matter, the reason in things and the principle of motion, and therefore is also called *Pneuma*, *Logos* or *Dæmon*. This immanent reason, however, is described by Seneca as divine Providence that loves us as a father, and desires not only to be feared, but also loved.³ From this point of view, then, "life according to nature," in which the older Stoics sought happiness, can only be defined as obedience to the Deity, subjection to his will, and life in God. Epictetus especially, Seneca's younger contemporary, treats at length of how our whole life ought to be a hymn of praise to the Deity.⁴ The Deity is our pattern and our help; he has equipped us with all the conditions of happiness, and if we subject ourselves to his will, we shall be happy.

¹ *De Vita beata*, 18.

² *Ep.* 71.

³ *De Prov.* 15, p. 2, 6; *Benef.* ii. 29, 4—6, iv. 19, 1; *De Ira*, ii. 27, 1, &c.

⁴ Cf. Zeller, *Phil. der Gr.* iii. 1, p. 665.

In this feeling of the nearness of God, and the intercommunion of the divine and human, the better men of the period could perhaps have found the inner reconciliation that they strove after. But the mass of mankind was not ripe for this thought of the immanence of divinity. Aristotle remained uncomprehended; and even those of the Stoic school who proclaimed it, fell more and more under the sway of Platonic dualism. Even Plato draws no sharper distinction between God and the world, matter and spirit, than is so often drawn antithetically by Seneca in those passages where he continually recurs to the "other world," the "heavenly home," and says expressly: "Matter *and* God compose the totality of things." "God rules the world, which surrounds him as its lord and guide, and follows him. . . . The spirit in man is what God is in the world; and what matter is there, the body is in us. . . . Therefore I fear not the transition, for I shall never dwell in such narrow confinement as here."¹

Consequently the view of the immanence of God was immediately abandoned once more. The other world, the soul's home, the place beyond, stands close to the present world; and the more men felt the oppression of earthly things in the gloomy times of the Cæsars, the brighter and nobler did they picture to themselves the beauty of the heavenly world. At the same time the desire for contact with it rose in like proportion. Salvation, it was thought, from this world of ills, could only be found in direct connection with the blessed world. The means to this end, which men had failed to discover within, had to be provided from without.

The wise man was to attain truth and felicity through divine revelation, since they were unattainable by the path of knowledge. Men were full of aspirations and longings after immediate contact of the soul with God, and, instead of seeking it in the world, had discovered two ways by which the present world and the world to come could join hands. Either divine mediators

¹ Ep. 65.

were to stretch out their hands to mankind from above, or, conversely, man should so spiritualize himself as to be capable of beholding the divine in direct intuition. Such contemplation, however, is no longer a problem of speculation; it is an immediate contact of the soul with the absolute—that is to say, religion. What we meet with here in the garb of philosophy are processes of religious life. Philosophy becomes a worship, the philosopher a hierophant.

The second practical way naturally more nearly concerned the school of practical wisdom in life. The same liberty, happiness and equanimity, which were the end of Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism, were now to be attained through religious union with the Deity. As, however, this Deity, in regard to this distracted consciousness, lies in another world, apparently inaccessible to rational knowledge, men no longer press onward to the truth along the path of speculation; but must prepare the soul by all kinds of inward and outward means of sanctification, purification and refining, to comprehend the Deity directly. Mystical elevation of the personality, of the inmost life of the soul in the form of ecstasy, are to raise the wise man up to the level of the divine, so that he can embrace the absolute itself.

The subject is transported into this elevated condition by a form of asceticism which professed to trace its origin from Pythagoras. As a matter of fact, the Orphic-pythagorean mysteries introduced to the Greeks the thought that certain kinds of abstinence and practices are pleasing to the gods and ensure the soul participation in the joys of Elysium.¹ But the special home of this thought is indeed the East; and it is just where East and West contended with one another, in Alexandria, that this new school of Pythagoreans meets us. Here, where the Jews had furnished their contribution to the Greek view of the universe, the schools of philosophy also had become confident

¹ Cf. Zeller, *Phil. der Gr.* iii. 2, 65.

believers in direct divine communications, and had approximated to the later Jewish custom of inducing such revelations of prophetic ecstasy by means of intense asceticism.¹ All hope of attaining truth by means of investigation was left behind. Knowledge had become a weariness, and weariness resigned itself to scepticism. Thus the Alexandrian Greeks were ready to turn to the Jewish doctrine of direct revelation. As knowledge had deceived them, they threw themselves the more ardently into the arms of faith.

Now the conditions under which individuals could attain intuition of the divine, were precisely the same as we have become acquainted with in its native home among the Jews of the books of Daniel and Enoch, belonging to the sects of the Essenes and Pharisees. Yet the Greeks preferred to derive such wisdom from Pythagoras instead of Moses. As a matter of fact, the Pythagorean school had become extinct in the course of the fourth century; and when we find the Orphic-pythagorean mysteries recommending abstentions, like those long practised among the Jews, as pleasing to the gods, we need, perhaps, only see in it the same influences of Oriental systems of religion as we find elsewhere in the practices of the mysteries.

It is conceivable, however, that the Hellene did not wish to learn from the Jew. Then the purifications, ablutions and sprinklings, the fashion of white garments, the holy hours, the abhorrence of contact with the dead or with women at childbirth, the abstention from certain foods, the flesh of unclean or mangled animals or those that had died a natural death—in short, innumerable ordinances which bear on the face of them the stamp of Oriental anxiety for cleanliness, and were adopted by the Greeks as means for drawing near to the divine—were referred to Pythagoras, who, centuries before, had consecrated his followers thus as seers and prophets. In order to remove all shadow of doubt from a source so honourable, this school,

¹ Cf. Vol. i. pp. 162, 163 (Eng. transl.)

sheltered in obscurity, produced innumerable writings professing to proceed from Pythagoras or one of his most famous disciples, but one and all forged.¹

Much religious longing, obscure to itself, besides great delight in falsehood and tendencies still more impure, cloaked themselves under this secret society. One P. Nigidius Figulus is praised by Cicero as a religious and philosophical reformer;² a certain P. Vatinius is reproached for committing all manner of crimes under the name of Pythagorean. Somewhat later we find these Neo-pythagorean tendencies entering into the school of the Sextians, in which, by the way, Sotion of Alexandria was brought up—Sotion, who admonished his pupil Seneca to abstain from all eating of meat, to fast and to confine himself to bloodless food. In his later years, Seneca assures us that he never felt the influence of material objects so little as when he was living according to this Pythagorean rule.

The edicts of Tiberius drove this school, so rightly regarded as a religious sect, into obscurity; under Nero, too, it was occasionally brought to justice for prophesying.³ For not only did this spectre of Neo-pythagoreanism rise in pseudonymous writings, but there appeared in every place individual conjurors and magicians who had converted the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers into a superstitious cabala, and boasted that through their holy Pythagorean life communion was effected with the other world, and divine inspiration and apparitions vouchsafed. The Chaldee and astrologer work with the master's doctrine of numbers, and make known the will of the gods; the ascetic teaches reconciliation with this will. Glowing with the power of repentance, the Pythagorean, with his white vesture, his unshorn hair falling over his shoulders, his long beard and strange, gleaming eyes, is the hierophant of this generation, the master of knowledge, to whom the women especially flock.⁴ The magician becomes the ideal of the time.

¹ Cf. Zeller, *Phil. der Gr.* iii. 2, 85, seq.

² Cic. in Vatin. 6, 14.

³ Sen. Ep. 108; Philostr. *Apoll.* 4, 35.

⁴ Philostr. *Apoll.* 8, 2, 6.

It is clear that the appearance of these Pythagorean saints marked the end of all attempts to realize the Stoic ideal of virtue, and thus to provide mankind with a redeemer and saviour. For it is not only through his asceticism that the disciple of Pythagoras wishes to be known as the friend and favourite of the gods, but also through his pure and devout mind. Such magicians, then, give themselves out as the high-priests of humanity; they enjoin on their followers long years of silence and severe preparation, only to disclose the key to all enigmas at last in some hollow formula, a rare amulet, or empty art of magic. Thus one of the most impudent of these holy itinerants, Apollonius of Tyana, who journeyed over Asia Minor and Egypt at the time of the Jewish war,¹ after a long period of trial imparted to his pupils, so eager for salvation, the profound information that only those libations find favour with the gods which flow over the handle of the jug, because that is the one spot never touched by human lips.²

On the whole, then, he is the characteristic representative of this movement, and also, as is shown by the various biographies of Moragenes, Damis and Philostratus, the most famous. In the time of the Flavians he must have played a great part even in politics. Philostratus' biography, which has come down to us, was certainly composed not earlier than the beginning of the third century, at the request of Julia Domina; but it made use of the older sources, so that we can learn from it all the rites and steps by which a man might become a seer, and which Apollonius professes to have inherited from Pythagoras himself. Because he has never sharpened the knife against animals nor ever eaten living thing; because he has esteemed linen, which does not come from animals, higher than wool, and has shod his feet with woven bast; because he has never suffered scissors to

¹ This opinion is justified not only by the biography of Philostratus, but also by Apul. *De Magia*, 90; Lucian, *Alex.* 5; Origen, *c. Cels.* 6, 41. Cf. also Dio Cass. 47, 18.

² Philostr. *Apoll.* 4, 20.

touch his head, which holds all the springs of sense, and whence issue all holy tones and voices, and language, the soul's interpreter, but rather let his hair grow like the Lacedæmonians; because, too, he has never offered heavenly beings the insult of bloody sacrifice, and never carried iron through their temples,—for these causes he was first endowed with the faculty of perceiving his own soul; then dreams brought him true prophecies; and at last he reached the point of knowing all things but a little later than the gods, of working wonders, of staying pestilences, of being visible or invisible at will, and finally of mounting before death to the immortals.¹ “That I lived not otherwise,” said he to Domitian, “preserves my senses in inexpressible cheerfulness, and wards off grief from them, and assures me of recognizing, as in the light of a mirror, all that is happening or will come to pass. For the wise man does not wait for the event, but espies it when still on the threshold; later, indeed, than the gods, but sooner than the multitude.”²

Even though Philostratus' biography evidently introduces certain later traits, e.g. in particular, the parody of the gospel and the Acts of the Apostles apparent throughout, still the description of the Neo-pythagorean method of attaining to vision of the divine is thoroughly characteristic and completely corresponds with similar indications of this period, such as are found, for example, in the fourth book of Ezra.³

And yet before this, Plutarch had formed a complete theory of the subjective conditions of divine revelation, by means of which the operation of the ancient and traditional means for producing ecstasy was explained on rational grounds. Like the spiritualists of to-day, the philosopher of Chæronea speaks of a higher sense, of a secret power, hidden in the soul as in a bud, that bursts into bloom under the stimulating breath of initiation, or stirs in dreams if the body is first made pure and brought to the requisite condition. “Then occurs in the soul what we call

¹ Cf. Philostr. Apoll. 8, 5, seq.

² Philostr. Apoll. 8, 9.

³ 4 Ezra iv. 35, ix. 26, &c.

enthusiasm ; and it may perhaps be assumed that, through the warmth which spreads over the whole body, certain pores are opened, which introduce pictures of the future to the soul."¹

The practical fruit of these deeply mystical speculations was doubtless the darkest superstition. Magic arts, cabalistic formulas and superstitious initiations, were to open the way whither speculation failed to reach. It was not only poets, like Virgil, who dreamed of the twig from the grove of Stygian Juno, that opens the way to the lower world, but the final conclusion of this profound Neo-pythagorean wisdom was nothing more than the conviction of Thessalian women, that magic alone leads to a vision of the gods :

"Charms from the cornfields draw the neighbour's corn ;
Charms stay the snake in fury onward borne ;
Charms from her car e'en Dian seek to hale,
And, but for clashing metal, would prevail."²

The philosopher is now a magician, and therefore legends easily spring up about the philosophers of old, telling how they ruled the winds and nailed the clouds fast.³

Meanwhile, this extraordinary growth of superstition is connected quite naturally with the positive and settled belief in a world to come, of which this world is only the thin curtain. The belief in miracles is the disbelief in nature come to maturity, the very contempt of the visible preached by Platonism. True being is really that in the heavenly world ; here there is nothing but seeming and illusion. Nature is no longer self-existent ; the movements of the other world play through her every fold. So the magician who rules over spirits of the other world makes nature bow to his will and authority.

In the days of old, wonders were worked by gods, now by men ; and the monstrous proof of intercourse with the beyond was simply miracle, the distortion of this world. Sensible truth is no longer valid, and the senses are more and more worthless

¹ Plut. *Def. Orac.* 40 ; cf. 48, and *De Pyth. Orac.* 21—23.

² Tib. *Eleg.* i. 8, 20 ; cf. Hor. *Epod.* 5, 45. ³ Philostr. *Apoll.* 8, 8.

for everything objective. Neither current nor bygone history any longer contains its centre of gravity within itself, but denotes something from the other world. Enigmas, far more mysterious than the simple meaning, lurk behind words and letters; and events happen, not from natural causes, but with a view to mysterious ends as the type of something to come or the antitype of something that has been. The present, the visible and sensible truth are of no validity for these men; they are utterly false in one respect and have become incapable of presenting reality, because they ascribe no independent significance to this reality, but everywhere are on the watch for omens and deities and revelations from the other world. In Philo, above all, we have a unique phenomenon; to him, sensible perception and illusion are identical. In his view, the first condition of true knowledge is to give up the results of experience.¹

Such, then, was the extreme development to which the Platonic contempt for nature and the world of phenomena had come. The consequence in practical life was, that the greatest minds in the time of the empire were sunk in such superstition as in the time of Pericles would have been scorned even by the peasant Strepsiades and the scholar Pheidippides. But now, as a logical result, the Platonic contempt for this visible world had expanded into contempt for nature and life.

The consequence was twofold. Not only was the search to attain the infinite a matter of great concern to a conception of the world that had gradually become more certain of the beyond than of the present, but it also demanded that God himself should bend down to men, and for their sake come forth from his world beyond. The one thought, of drawing near to God, was quite impossible without the other, that God, too, is willing to approach us. Only this was opposed by the Platonic idea that God is too pure, too holy, too supernal, to enter into personal relations with mundane things. Therefore Plato had himself introduced intermediate beings, through whom God

¹ De Migr. Abrah. M. ii. Introd.

created and sustains this earth on which he can never appear himself; and in his view and that of his pupils, the popular gods have exactly this signification of providing the means of intercourse between this world and the supreme Deity who dwells in unapproachable brilliance.

Now direct relations with the Deity being demanded, this doctrine of intermediate beings was offered to meet the demand, in order to make it possible to conceive the inconceivable through the introduction of intermediary members. In Plutarch, it is the *dæmons*, "they that share the nature of mortals and the power of divinity," who effect the intercourse between the Deity and mankind. "If," says Plutarch, "one should take away the atmosphere between moon and earth, he would destroy the unity and connection of the universe by the fact that void and unconnected space arises in its midst. In the same way, those who assume no race of *dæmons* destroy all community and connection between gods and men, inasmuch as they let go (in Plato's words) interpreting and ministering nature, and compel us to degrade the gods to our own necessities. We, however, will not listen to those who withdraw from the Deity all share in prophecy and all care for initiations and orgiastic rites, any more than we believe that the actual Deity is active in these matters; but we leave the care of them instead to the helpers of the gods, and therefore believe in *dæmons*."¹ This, then, was the point where the thought originated that intermediaries are needful between God and man. This was the very point at which Neo-platonism intervened, making a last desperate effort to bridge over the dualism of the Platonic view by pouring world upon world of *æons* into the gulf between this world and the beyond.

But even before Plutarch showed the way from the world of men to the gods by the ladder of the world of *dæmons*, the Alexandrian Jew Philo, on the border-land between Judaism and Platonism, had elaborated a subtle system, which incorporated

¹ De Def. Orac. 13.

Platonic dualism, and at the same time overcame it by the doctrine of divine intermediaries. There is an intermediary between God and the world, namely, the Logos, the scheme of the universe, which the Stoics had already spoken of sometimes as a person, sometimes as an order or a thing, just as Plato had spoken of the world-soul. In conceiving of the primordial world-thought, or Logos, as a person, the first-born existence that sprang from the Deity, and through whom and in whom the world exists, Philo had enunciated the formula that brought together this world and the beyond, making God from the other world belong to this without removing the actual severance. Now an external bridging over of the antithesis, such as this, suited the consciousness of the time better than the Stoic's immanence of God, which would deny dualism. Step by step, paganism had drawn nearer to the Jewish conception of God. Men had come round to a belief in the absolutely supernatural nature of the divine, which was the starting-point of Judaism. Thus they had found it impossible to refuse belief in divine revelations, and the prophetic and ecstatic form of these revelations; and when the sense of estrangement from God and vacancy in the visible world nevertheless remained, it was a Jew who realized how to make a transcendental God immanent, by conceiving of the system of the world as a personal emanation from the Deity.¹

Had it been possible to present the sense of unity with God, and especially the consciousness of reconciliation, on speculative lines, the speculation of the Logos would have solved this problem. In principle, dualism was subdued by it. But the veritable conviction that there is a Logos reconciling God and the world, the sense that as an actual fact we are in God through such an intermediary, was not to be presented on lines of thought. Not until the Christians of Alexandria announced to the world that the Logos has become flesh and we have seen its glory—not until they showed forth one of whom such amplitude could be

¹ For fuller discussion, see under Philo.

declared—did believers arrive at a settlement of the dissension which till then had severed the human and the divine.

Yet it cannot be said that paganism had not at least sought after such a God become flesh, completing the reconciliation between the present and the beyond. Only the whole problem of religion is apart from speculation, and therefore speculative treatment finds its sphere in mythology. Hercules and Apollo, both originally representatives of the sun, were assigned this task of reconciliation by the Platonizing mythologists of imperial times. In expiation for shedding the blood of the dragon Pytho, Apollo was said to have become a herdsman in the service of the Thessalian king Admetus. The God, then, by abasing himself and putting on the form of a servant, became at once the redeemer and reconciler of men on whom sin lay heavy, the saviour of the weak and those that cry for help, of the guilty and the repentant. Now the same form of the servant assumed by Apollo under Admetus, is borne in turn by Hercules during his eight years' service to Eurystheus, at whose command he performed the labours depicted in the temple of Zeus at Olympia. Thus Hercules is the ideal type of obedience and resignation, who for his labours received in part the title of god, and who would have us follow him along a like path of apotheosis. The same deeper meaning passed into the conception of Æsculapius. Originally the genius of the healing activity of the priesthood, he becomes in later times, especially in the circles of the Cynic philosophers, the divine helper sent to the sick and not to the whole.

Here, then, we see again one of the conceptions within which Christianity became conscious of its religious actualities, ready developed in the consciousness of the time. Through Philo, belief in supernatural intermediaries between this world and the beyond is linked to belief in one God and eternal life, and the longings after the wise man's ideal of humanity; so that he who brought peace to this generation forsaken of its gods, must necessarily be regarded by it as the mediator between God and the world, the Logos that has become flesh. These ideas were

ready prepared in the consciousness of the time; but though ideas must cover some import, to work this out was not the concern of the school. One thing, however, philosophy accomplished. After the labour of centuries, it had constructed a conception of the world with a point of view that clearly formulated what must be the characteristics of a religion that should satisfy the peoples of the Roman empire who had gone astray in their traditional cults. Finally, philosophy also had a voice in deciding between the rival religions which were continually coming from the East and offering themselves to the West as true belief.

In the first place, indeed, it had made every form of nature-worship impossible. Without philosophy, some kind of retrogression to nature-worship was not inconceivable. The condition of the Roman empire gave Oriental cults facilities for every kind of propaganda. As it was, the priests of Isis and the worship of Mithra, together with the Mother of the gods from Asia Minor, marched to conquest, and had achieved dazzling, if ephemeral, successes. Even Tacitus considered these ancient Asiatic cults, especially the Egyptian, far more dangerous than Christianity. But victory could be secured only by a religion which grew out of new conditions of life, not by any of the old religions of nature, however attractively they adorned their worship. The Asiatic religions were religions of nature, but man no longer felt himself dependent upon nature. His philosophy had taught him this was not the absolute. Therefore the world did not, after all, go over to the worship of Osiris or Mithra, in spite of the great fears of certain Roman legislators.

Besides, return to the belief of their ancestors was impossible. The old Hellenic and Roman gods, like the God of the Jews, were national gods. But the nations were merged in the Roman empire, and the *orbis terrarum* cannot employ the gods of a province. The consciousness of the unity of mankind had awakened; the barriers of nationalities were overthrown; and of all the languages, only two remained. How, then, had a local worship any prospect of becoming universal?

On the contrary, a new religious need had arisen, unknown to the ancient world. The individual had long been busied more with himself than with the state. He needed a God for his heart rather than for public observances. Both tendencies, however, of cosmopolitanism and heightened self-consciousness, went hand in hand. The subjective life of the individual soul had reached its full development through the very fact that the consciousness of the family and the state was sinking into the background; while, conversely, universalism, which does not inquire into birth and status, rests on the fact that the universal conditions of human life are the subject of reflection. For the individual is also the most universal. This, too, was the reason why the Porch, whose philosophic problem was thoroughly individualistic, preached most ardently the equality of all and the brotherhood of nations.¹ One of their later representatives, Epictetus, could even reduce this thought to the religious formula: "All are brothers, for all in like manner have God for their Father."² "All rational beings," says Marcus Aurelius also, "should be considered as making up one state, to which individuals belong as houses to the town."³ So, just because man withdrew himself from all external things to his inmost spiritual and moral nature, he found it possible to recognize the identity of nature in all, and to place himself at a universal and cosmopolitan point of view.

A religion, therefore, to satisfy this generation, must have a character of universality, partly because the intellectual horizon of the nations had become too wide to be content with a national god, partly because it had to minister to the needs of the personality and the individual heart, common to one and all. It might not, like the old religions, connect itself primarily with the family and the state; for now it is individual sensibility, as formerly consciousness of the state, that dominates the mind.

This religion, then, *must take up its position further within the*

¹ Cf. Zeller, *Phil. der Gr.* iii. 1, 277, seq.

² *Diss.* i. 13; cf. 3, 1, seq.

³ *M. Aur.* iii. 11.

dualistic view of the universe, in which the thought of the period moved. At the same time, however, it must offer the mind a reconciliation of this dualism, must subdue it by religion. God must be supernatural and spiritual, yet the world must not be void of God. The other world must sweep above this in infinite grandeur, yet must cast its reflections upon this vale of shadows and offer the clear assurance of a passage across the gulf.

But a guide was also looked for. Where was the wise man, spoken of by the Porch—the friend of friends, dreamed of by the Epicureans? Where was the holy and upright man, described by the Pythagoreans as the flower of philosophy, the prince of magi, the theurge endowed with miraculous powers and prophetic gifts, who makes himself worthy to grasp the hand of the power beyond?

A dream-like obscurity surrounds all those ideas which are to be the support of future centuries, when they first begin to stir in human consciousness. They are still commingled with all kind of earthly matters; but they only need a strong impulse to become, in the course of history, conscious of their own truth. Philosophy has built the portal through which religion enters. It had brought into consciousness the great gulf between this world and the beyond; Christianity does it with the message: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God, and the Word became flesh and dwelt among us." The *apathia* and *ataraxia* of the philosophers had not held their ground against this world of evil; but the message of the apostles ran: "Our belief is the victory that has overcome the world." Volumes were written by Stoics and Epicureans on the question how the wise man can attain to true peace; and this, indeed, was the message of the new religion, borne in the forefront of the gospel of the Galilean fisherman: "Glory to God in the highest: peace on earth and goodwill towards men."

5. THE THEOLOGY OF MEDIATION.

Religious life is one of the most powerful motives in healthy nations; but its significance is still more strongly felt in irreligious times through the void left in the life of the people by its decay. This, above all, explains the unceasing activity with which the philosophical and theological movements to improve the world, the teachers and priesthood of the time, sought the religious life in places where it was not; it explains the self-scorning activity that continually sets its patchwork close to the rent, that digs wells where no water is, and fills the world with its noise about questions that have long lost all meaning and all significance. Thus, much might be said about the quarrel between Epicureans and Stoics over gods in whom neither side continued to believe; about the rivalries of mystagogues and priestly colleges, did not these disputes bear the character of party hate far more than of essential differences. This noisy activity, displayed now in the introduction, now in the prohibition, of foreign worships—to-day in sifting the Sibylline books and censorship of priests and vestals, to-morrow in restoring the institutions of augurs, haruspices or mysteries—has, in fact, but one basis and presupposition, the knowledge that the basis of official worship is lost. The consciousness of the time had outgrown polytheism, and was confronted with the question, what was to be done with the polytheistic religion of the state?

In the first place, as was only equitable, speculative theology came forward to help at a time of need, by being ready to explain polytheism as monotheism, to interpret the religion of Nature spiritually, and to draw a deep moral sense out of the bold sensuality of the secret cults. Religion had to be reconciled with the consciousness of the time, and philosophical theologians and theological philosophers were ready to establish the inmost harmony of both parties. It was only necessary to give up the sensuous ingredients given by poets and the antiquated views

found among the uneducated; then, men flattered themselves, the old faith of their fathers would revive. In this concert of theological antagonisms, Stoicism assumed the *positive* tone, while Epicureanism and Scepticism rather adoted the *negative* side.

Not but what the latter had also had their own method of coming to terms with polytheistic belief. The Epicureans, certainly, were thoroughly in earnest with their physical view of the world, and Epicurus designed by means of it entirely to get rid of the delusion of a divine Providence, as indeed is recorded to his especial glory by Lucretius, so much admired in Italy. Still Epicurus is far enough from denying the gods. They must indeed exist, as the belief in them is found everywhere, and this presupposes their existence. For according to Epicurus' sensualistic doctrine of perception, in which all our conceptions are derived from external impressions, these conceptions of God can only arise from the fact that actual gods appeared to the ancients, as they still appear to us, in dreams.

That they no longer concern themselves with us is shown by the immense amount of evil in the world, the triumph of sin, and the ruin of virtue.¹ The universal assumption, however, that the gods are beatific beings, further shows that they would cease to be so as soon as they burdened themselves with care for this earthly tangle. Rather the gods dwell, as indeed their spiritual nature demands, in the interspace between the worlds, under an ever cloudless sky, untroubled by any storm.² In these regions they enjoy their Olympian felicity, while the worlds roll by them in the eternal order of the universe.

Thus the negative theology had kept knowledge and belief absolutely apart as perfectly distinct spheres. Without giving up a single point of its own physical view of the world, there was no need for it so much as to touch a hair of the ancient gods. Indeed, by leaving the gods, on this materialist theory,

¹ Lucr. v. 165, seq.; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 8, seq.

² Cic. Divin. ii. 17, 40; Lucr. ii. 646.

exactly as they are represented in the popular mind—male and female, old and young, winged and horned—it could plume itself on its orthodoxy in contrast with Stoicism, since it takes the gods as they are, while the Stoics identify them with natural substances which can never receive the name of true gods.¹

As to the part played by Scepticism, it analyzed religious dialectic no less than all other dogmatic conceptions, and its arguments assuredly contributed something of their own towards still further destroying the foundation of the old views. Still, if it remained true to its principles, it was bound to stop short of the positive assertion of the non-existence of the gods.

In opposition to both these schools, the Stoics decidedly laid claim to the reputation of old-fashioned belief and orthodoxy. This was due to perfectly pure motives. It was no interested piety of priestly colleges, defending their temples and benefices against the infidelity of the times, but an earnest religious bent that gave the Stoic school this conservative position. The adherents of the Porch had left the popular religion far behind, but wished to spare it as a veil of truth necessary to the people. Their own view of the world was fundamentally religious. Stoicism starts from the assumption of a divine world-soul, whose divine power generates all finite beings from itself, and enfoldes them and permeates them with its life. It was not consonant with such a religious conception of the world to shake individual belief in the gods, unless it could raise the latter to its own level of speculation.

Stoic pantheism, moreover, maintained a truce with polytheism. In its full and original sense, indeed, the Stoics could only apply the name of God to the one primary essence; but why should not the name of Divinity be also conceded to the several operations of this divine power? The only difference between them and an eternal and infinite was, that they were regarded as finite and created gods.² It was no doubt unfor-

¹ Cf. on this point, Zeller, *Phil. der Gr.* iii. 1, 399, seq.

² The Stoic, in Plutarch, *Def. Or.* 19.

fortunate that the average man conceived of these divine powers as human forms, but this conception appeared by no means unjustifiable from a symbolic point of view, so far as man is actually the lord of all creatures, and the Deity the lord of the universe.¹

Thus, then, in the Stoic school the stars were called gods, because, as the crown of created things, they perhaps partook of divine reason in the highest degree, and therefore might be beings endowed with souls, as indeed had been supposed by Plato and Aristotle.² But it was equally justifiable to call the elements gods, as the divine power is similarly operative in them at first hand.³ Moreover, with regard to such things as are specially serviceable and necessary to mankind, and in which, therefore, the bounty of the Deity is especially manifest, such as bread and wine, why should not they also be called gods?⁴ The consequence was, that in many cases this reasoned belief gave rise to a far cruder expression of nature-worship than had even been reached by credulous antiquity. Plutarch, for example, is occasionally indignant with the Stoic Cleanthes for calling the dry wind that destroys the crops, Proserpine; while another pushed the same idea so far in the pithy language of orthodoxy as to sing:

“When bands of youths cut down Demeter’s limbs.”⁵

With these principles the Stoic school had rescued whole categories of gods. Zeus was considered as the one primary being, who has produced all things and gods from himself, and receives them back again into himself. This Zeus is certainly not the ancient cloud-compeller who smote the Titans with his bolt, and was deceived by his consort on Ida; he is the totality of the world regarded as unity, primary fire, æther, world-soul, universal reason, universal law or destiny. That part of Zeus which turns

¹ Plut. Plac. i. 6, 16.

² Zeller, *Phil. der Gr.* iii. 1, 176; Plut. *De Facie Lunæ*, 6, 3.

³ Cic. *N. D.* i. 15, 39, seq., ii. 26.

⁴ Cic. *N. D.* 23, 60, i. 15, 38.

⁵ Plut. *De Is.* 66.

into air is called Hera; in his lowest portions, shrouded in mist, he is called Hades. That part which passes into elementary fire is called Hephæstus; that which becomes water, Poseidon; and the earthy part, Demeter, Hestia and Rhea.¹ By thus debasing the coinage of thought, it was possible to make the impudent assertion that the ancestral beliefs had not been given up.

Another consideration offered the polytheistic interest a still better chance. If the divine power of the one Zeus represented itself in elements and stars so as to be worthy of worship, why not still more in the great men of old? Why should not the immortal souls of men who here below had cleared forests, slain monsters, exterminated robbers, or founded cities, be honoured as divine? They are indeed, says Cicero, good and eternal, consequently they are duly (*rite*) to be honoured as gods; hence the cult of Hercules, Bacchus, Romulus and so forth, is not open to the slightest objection.² Finally, however, it was possible to ascribe suitable divine honours even to the intermediate beings, the dæmons, who represent the descent of the divine to the human spirit. "If," it was said,³ "there are living beings on earth and in the sea, then such must exist also in the purer element of air, and consequently in the still purer element of æther. The latter would be the gods—that is to say, the spirits of the stars; and the former, the dæmons." Moreover, this belief in dæmons commended itself for the additional reason that it was not necessary to ascribe a purely divine nature to such intermediate beings, and therefore all the wealth of mythological ornament was freely lavished upon them.⁴

This kind of philosophy, indispensable, as was seen above, to the completeness and graduated succession of the spiritual world, thus became exceedingly precious and valuable for theology as well. Personages such as the Cyclopes, Titans, Erinnyes,

¹ Cf. in Zeller, l. c. 303, seq.

² Cic. N. D. ii. 24, 62.

³ Sext. Mth. 9, 86.

⁴ Thus Chrysippus, Plut. Quæst. Rom. 51, and Plutarch himself, Def. Or. 14, 25 and 17.

dog-headed hares and goat-footed fauns, could be ascribed to it.¹ It was the dæmons to whom Agamemnon had to sacrifice his Iphigenia—for how could a god require such an offering? It was they who bore the burden of the love-affairs in mythology—they who brought pestilence and famine upon men, and instigated war, “till they fulfilled the object of their desire.” It is in their honour, too, “that in the mysteries men eat raw flesh, lacerate themselves, fast and wail, and in many places permit themselves the use of shameful words at the sacrifice, and raise a clamour with all manner of bodily contortions—for how could such things avail before a god?”² Consequently the Stoic had in principle restored every class of god, and men were so proud of their own orthodoxy as to speak with indignation of the “bold infidelity of the Epicureans,” who poured contempt upon the belief in dæmons.³ A man like Cleanthes even wished Aristarchus of Samos to be punished for atheism in teaching that the earth revolved round the sun, because it was not fitting to depose the Hestia of the universe.⁴

But however satisfied men were with their own orthodoxy, belief in the gods had only been saved in principle. Confronted with mythology, men found themselves individually as hampered as a modern theologian, when called upon to draw the practical application of Balaam’s ass, Jonah’s whale, and the sun of Gibeon, from his conception of miracle. Now for once it was eminently unfortunate that documents stated the fact—and many cults, and holy places and relics, attested it—that Zeus had once been cast into chains by mutinous gods, and hung his wife on a chain and cast his son from heaven. Such histories suit ill enough with the elementary forces, which had been tricked out with the names of the gods.

Now while men were willing to retain the existing religious authority—and, indeed, the laws of its peculiar view of the world could not be put aside—they betook themselves to all those bad

¹ Plut. Quæst. Rom. 51; Def. Or. 13—19.

² Plut. Def. Or. 14. ³ Def. Or. 19. ⁴ Plut. De Fac. Lunæ, 6, 3.

arts of exegesis which seek to save popular belief by doing violence to it, and putting forward their own conviction as its proper meaning. The incredible, then, either received a natural explanation, or was represented as an allegorical presentation of a moral or physical truth; or, again, temerity even went so far as to assert that Homer, the Bible of the Greeks, spoke conformably to the truth in part only of his statements, while in others he accommodated himself to common opinion.¹ When Seneca explains lightning to be dry air set on fire by pressure,² he is confident that intrinsically this was also the opinion of the ancients. "They imagined to themselves under Jupiter the same thing as we do—the vivifying spirit of the universe, by whatever name it is called. Would you call him Nature? Needless, for it is he. Would you call him the World? It is no misconception, for he is the whole of what you see." By similar naturalistic interpretation, the birth of Apollo (the sun) and Diana (the moon) from Leto (oblivion) means nothing more than that sun and moon come forth from the night,³ and Apollo's swift-slaying arrows are nothing more than his scorching rays which arouse pestilence.⁴

Other sacred histories, again, are allegories of physical or moral truths. The meaning of Jupiter first in chains and then released is, that the order of the world rests upon the equipoise of the elements.⁵ The origin and sequence of the elements is given pictorial form in the suspension of Hera;⁶ the order of the world-spheres, in the golden chain by which the Olympians strove to drag down Zeus.⁷ Uranus in the sacred story is emasculated. This signifies that, for the production of all things, æther requires no sexual functions;⁸ Cronos eating his children, signifies that the order of nature checks the unlimited fecundity of the elements.⁹ Dionysus torn by jealous Hera's torturers,

¹ Zeno in Dio Chrysost. Or. 53, § 276, R.

² Quæst. Nat. 2, 25.

³ Cornutus, ch. 2, p. 10.

⁴ Heracl. ch. 8.

⁵ Ibid. ch. 25, 52.

⁶ Ibid. ch. 40, 83.

⁷ Ibid. 37, 73, seq.

⁸ Cic. N. D. ii. 24, 63.

⁹ Cornutus, ch. 7, 21.

implies only that the unity of the whole separates into the multiplicity of the elements, beings, species.¹ With the substitution of a similar *quid pro quo*, such as the mere names of the gods, for their actual denotation, it was easy to assert that the gods were not denied, and that the atheism of the Epicureans, who had, as it were, laid the gods to rest, was worthy of all condemnation.

However, greater difficulties arose over the practical application of the form of worship. If the Stoic always had to represent something under the old myths, far severer demands were made upon his readiness to believe by festal sacrifices, and prophesy from augury or inspection of entrails. But he who has started upon the inclined plane of the theology of intermediaries, always finds at last some pretext or other to make the inconceivable conceivable, and to obtain an affirmative conclusion from a negative premiss. Thus their growing laxity of principles at last led the school of the determinate universal order even to support the superstition of the augurs and haruspices. Following the indissoluble concatenation of causes, they were confident that the next link of the chain could be deciphered from the one in immediate view.²

From the point of view of a system that identified the divine powers with the eternal order of natural laws, it was indeed absolutely inconceivable for the Deity to work in human fashion towards determinate and individual ends, and to submit to interrogation about them.³ But instead of concluding thence, with the Epicureans, that there was nothing to be done with miracles and prophecies, they preferred to put forward an edifying discourse about still undiscovered laws of nature, by means of which the future is bound to foretell itself in certain natural phenomena, and which were already disclosed by careful observation. "You make the Deity," says Seneca to the priest, "too much of a petty busybody, in making him shape dreams for one

¹ De $\epsilon\iota$, ap. Delphos, 9, 21.

² Cic. Div. i. 55, 126, seq.

³ This correct consequence of the system is drawn by Cicero, Div. i. 52, 118.

and entrails for another." Then, instead of rejecting this pettiness, he adds immediately: "Certainly these premonitions proceed under divine guidance; but it is not that the bird's wings are guided by the Deity, nor the victim's entrails moulded thus or thus under the axe. Each order of fate sends its premonitions before it."

Now the reason why the eternal order heralds victory by flying eagles, and defeat by constriction of the entrails, is certainly difficult to see; but, humbly adds our mediate theology: "Some things are perfectly easy for us, others we cannot understand. . . . The observation of astronomers has discovered the meaning of five stars; it does not follow that the rest shine without purpose. So with the rest; for there is no living thing but expresses something by its movement or conjunction."¹ So, instead of God, who rouses the raven or eagle from the thicket, there was supposed the profound conception of a pre-established flight of birds, whereby, according to eternal ordinances, birds flew to the left of the unlucky, and to the right of the lucky.

But, like many another, this tenet of speculative theology, though originally naïve, was afterwards freely infused with speculative proofs. Expressions had been used of the absolute order of things which only had meaning for a personal God, and no amount of profound words could conceal this disparity. Dimly perceiving that such an appeal to unknown laws of nature was all too unsubstantial, they used to put forward this dilemma to coerce the Epicureans, who had no intention of denying the existence of the gods, and yet would not submit to divine omens: "If there are gods, they must also reveal themselves; and if they do not reveal themselves, there can be no gods."² Now as these revealing omens are of the most various kinds, so there was no kind of augury, whether inspection of

¹ Seneca, *Nat. Quæst.* 2, 32; similarly Cic. *Div.* i. 52, 118; *ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa præcurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, &c.*

² Cic. *Div.* i. 5, 9; 38, 82.

victims or prophecy from lightning and the heavens, from the flight of birds and omens of every kind, which the Stoics did not vindicate with their profound theory of the pre-established concatenation of phenomena.

Yet this attempt to save popular belief by rationalization, and to bring its form into harmony with religion, proceeded incessantly. What had the old gods to do among the mechanical cog-wheels of a physical conception of the universe? The popular belief was absolutely unable to strike root in this prepared soil. The only result was, that Stoicism destroyed the results of its own system by allowing the claim of religion to introduce personal causes among those of physics. Perhaps the Stoic school added a contribution from this side in order to increase religious feeling and belief in unbroken communications from the powers beyond. But as to its own peculiar programme of reconciling religion with culture, this was unattainable with such worthless proofs. Believers in the old gods believed in Artemis, lover of mountains—in Apollo of the flowing hair, and Hera of the lily arms, as the poets sang her—not in star-spirits and earth-soul. Those, however, who, like the elder Pliny, spoke in the name of physics and astronomy, were not inclined to obscure their science with the fogs of mythology. "So long," says this thoughtful man, "as we are not clear about the immediate phenomena of nature, human inquiry into that which lies outside the world is fruitless."¹

A completely enlightened generation lived in the great cities, opposing proportionately bolder unbelief to the religious tendencies of the time.

"Only a child who can't add two and two,
Believes in ghostly shades, the world below,
The ferryman's pole, black frogs in eddying Styx,
And *one* bark bearing thousands o'er the flood."²

To a certain class of politicians, the religious tendencies of the Stoics doubtless counted as very praiseworthy. For the number

¹ Plin. Hist. Nat. 2, 1.

² Juv. ii. 149, seq.

of those who gladly saw the ecclesiastical establishment rehabilitated, on grounds however weak, must always be great, especially among politicians and the propertied classes. In the centuries before and after Christ, this party was of course not yet dangerous. It became so, however, as soon as an open struggle arose, and Christianity, gaining strength, made a serious attack upon the religious establishment. Those emperors, in particular, who owed allegiance to the Stoic school, were the bitterest opponents of Christianity, and all the hollow evidence of mediate theology for the existence of gods, genii and the sacred art, which at first only raise a smile, became weighty arguments when enforced by the lictor and his axe.

If, after all, Stoicism did not succeed in checking the monotheistic solution of the established religion, how could there be any talk of a renewal of faith through it? It followed that the protection of tradition from the reproach of being ridiculous and immoral, by the insertion of all kinds of profound meanings, did not restore the belief in it. This belief in the gods, the sense of dependence, was not given up because the poets ridiculed them; the poets only did so because consciousness had already released itself from a polytheistic conception. But even if philosophy had succeeded in proving to the multitude that these figures meant what they never meant, that Uranus was the æther and Zeus the central fire—even if the populace had learned to regard this mythology as secret hieroglyphs—the sense of dependence was not thereby restored, for a nation is not pious because it refrains from making merry over what it holds sacred. Thus men learned consciously, for the first time, that philosophy and religion, however often confounded with one another, are yet very different things, and that if a nation ceases to feel dependent upon the powers it formerly worshipped, no train of proof, no power of logic, is capable of forcing this sense of dependence upon them by argument and demonstration.

6. THE MYSTERIES.

Granted that the attempt to harmonize the old belief with the new conception of the world proved the more fruitless the longer it continued—that theological experiments only ruined the poetical beauty of the old myth without rendering any assistance to clearness of thought—that, in short, this belief introduced by theology was insipid, powerless and inconsequent—still this does not imply that there were not modifications of tradition which succeeded in satisfying the religious craving. Not theological theories, however, but modifications of worship fulfilling themselves more or less unconsciously, were the means by which the established religious institutions quietly and gradually reckoned with the changed religious need. For the duration of every form of religion is proportional to its capacity for development.

Now the religious need, as we have seen, had changed, especially by its gain in moral depth, its desire of divine help for the purification of the individual heart instead of the family and state, and the sense that it was dependent on a world beyond, the home whence it springs and whither it strives to return. The question now was, whether a side which further took into account these individual religious needs, and especially belief in the other world, was to prove superior to the established religious institutions—forms of religion that dealt with the state only, and had grown out of tribal consciousness at a time when the individual had not yet assumed independence, but knew that his destiny was bound up with that of his clan.

In reality, one institution did prove itself capable of development on this side: the Mysteries, which obtain a greater significance precisely from the time at which belief in the gods of the state received its first shock. These mysteries were originally festivities in honour of the gods, like any others, except that publicity was denied them, because they were connected with

certain societies, clans and callings, or even because the nature of the gods they had reference to, e.g. the Chthonian deities, demanded this secret worship. Now as the public forms of worship were quicker to adopt the advances of the time, while the secret cults clung to the ancient forms—or, again, because foreign rites, forbidden in public, repeatedly forced their way into the forms of secret worship—an antithesis arose between mysteries and public religion, as if the former offered a venerable, esoteric and peculiarly valuable religious initiation, which was not at the command of the latter. In fact, the mysteries monopolized the Chthonian deities by means of symbolism closely connected with the obscurer spheres of religious life.

Evidently Egyptian influences made themselves felt here, as the worship of Demeter and Dionysus became confused with that of Isis and Osiris. Among the Egyptians, the myth of Osiris had developed from within a complete doctrine of the fate of the soul after death. Osiris, or Nature succumbing to the fierce heat of Typhon, continues his life beneath the earth in the dark womb of the under-world; that is to say, Osiris, driven from the world of light, rules over the world of the dead. To this continued life of creative nature in the halls of the under-world was linked the thought of continued life for the dead also, together with a complete doctrine of the world beyond. In like manner, and, as Herodotus at least asserts, through Egyptian influences,¹ the doctrine of immortality among the Greeks was linked to the worship of Eleusinian Demeter. Demeter's daughter, Cora, originally the vanishing beauty of the plain, was conceived of as queen of the kingdom of the dead, and her special feasts, which originally presented the death and revival of nature in forms of worship, now become symbols of the belief in immortality.

A like transformation takes place in the Dionyso-orphic mysteries. These also, originally, did no more than celebrate in wild, orgiastic rites the life of nature that dies down in

¹ Herod. 2, 81, 123.

winter and wakes anew in spring. They now acquired a deeper religious meaning in a fantastic doctrine of the migration of souls and their reward and punishment after death.

This transference of the meaning of the myth from nature to mankind, this application of the laws of vegetation to the soul's life, seems very simple. But in order to find this new meaning in the myth, the mind must already have been actively engaged with the belief in the continuance of the soul. A strong consciousness of the soul's independence is also apparent in the fact that men were no longer satisfied with the shadowy after-life of Homeric theology, but proceeded to assert that, just as a covenant had been made with Zeus, under which the ravished Cora returns each year, so also a covenant had been made with death, by means of which the Eleusinian initiate enters hereafter upon a new and imperishable life. While, then, the original object of these mysteries was to implore Demeter's protection for the increase of the seed committed to her charge, the promise involved in these mysteries had now widened until the mystæ were to dwell after death in the immediate presence of the gods below, while the uninitiated were flung into a miry slough.¹ Consequently the directors of the Eleusinian mysteries assumed to themselves the keys of Elysium, and, in the Triptolemus, Sophocles, in all seriousness, calls those thrice happy

“ . . . who having seen these rites
Go down to Hades ; these alone are given
To live ; the rest know only sorrow there.”

As befits this great promise, the conditions of admittance to the mysteries became stricter and more complex. Numerous purifications and abstinences came first, and participation in the secrets followed but gradually. This participation itself consisted less in words than symbols, and, as it seems, scenic representations and mystic performances, which were begun with the neophyte himself. We have no express information on these sacred matters, as “it is never permitted to neglect

¹ Aristid. Eleusin. § 421 ; Dind. Aristophan. *Frogs*, 140, seq.

them, nor investigate them, nor divulge them, for the great affliction of the goddesses restrains speech.”¹ However, there is no doubt that the newly-initiated souls had their own lot after death shown them symbolically in a scenic representation of the myth of Ceres and Proserpine.

“First come,” says Plutarch, “aimless movements and weary hurrying to and fro, and anxious unsanctified wanderings through a certain obscurity. Then before the initiation itself, all manner of hardship, horror and trembling, and sweat and astonishment. After this a wondrous light breaks upon them, or they are received in delightful places and meadows, full of voices, quires, and reverent, holy songs and sights. Through these the now initiated neophyte goes his way, released and at liberty; and, crowned with flowers, holds festival in company with pure and holy men, gazing here over the uninitiated multitude of the living, crushed and trodden down by one another in deep mire and mist, and clinging to the good things of their world in fear of death, amid misery and unbelief.” Thus the toilsome wandering of the neophytes through darkness, over slippery places or heavy ground that clogged every step, and the sudden change from horror and trembling, clamour and sweat, to the light of meadows alive with dance and song, set forth the contrast between this poor, laborious life and the future glory. The same meaning, namely, that the pains of this time are as nothing compared to the future glory, was contained in the mystic drama which represents Demeter toiling over land and sea in the search for Cora, and wandering with torches through the under-world, and at last finding her and thereupon instituting these same mysteries. In the pain and relief of the sorrowing mother, man was to realize his own salvation; Demeter’s corn, that is sown corruptible, was to call to mind the life that in her daughter’s kingdom rises incorruptible.²

How deep a hold upon the heart was possessed by this cult,

¹ Cf. the so-called Homeric Hymn to Demeter, l. 477, seq.

² Plut. de Is. 25; Clem. Al. Protr. 2, 12.

which relied upon a shock to the inner man, is shown by many proofs extending to the latest times. This worship alone retained a memory of powers upon which men actually felt themselves dependent—death and retribution; and this is why such infinite value was set upon these rites. No participation in any other rites of worship could save the uninitiated from the eternal slough, if he had neglected these mysteries; while the *mystæ* were assured of the favour of the powers below. Such a view was only possible where all other forms of worship taken together no longer included as much power and life as this one rite. Thus the Eleusinian mysteries were the vital part of religious existence, an institution well ordered in its appearances, brilliant and respected wherever it appeared, and of sufficient intrinsic worth to attract continually an innumerable multitude of participants from all classes, far and near, and to find imitation in numerous affiliated societies. Of all the excellences that human life owes to Athens, Cicero calls the mysteries the most precious; for they teach not only how to live with happiness, but also to die with a better hope.¹ So, too, Plutarch celebrates the moral effect of the mysteries on the young: "If their behaviour is at first restless and noisy, as soon as they enter they assume a new being, become calm and silent, obedient to the Deity, humble and moral."²

The enlightened, for their part, delighted to pour scorn upon these institutions; and as cavillers of to-day calculate the cubic capacity of Noah's ark, so the scorers of the mysteries reckoned up the size of Charon's skiff, which must have been very capacious to transport the hourly host of dead over the Styx. But Juvenal, who speaks of it, disapproves of such jests; and, according to him, the souls of Cannæ wished to purify themselves "as often as such a shade repairs to them."³ In the last hours of paganism, however, at the time of Marcus Aurelius, Aristides in his Eleusinius looks back with emotion to the innumerable gene-

¹ Leg. 2, 14, 36; cf. Verr. 5, 72.

² De Prof. Virt. Sent. p. 258, H.

³ 2, 155, seq.

rations of blessed men and women who have found their highest joy in this belief and its festivals; and the same feeling appears in the emblems of many sarcophagi and tombstones,¹ which display the hopes of Eleusis.

When Rome began experiments in the re-establishment of worship, it became important to naturalize the Eleusinian mysteries in Italy. In former days, Augustus had taken up the idea of endowing the mysteries anew with greater brilliancy; the emperor Claudius had occupied himself with transplanting them from Attica to Rome;² and in Lucian's time, pagan reformers sought once more to make paganism more palatable to the multitude by means of similar mysteries.³ The Eleusinian mysteries showed themselves tenacious of life under all circumstances; and the bitter fight made against them by the Fathers of the Church was due to the fact that in heathen form they provided their contemporaries with the doctrine of the future life and the right preparation for it, which the young Church claimed as its monopoly, thus satisfying a need on which Christianity, for its own part, used to reckon.⁴

It might, indeed, be asked why the Eleusinian mysteries were grudging permission to grow up into a permanent religious institution, a new church based upon the belief in immortality. It contained a great number of fruitful germs. Earnest belief in the world beyond and in retributive justice, profound maxims about Zeus, the beginning, the middle and the end of all things, attest that purer conceptions of God could be reached through them than were offered by the public worship. Moreover, there was a greater sense of nearness to the Deity. Here the Divinity appeared in quite a new light, as subdued to the varying circumstances of natural life, suffering, dying, born anew, and therefore more sympathetic to mortal hearts. At the same time the

¹ The most beautiful monument of this kind, the grave of Lysicrates, refers to the Dionysia. Cf. Overbeck, *Gesch. d. Plastik.* ii. p. 63, seqq.

² Suet. Claud. 25.

³ Luc. Alex. 38, seqq.

⁴ Clem. Al. Strom. v. 689; Potr. c. 2; Augustin, *Civ. D.* 7, 20.

ethical element strongly preponderated. The duties of purification and abstinence demanded of adepts were anything but mere outward forms. Far from this, Aristophanes had long since presupposed conduct pleasing to the gods as the first condition imposed on the mystæ.¹

Nevertheless, this cult of the mysteries was but a very imperfect expression of a real spiritual religion. The hot pulse of the old nature-worship was only too clearly felt in the orgiastic elements with which the feasts of the "saved" were bound up. This feast, otherwise so pure, did not forget that Demeter was the goddess of fertility, and her revolting symbols were carried along by the initiates in mystic caskets, which they gazed upon and touched with hand and lip. In times of faith, this had passed for an act of piety; but now many thought it indecent, just as to-day an enlightened man takes offence at songs which his forefathers sang in all devoutness with their wives and daughters. It was more clearly felt that new wine was poured into old bottles, because the Eleusinian were associated with other mysteries, in which the orgiastic character of nature-worship was presented far more crudely and completely. Thus it is perhaps allowable to say that the Eleusinian, are ruined by their association with the Dionysiac, rites, which gave a bad name to the mysteries in general, especially among the Roman police.

The same fundamental thought that dominates the worship of Osiris, Adonis, and Attis, in Egypt, Phœnicia, and Asia Minor, namely, the celebration of nature's death and revival, had in Greece found milder forms of expression in the worship of Demeter, and, in the worship of Dionysus, wilder orgiastic usages befitting the nature of the wine-god. Here, too, the varying course of nature had been invested with the history of the god's suffering and life. It was most fully worked out in the worship of the Thracian Dionysus, named Zagreus or Iacchus, which was said to have been founded by Orpheus; a worship which brought into prominence the dark side of the

¹ *Frogs*, 145, seqq.

myth, the suffering of the god. Hera pursues Semele's child, Dionysus, with implacable hatred; at her instigation the Titans tear him piecemeal; Athene saves his still beating heart, and Demeter gives him a new divine body, while the Titans are annihilated by the avenging thunderbolt of Zeus. Thus the vine, nipped and hardly used by winter's storms, becomes in its god the type of human life.¹ Each year under the flickering light of the torches borne by women worshippers, a babe was rocked in its cradle at the holy grave in Delphi, and bathed in a vessel; thus celebrating the birth and Christmas of the god.² To heighten the sympathy and love of the believers, they were shown the plaything with which the Titans allured the child from its place of security; they were reminded of his bloody sufferings and death in torment by pieces of raw flesh, which raving Mænads carried round, tearing them with their teeth and snatching them from one another. Finally, the relics of the divine body were interred by Apollo in a sacred grave. Through this last feature, Dionysus Zagreus also becomes god of the under-world by preceding all others in death, just as by going forth again in a new and divine body, he appears as the representative of human immortality. This was the kernel of the myth, though the story of Ariadne in Naxos and Semele's return from the lower world gave the opportunity for adding wanton scenes.

Though by this time the public feast of Dionysus was wild and extravagant, it was in the mysteries that the sensual element celebrated its completest triumph. Pausanias³ considers it impious to relate the bringing back of Semele from Hades, her return to upper air under the conduct of Prosymnus, and the dangers of youth from the Fauns; but in Italy the *police des mœurs* inquired more closely into the disorders of these secret representations. In the year 186 B.C., the wantonness of Asia had even found its way to Rome, carrying all before it; as Dio Cassius says:⁴ "mysteries were practised in Rome that

¹ Plut. de ei, 9; Pausan. 8; 37, 3.

² Plut. De Is. et Os. 35.

³ 2; 37, 5; 7; 28, 3.

⁴ Fragm. on the year 567, A.V.C.

united the dissolute rites of Ceres with the sensuous refinement of Iacchus."¹ First in the grove of Stimula, that is, Semele, then soon in a hundred other places, gruesome orgies took place. Even the innocent fell as victims. Allured there, and deafened with the noise of fanatical music, they were overpowered and made away with. The mischief was contagious; the crowd of mystæ continually grew in numbers—*alter jam populus*—when the consul Albinus struck boldly at the ulcer. Seven thousand men and women were either imprisoned for life or executed; and the lawless assemblies were thus checked. Thenceforward the Orphico-dionysiac mysteries could inspire no confidence. From being a profound representation of the hope of immortality, they had assumed the forbidden shape of secret excesses. So Tacitus tells how Messalina held the Dionysia in her palace: "The wine-presses creak; the must streams forth; women clad in skins leap around as sacrificing or raging Bacchantes. She herself, with floating hair, waved the thyrsus."² It is easy to understand that such infamy in the highest branch of the mysteries re-acted upon the institution itself. However enthusiastically all participants express themselves about the Eleusinian mysteries, these were finally acclimatized nowhere but in Attica. Probably there existed a great number of mysteries that could all be called offshoots of the Eleusinian and Dionysiac mysteries, but they remained secret worships. They did not reach the stage of public religion; they were therefore perpetually exposed to the danger, and still more to the suspicion, of moral corruption.

7. FOREIGN CULTS.

For centuries together the Olympians had repulsed the Asiatic nature-divinities. The holy cry of Attis was silent in the cities of Asia Minor; and the lament of Adonis was rarely heard in

¹ Liv. 39, 8—18.

² Tac. Ann. 11, 31.

the Greek cities of Syria. In the greatest city of Egypt the holy Apis and the two gods were spoken of with contempt. The time, however, had now come for the venerable gods of Asia to repay the Olympians for the defeats they had brought upon them in the long period of enlightenment under the Diadochi. If we ask how it comes that after the first century B.C. religious worship visibly transfers itself from the living types of the Olympians to the abstract, shadowy figures of the Asiatic and Egyptian deities, it may be that, imperfect as it was, their universality was one reason why they offered more fitting symbols of deity than the individual human figures of Homer's gods. The fluidity and universality of the Asiatic divinities, originally due to the want of plastic power in Oriental nations, now succeeded in establishing Asiatic conceptions of religion, as the tendency of the time was to merge the concrete gods once more in universal principles.

However, another factor must not be overlooked. The Græco-Roman world, having gone astray by itself, seeks after authorities. Unsatisfied with its own, it reaches after the ancient and the foreign. The divine has withdrawn from the proper life of the present; it is therefore sought in the past, in hoary antiquity. The age of a religion seems in itself a guarantee of its truth. New religions stand aloof from the gods; the old knew them and were beloved of them. In this forsaken world of the West no gods dwell; true worship, then, is perhaps to be sought in the far East. It was one of the rare symptoms of an unsatisfied need for religion, that the time gave credence to a cult in proportion to the remoteness of its original home and the dim antiquity it reached back to. Any living man who would speak of the divine must at least, like Apollonius, have been among the Indians and beyond the cataracts of the Nile among the Gymnosophists; or, as indeed often happened, he did better still to make use of the old and honoured names of Pythagoras, Archytas, Orpheus and the like, for his writings. Both are almost naively mingled in the sayings now current, that all

great philosophers and lawgivers learned the wisdom of the hoary East on their travels.¹ The greater the certainty that, at the present, God is withdrawn to an infinite beyond, the more likely it seemed that all truth sprang from dim remoteness. Speculating in this direction, the clever Jew Josephus wrote his tractate, "On the high Antiquity of the Jewish Religion," and his "Jewish Archæology." This tendency of the time was successfully exploited by scores of other pseudonymous writers, and gives the key to the fact that the old cults of Asia Minor and Egypt, despised in the time of the Diadochi, now acquired a new glory.

Egypt in particular had the reputation of being this land of ancient tradition,² and wished, moreover, to have this reputation. Long ago the priest who guided Herodotus over Sais put aside his appeals to Greek authorities, with a smiling reference to the burial-chambers of the kings, their generations and generations including tens of centuries.

The priest of Isis came forward in the West with the same pretensions, while factitiously keeping account of the most modern requirements. For, on closer inspection, it was the reference to the life after death which endowed Egyptian religious teachings with such attraction for the world at that time. The Greek Olympus had been a religion for the happy; now the sombre, melancholy gods of Egypt came to their rights—for in contrast to the bright world of the Olympians, that of the Egyptian gods was full of unsatisfied longings, full of lamentation and mourning; their myth, one long history of violation, murder, grief and endless wandering. Xenophanes of old could say of the Egyptians: "If those to whom you pray are gods, lament not for them; but if they are worthy of lamentation, pray not to them." Now things were otherwise; men had come to recognize the

¹ Strabo (Geog. 17, 1) makes Plato study the wisdom of the Egyptian priests thirteen years. As is well known, this practice is constant among the Neo-platonists.

² Lucian, *Dea Syra*, 2.

meaning of pain as religion, and mortality found its own redemption in contemplating the story of divine suffering. So it was that the story of Osiris' suffering spoke to the heart with a voice of power.

The characteristic of the Egyptian religion, however, was meditation on the evil for mankind arising from nature.¹ This turn of the sense of dependence was due to the influence of the Egyptian heat, the fainting earth, the many plagues of animals. The hot climate also led to the hollowing out of shady grottos as worthy dwellings for the gods—wide rock-temples, whose dim spaces, with their massy pillars in half-darkness, inspired the worship with deep awe. Every face of the gigantic monoliths of black basalt shows the depressed and melancholy character imprinted by the oppressive climate of the sons of Ham.

Thus the myth of Isis and Osiris, which, like other myths, describes the revolving course of generation and decay, the yearly change of vegetation, delights to linger over the painful side of these phenomena. Osiris, the sacred stream, has for mortal enemy Typhon, the sand-storm of the desert, the parching heat, the salt and barren flood. By him, the river is held captive and killed; while Isis, the land of Egypt, pines for him and languishes for his fertilizing stream.² After long wanderings with her step-son Anubis, his wife finds the dismembered corpse of the god, whose severed portions she gathers carefully, puts together again, and entombs at Philæ. The first point that strikes one in this embodiment of the nature-myth is the predominant insistence on the dark sides of the life of nature, and the fuller representation of divine suffering. The gloomy impression peculiar to the worship of Isis arises from this revelling in the bleeding wounds of Osiris, and the countless sufferings of the goddess.

¹ Cf. Dunker, *Gesch. des Alterth.* Vol. i.; Pfeleiderer, *Die Relig.* 2, 74, seq.: Herod. 2, 35; Diod. Sic. 1, 10 seq.; Plut. *De Isid.*

² Herod. 2, 61; 137—182; Diod. 1, 17; Plut. *De Is. et Os.* 13; cf. Creuzer, *Symbolik*, 1, 208, seq.

This is reinforced by another point. While the Phœnician worship of Adonis keeps to the surface of phenomena, and confines itself to celebrating the appearance and departure of the bloom of the fields, Osiris continues his life in the world below. The Egyptian sees in the renewal of spring a type and pledge of the soul's life extending beyond the grave. Now this precisely was the side dwelt upon in the essence of the Egyptian conceptions. This side, too, might primarily be a reflection from the Egyptian's view of nature. He saw the Nile come and go, fall and rise; he saw seasons and constellations return in their courses, like the ebb and flow on the sea-shore. Thus too, it seemed to men of reflective temper, their own life must describe a vast cycle in various phases, in order to come back to the old body after passing through one material form after another. But the existence of the soul is still bound up with the sustaining shell of sense. Hence the care for the preservation of the corpse, so that the soul, completing its course, may find its shell once more, and not be condemned to eternal wandering—a worse fate, in the eyes of the rest-loving Egyptians, than hell itself. Possibly the extraordinarily rapid advance of decomposition in this climate had originally necessitated the practice of embalming, no less than the yearly overflow of the sacred stream that swept away both soil and graves. However that may be, this usage gave the impulse which the theologians of the rock-temples directed specially to the question of the fate of the soul after death, and which so persistently dominated popular thought, that the Egyptian's most serious problem was to find time during life to build his tomb.

Starting from this side, religion had raised itself above the level of nature-worship. Not every soul might hope to live on with Osiris after its departure; this was decided by the inexorably just tribunal of the dead. He who is brought before it has his heart weighed in the scale of Justice. If his heart is found too light, he wanders in one of the seventy-five chambers of

hell, where souls are torn, beheaded and seethed. The just, on the other hand, obtain the ostrich-feather of righteousness. Strengthened by the water of life, they pass safely by all dangers till they come to the fields of the sun-god in the east. "Those who have found grace, dwell in the dwellings of glory, where the heavenly life is lived. The bodies they have quitted will rest for ever in their tombs, while they rejoice in the sight of the most high God. The god Ra saith unto them: Take your sickles, harvest the fruits of the fields that are your portion; carry them into your dwellings, enjoy them, and offer them to the gods as pure gifts of the fruits of the fields of glory."¹

Considering the religious disposition of the age, as we know it, it is no wonder if this set of conceptions met with great sympathy. Bidden to Italy through the cognate worship of Demeter, Isis became the moon-goddess as the deity of nature's regular change. The heifer, formerly the symbol of herself as the land of the Nile, now comes to mean the horns of the moon,² and mourning Isis is the real moon wrapping herself in shadow and pursuing the sun with longing. Hence Isis did not cease to be goddess at once of the under-world and of fertility. As goddess of the under-world she also rules over dreams and visions, and her priests are interpreters of dreams.³ The sick and barren are healed in her temples; her miracles are recounted by the pictures on the walls.⁴

. . . . "That such thy power, they all attest,
Those painted tablets, hanging in thy shrine."

Elevated thus to be the universal goddess, Isis became to Egyptian and Greek theologians the symbol of the one source of all things,⁵ as is proved, according to Proclus, by the inscription

¹ Cf. Pfeleiderer, l. c.

² Diod. i. 11; Plut. Is. 52.

³ Paus. Phoc. 32; Ovid, *Metamorph.* 9, 685; Cic. *Divin.* 1, 58.

⁴ Tibull. 1, 5, 27; Juven. 12, 28; Ovid, *Amores*, ii. 13, 10, seq.

⁵ Apulei. *Met.* xi. 5; Isis says of herself: "Me the Phrygians call the Mother of the gods, from Pessinus; the Athenians, Minerva; the Cypriotes, Venus; the Cretans, Diana; the Sicilians, Proserpina; at Eleusis they call me Ceres; elsewhere Juno, Bellona, Hecate, &c."

in Sais, ascribed to Isis by Plutarch: "That which is and will be and was, I am. My mantle hath none plucked away; the fruit that I bare was the sun."¹ The conception of Isis being thus generalized, it was finally possible to identify her with the Deity in general; and, in fact, the priests of Isis endeavoured to monopolize the monotheistic interest of the time for their own worship. Hence, even in Apuleius, Isis is called "the mother of all things, the queen of all elements, the beginning of the seasons, the sum of the divine, the ruler of the spirits of the departed, prototype of all male and female deities, who rules over the bright heights above heaven, the ocean's healthful streams, and the lower world of mournful silence; she whose universal godhead the whole earth worships in various ways, in manifold usage and under innumerable names."² Therefore, as Jehovah, according to the synagogue, was to supplant the other gods, so the priests of Isis intended to merge them in the one divinity of Isis. The dusky pomp of the temple, the mystic profundity of the myth, the austere rites and the monotheistic tendency of the conception of the Deity, all worked together to gain the goddess great respect among the masses. None of the foreign cults were so strictly restrained by the Roman state, and yet its windowless sanctuaries, shunning the light, rise everywhere, and its processions can be seen in every large town; white figures of women robed in thin gauze, with mirrors on their backs, shrill flute-players, men rattling the sistrum to scare away Typhon, priests with shaven heads, boat-shaped

¹ Plut. Is. 9; Procl. in Timæ. i. p. 30; cf. Hymn. in Isid. v. 31.

² Apul. Metamorph. xi. 4. Similarly her priests call upon her with these words: "Te superi colunt, observant inferi; tu rotas orbem, lumnas solem, regis mundum, calcas Tartarum. Tibi respondent sidera, redeunt tempora, gaudent numina, serviunt elementa. Tuo nutu spirant flumina, nutriunt nubila, germinant semina, crescunt germina. Tuam majestatem perhorrescunt aves cælo meantes, feræ montibus errantes, serpentes solo labentes, belluæ ponto natantes." Thus religion seemed to be maturing into a monotheism, where the many gods were to be lost, not in the Jewish Jehovah, but in the Egyptian Isis.—Apul. Met. 11, 15.

lamps, branches of palm, caducei, baskets, and golden breasts dropping milk. Then wandering figures wearing the masks, dog-headed or hawk-headed, of gods; finally, the goddess herself with the moon's disk on her head.¹

The republic had often forbidden this cult, in many ways offensive and therefore contemptible in its eyes, but in vain; the temples, levelled with the ground, continually rose anew. In Cæsar's time the goddess was at last tolerated outside the towns,² and the triumvirs could ingratiate themselves with the populace by erecting a temple to Isis in the third district of the city and securing it by law.³ After this, Rome swarmed with Egyptians, who lived on Roman superstition, and, begging from house to house in masks of Anubis, levied contributions for the goddess.⁴ The Egyptian goddess had many adherents, especially in the lower strata of society; and even districts which held themselves above all other classes clung firmly to her religious statues. Thus Propertius grows weary every new moon when the holy time keeps his mistress aloof, and he rails at the goddess:

"Hast not enough of Egypt's swarthy sons
That thou hast come so far afield to Rome?
Or what thy gain, if maidens sit alone?
Haste thee (Propertius bids); draw back thy horns,
Or, Ruthless! without ruth thou shalt be banned;
Tiber and Nile in friendship never joined."⁵

Augustus regulated the building-tax for the numerous temples, but at the same time subjected them to severer inspection, and later his minister Agrippa found it necessary to banish new temples a thousand paces beyond the walls.⁶ Under Tiberius the priests of Isis suffered a great catastrophe, in which they also involved their neighbours, the Jews. A Roman lady of quality had treated an admirer coldly. Under the pretext that Anubis desired her, some of the priests delivered her into her

¹ Apulei. Met. xi. 12.

² Dio Cass. 40, 47.

³ Ibid. 47, 15.

⁴ Appian. B. Civ. 4, 47.

⁵ El. 2, 33.

⁶ Dio Cass. 53, 2; 54.

admirer's hands. The knight, who wore the mask of Anubis, escaped with banishment; but Tiberius crucified the priests, razed their temples to the ground, and flung the statue of the goddess into the Tiber. Four thousand Egyptians and Jews then went to Sardinia as soldiers.¹

This, however, was the very last reaction of the Roman state against the secret gods of Egypt. The Flavian dynasty vied with one another in honouring them, and the emperors of the restoration saw in them the still fruitful supports of pagan religion. Historians, who upheld the old Latin ways or were averse to superstition in general, were the more encouraged to loose their shafts at the odious religion that filled the house with troublesome rites, specially repugnant to its master.² It is hardly probable that all their reproaches were well founded. The temples of Isis, like others, or perhaps to a greater degree, because windowless, may have been misused for assignations;³ but the suggestion that the strict and earnest cult itself countenanced immorality is unproved, and contradicts the fact that it received aid and furtherance from the Flavii, who were very strict in matters of public morality.⁴ The great majority of the common people certainly sought nothing in the temple of Isis but the satisfaction of their religious need. The loadstone that drew the masses from the bright temples of Jupiter into the twilight of the Egyptian sanctuaries, was not wild sensuality, but the mysterious antiquity and mystical profundity of the rites, together with their complete reference to the other world.⁵ After all, it is certainly not the vague religious instinct of the

¹ Ant. xviii. 3, 4; Tac. Ann. 2, 85; Suet. Tib. 36.

² Juven. 6, 522—549; Tibull. 1, 22—32.

³ Juven. Sat. 6, 489; 9, 20—25; Ov. A. A. 1, 77.

⁴ Eutrop. 7, 23; Lampridius Commod. 9; Spartian, Caracalla, 9; Alex. Sever. 26.

⁵ So Apuleius (Metam. xi. 11) makes the priests of Isis speak to the adept Lucius: "Ad portum quietis et aram Misericordiæ tandem venisti. Nam in eos, quorum sibi servitium Deæ nostræ majestas vindicavit, non habet locum casus infestus," &c.

populace that decides upon the tenability of a worship, but the thinkers' definite conception of the world. To them, however, the Egyptian cult remained a crude nature-worship, and that of the lowest grade, the worship of animals. Besides, the profoundest ethical thoughts could not make the crude conceptions of antiquity more endurable to the new generation, and the power of this cult over the heart endured only so long as no purer religion gave a more adequate expression to the belief in a creative power and the continued personal existence of mankind.

While it was essentially the doctrine of immortality that supported the Egyptian religion in face of the general inclination to dualism, on the other hand it was the longing after the soul's immediate contact with the divine, the tendency to direct inspiration and ecstatic spiritual revelations, that advanced the enthusiastic service of the Asiatic Mother of the gods. If the philosophers had come to the conclusion that the soul stood nearer to the divine in corybantic madness than in reasonable meditation, who could blame the ordinary man for considering the sacred rage of Cybele's priests a clear proof of divine, spiritual communion? But here, too, we have the tendency towards monotheism, in which the Mother of the gods, just like the Egyptian Isis, is held to represent the primal unity of things. The tendency to unite the gods in a higher unity was met half-way by the myth of a mother of Zeus and Hera, a sovereign queen, by right of age and dignity superior even to sovereigns. Thus the Orphics elevated Rhea, the goddess of nature and the mother's womb, to the highest principle of the universe; Time is her husband, and to Cronos she bore earth, heaven, sea and winds.¹

It was not long, however, before Rhea, too, became identified with Cybele, the Phrygian representative of the life of nature. Thus the worship of nature (here clad in the myth of Cybele and her beloved Attis) became an element in the worship of

¹ Orph. II. 14.

the Mother of the gods. The suffering of the spring-god is here described by the myth as mutilation, inflicted either by others or by himself in an access of madness. On this depends the characteristic feature of Cybele-worship, self-mutilation at her feast by the ministers of the goddess. The noisy search after the lost Attis was followed by his triumphant discovery, in which the untamed madness of Asiatic nature-worship burst out. The clash and clang of cymbals and kettle-drums, pipes and horns, accompanied the enthusiastic dances of the armed priests, who, pine-torch in hand, ran over hill and dale with streaming hair and wild cries, gashing their arms and feet. The madness of the feast, indeed, reached the pitch of bloody self-mutilation; and instead of the symbolic phallus, the bleeding subject of the emblem was itself carried in procession.

“ . . . With streaming hair
The bleeding priests of Cybele lift their wail.”¹

The celebration of this feast was divided into six days, each with its own rites. The characteristic of the whole worship was the procession; the marching of priests and hieroduli through villages and towns, with wild riot and holy *ululatus*, that filled mountain and valley with mad noise.

“Where sounds the cymbal’s voice, the drum’s hoarse roll,
Where low the Phrygian pipes on crooked reed,
Where Mænads toss their heads with ivy crowned,

.
Sudden the choir shrieks high with quivering tongue,
The light drum rolls; the hollow cymbals clash;
The hurrying throng speeds to the green hill-top.”²

Finally, this holy revel, too, came in as a new fashion, and just as the senseless sobbing and ecstatic shouting of revivals can still throw great multitudes to-day into religious excitement really sensuous in character, the sacred frenzy of Cybele’s priests acted by spreading contagion around. The multitudes joined in their clamour, and, intoxicated with it, believed they

¹ Lucan. *Pharsal.* 1, 556, seq.

² Catull. 63, 21—23, and 28—30.

could trace in their ecstasy the stir of the divine. In Lucian's time, the country people still gathered in crowds round the mendicant priests of the Mother of the gods while they made a collection. Not even the notorious vices of the pious vagrants prevented the average man from tracing the visible workings of divine possession in their frenzied dances, their distorted limbs and bloody lacerations.¹

Various motives combined to make this village-worship enjoy peculiar devotion even in the highest Roman aristocracy. The goddess had been brought to Rome in the stress of the second Punic war on a decree of the senate in conformity with Sibylline oracles.² But the glory of the great families was rooted in the memory of this period. It was possible, by means of the legend of Æneas, to represent the great Mother still more as the special protector of the nobility.³ She had performed a miracle immediately upon entering the city on behalf of certain ladies of the nobility whose reputation was in jeopardy.⁴ The actual worship, indeed, was only ministered to by natives of Asia Minor, but none the less it was one of those in whose stimulating celebrations the failing nobility of the period believed it felt the stirring of divinity more clearly than in the honourable worship of Latium's gods.

While antiquity was the attraction in the worship of Isis and Cybele, its distant home in the bright East recommended the cult that came last into fashion, the cult of the Persian Mithra. The land of the sunrise is the home of the god of light, and can, as it were, speak of him at first hand. Among the Persians, Mithra was the chief god of the lowest grade, i.e. the chief of the popular gods, who represent the twenty-eight days of the lunar month. He is the genius of the sunbeam, and his name is "the Friendly." As the prince of good geniuses, he is the lord of all life. Sleepless and vigilant ever, he is the source of light

¹ Luc. Lucius sive Asinus, 35—42.

² Liv. 29, 10.

³ Ov. Fast. 4, 247; Virg. Æn. 9, 80.

⁴ Ov. Fast. 4, 320, seq.; Cic. pro Cælio, 14, 34; Suet. Tib. 2.

and brightness; he goes on his way as an advancing hero; he gives the earth light and the sun; he contends with the Devas. Then, as all natural objects receive direct ethical significance in the Persian religion of light, it is easy to see how Mithra immediately becomes the protector of virtue and peace, and, in general, lord of the ethical system of the world.

The first opportunity of becoming acquainted with the god of light came to the Romans through the pirates whom Pompey had taken prisoner. "These," says Plutarch, "performed their strange sacrifices at Olympus, and celebrated special mysteries, of which the worship of Mithra, first introduced by them, has maintained itself to the present day."¹ Yet the worshippers of Mithra did not let it be understood that they were introducing a new deity. To them also, Mithra is simply the deity whom some call *Astræa*, some *Venus*, others *Mithra*.² What won sympathy for the worship of Mithra in Rome, was the fundamental ethical thought that the deity is set in constant strife with evil. Mithra strikes with his club the "sin-entwined Devas;" and even "death-teeming Ahriman" must tremble before him. Those who are initiated into his mysteries take the side of such champions against the principle of evil; they support those who extend the bright sphere of Ormuzd, the supreme good. After prolonged and severe probation, consisting especially in a kind of ordeal by water, fasting and scourging, they are declared soldiers of Mithra.

The initiation took place in a cavern or grotto, supposed to represent the fabric of the world; and involved all manner of horrors, passing through fire and ice, drawn swords, and waiting in dark chambers. Only after the neophyte had in these trials displayed his earnest will to defy all the terrors of Ahriman, was he invested with sword and chaplet as a soldier of Mithra, and received the holy bread and blessed cup.

All through imperial times there was a steady growth in the numbers of those who thought to attain immortality through

¹ Plut. Pomp. 24.

² In Dionys. Areop. p. 427, seq., edit. 1644.

the purifying expiations of the sun-god. The numerous Mithra-stones in every garrison, as well as many coins, attest the extension of the cult. As Osiris is god of sorrow, Mithra is the god of triumph, with whom hearts beat in unison. Platonic dualism, too, recognized its religious antitype in the dualism of the Parsees, and hoped by means of it to become the positive belief of the people. The pure and chaste god of light, of whom no myth related anything but virtue and strife against evil, won many hearts from sin-stained Olympus. No small number thought it the problem of life to wrest a tiny corner of earth from the Devas, and consecrate their home as a sanctuary of the pure Ormuzd. Above all, the most ideal characters in the history of imperial Rome gave their protection to the Mithra-worship.¹

Thus in the consciousness of believers the old Asiatic deities had gradually driven the Græco-Roman deities off the field. Perhaps the reflection arose whether the one deity of the approaching monotheistic period was to be called Isis or Mithra.² But the lingering remains of the old nature-worship were so significant, that these cults could not but remain at a disadvantage before Judaism, which was monotheistic from the first, and did not find it necessary to fuse superfluous gods into its own deity, but had always denied the others, or at most admitted their existence as devils.

This, then, was the reason why none of these cults which pressed onwards from the East maintained their ground for long. They were all religions of nature, while man was no longer

¹ E.g. Antoninus Pius, Constantius Chlorus, Julian. Cf. Lamprid. *Commod.* 9; Himerius, 7, 2.

² To what extent belief in these re-habilitated Asiatic divinities determined the precise pagan religion of later generations, is characteristically shown by the book dedicated by Firmicus Maternus to Constantine the Great: *De Errore Profanarum Religionum*. Its refutation is directed almost exclusively against the cults of Isis, Cybele and Mithra, besides the various mysteries of Bacchus, Ceres, Adonis, &c.; while the old Roman state-religion appears in itself so antiquated, that the author finds a polemic no longer necessary.

dependent upon nature. They were polytheistic, and thinkers conceived the world as a unity. Part of their heritage was coarse, sensual practices; but the sinner sought release from sensuality. They were gods of separate nations; Rome was cosmopolitan. They were religions of outward practices, fasting, ablutions; man, however, longed for a pure heart as the first condition of peace. Thus as one man inclined to brood over the future of the soul, and another to crave for contact with the divine, while a third devoted his energies to the defeat of evil, so long, doubtless, mysterious Isis, or Cybele, goddess of frenzy, or the "unconquered god," could find many adherents; but, taken as a whole, the need of the period for belief could not be permanently satisfied by any religion which had grown up on the foundation of a discredited theory of the universe. The need was not for a religion that had shifted its meaning to monotheism, but for one that had been monotheistic from the first. And this religion was at hand. Had not Israel's prophets already spoken of a millennium, and his poets sung of the everlasting that is God, and none besides?

As a matter of fact, paganism felt a strong attraction towards the synagogue, whose propaganda was one of the most effectual elements in the religious ferment of the time. The longing that gained recruits for Isis and Mithra must needs have been to the advantage of Moses and the prophets, especially as the Greek Bible had made both accessible to paganism. One would indeed doubt the consistency of human nature, if at any time only dog-headed Anubis or many-breasted Cybele had found adherents, while hearts were closed to the thunders of the Prophets and the soft spring-rain of the Psalms. On the contrary, it is clear, from the especial indignation of Roman statesmen, poets and historians, that men were fully awake to the dangers which threatened from this quarter, although underrating them in view of the wide-spread hatred of the Jews. Yet there was already on foot a great movement of the "friends of the Jews," the "believing Greeks," finding the source of its power both in the religious

need and in the new philosophy of the universe. Those who sought after a single, holy and righteous Deity, and mortified themselves for the sake of eternal life, could seek admittance to the synagogue alone. Here they were terrified by no perilous symbol, insulted by no trace of wild nature-worship. Here they found the holy Godhead they sought for, and the encouragement of the hopes their hearts desired. Here was the field which was to bear the harvest of the future.

Second Division.

THE RELIGIOUS MISSION OF THE JEWISH
DISPERSAL.

THE RELIGIOUS MISSION OF THE JEWISH DISPERSAL.

1. THE JEWS IN THE DISPERSAL.

"It is not easy," says Strabo of the Jews, "to find a spot in the world that has not sheltered this people and is not in their power."¹ The same testimony is given by Judaism itself, for as early as the second century before our era the Jewish Sibyl sings of her people :

"Thou hast filled every land and every sea,
All men thy foes for thy supremacy."²

Indeed, in both the great empires of the time, there was hardly a single great town without Jews. As they had been settled in the land of the Euphrates by the stern rights of war in former centuries, so numerous colonies had obtained a footing in Egypt and Asia Minor, partly as prisoners of war, partly attracted by great privileges. The desire of commerce, however, had led them to Greece, Macedonia, Italy and Spain. Nevertheless, this long-continued emigration was always a matter of necessity, for never was the barrenness of a country so disproportionate to the fertility of its inhabitants as in Judæa. However, it was easy to

¹ Apud Jos. Ant. xiv. 7, 2.

² Sib. iii. 271, 272. Cf. Philo, in Flacc. Mang. ii. 524; Leg. ad Cai. 577, 587. In the latter place, Herod Agrippa enumerates to Caligula all the places that have been occupied by the Jews. They are: Egypt, Phœnicia, Syria, Cœle-syria, Pamphylia, Cilicia, Asia, Bithynia, Pontus, Thessaly, Bœotia, Macedonia, Ætolia, Attica, Argos, Corinth, Peloponnesus, Eubœa, Cyprus, Crete. Cf. also the list, Acts ii. 9—11.

over-estimate the strength of this Jewish population, because they forced themselves to the front in all the chief cities, even where the open country was free from them, and still more because it is given to this notable race to be the object of universal remark, where another and equally strong section of the population would long pass unnoticed.

It would be idle to disguise the fact that these settlements were equally detested everywhere, since we possess just as many complaints against them as we do testimonies to their existence. Accustomed to cry out against oppression where they themselves were the oppressors,¹ and ascribe to their creed an aversion due to their personality,² they had no friend in the wide world but themselves and the power of the state, to which they sold themselves unconditionally. Through the latter, indeed, the Jewish dispersal even became, in a certain sense, a privileged class, until relations were strained by the outbreak of war. Treated with different measure from the rest of the provincials, the Jews enjoy civic rights and autonomy in all the new towns, i.e. those built by the Syro-Macedonian kings.³ Independent of the magistrates, they governed themselves by their own national leaders, alabarchs, archons, genarchs or ethnarchs, as they were called in the great cities.⁴ The alabarch of Alexandria, with his pre-eminent influence over Egypt and the commerce of the world, would hardly have changed places with any of the vassal princes of Asia Minor or Syria.⁵ In the older places the Jews had freedom

¹ Ant. xvi. 2, 5; xii. 3, 2; Philo, in Flacc. Mang. 525.

² Sib. 3, 271; Jos. Ap. 2, 39.

³ Ant. xii. 3, 1. The inscription of Berenice at Cyrenaica (cf. Inscr. Græc. Vol. iii. No. 5361) is interesting. It appears from it that the Jews of that city formed a *πολίτευμα* of their own under nine archons.

⁴ Cicero, Ad Atticum, 2, 17; Juven. Sat. 1, 130; Jos. Bell. vii. 3, 1; Ant. xix. 5, 2; xx. 5, 2, 3; xiv. 7, 2; 10, 17, 19; xiii. 6, 7; xvii. 12, 4; 2 Cor. xi. 32.

⁵ Ant. xviii. 8, 1. The alabarch Alexander of Alexandria was the father of the Roman proconsul Tiberius Alexander, and father-in-law of the princess Bernice: *ibid.* xix. 5, 1. Alabarch Demetrius was brother-in-law to king Agrippa: xx. 5, 3, &c.

of worship at least, if not autonomy also—as, for example, in Damascus.

Herein they were distinguished from all other cults, which, as a rule, remained confined to their native place, or at most obtained relaxation in a few instances. They were free from military service;¹ they were absolved from certain duties;² moreover, they might not be summoned before a tribunal on their feast-days; and in Asia Minor, Agrippa was so considerate of their feelings as even to forbid the prætor summoning them to surrender to their bail on the sabbath.³ Though their religion made them incapable of bearing certain burdens of Greek social life, still it did not incapacitate them from taking their share in the public distributions customary at pagan festivals. The local authorities were even bound to send a loyal Jewish community the value of the gift in money, instead of the gift of oil, to them unclean. This money, too, should the usual day of distribution fall on the sabbath, had to be paid over to them on another day.⁴

To many proselytes these advantages seemed not too dearly bought at the price of circumcision and the scorn of their fellow-citizens. Nevertheless, they were always inclined to represent themselves as persecuted, and made themselves obnoxious even to friendly officials with their endless grievances.⁵ The whole of the Dispersal, and above all the active Jews of the capital, unfailingly raised a clamour if an official seized on the property of a Jewish community, or hurt a hair of one of them. In face of the admirably directed means of making an outcry which were at the disposal of a people always inclined to riots, deputations, petitions and apologies, the constituted authorities gradually lost any desire of embroiling themselves with their Jewish communities.⁶

¹ Ant. xiv. 10, 3.

² Ibid.

³ Ant. xvi. 6, 4.

⁴ Philo, Leg. ad Gai. Mang. 569; cf. Vol. i. 263; Ant. xii. 3, 1; xiv. 10, 11; xvi. 6, 2. 4. 6. 7.

⁵ Acts xvi. 20; xvii. 6; xviii. 14; Cic. Pro Flacco, 28.

⁶ Cic. Pro Flacco, 28; Jos. l. c.; Philo, Legatio, l. c.

Their complaints had possibly less real ground than those of the cities in Asia Minor and Greece, which were no longer able to keep off Jewish encroachments at home.¹ The clannishness of this race, their world-wide ramifications, their activity, established a competition that the native traders could hardly sustain—a competition which, quite apart from religious antipathies, already provoked the vigorous hatred of the Gentiles. But little attention had been paid to Jeremiah's cosmopolitan advice: "Seek the peace of the city whither I have caused you to be carried away captives, and pray unto the Lord for it; for in the peace thereof shall ye have peace."²

They lived selfishly for their own interests, and used to seek help from the Roman government against the allies of the city. As a rule, too, they obtained it; for on this point it accorded both with Cæsar's last will³ and the traditions of the divine Augustus,⁴ to carry on the policy of the Ptolemies, who had seen in the Jewish colonies the surest allies of the constituted authorities.⁵ Thus the number of Jewish settlements at the beginning of the empire is always on the increase, and we can see in them an important factor in the history of the time, strong in their unity, and making themselves felt in the imperial palace, no less than in the poorest quarter of Rome or the remotest valleys of the province.

In the city, they accuse the oppressor of the Dispersal; in the province, they smoothe the way for the friend of the Trastevere; and in this ubiquity enjoy an influence which could even curb loud-mouthed advocates like Cicero. But Israel's peculiar and undisputed domain was commerce, especially retail trade. The very important traffic with Mesopotamia was so completely in their hands that even diplomacy often made use of the great Jewish houses in Antioch, such as the house of Saramalla, &c.;⁶ while

¹ Ant. xvi. 2, 5.² Jer. xxix. 7.³ Ant. xiv. 10, 8; Suet. Cæs. 85.⁴ Ant. xvi. 6.⁵ Ant. xii. 3, 4; xiii. 10, 4; 13, 1; xiv. 6, 2; 8, 1; Ap. 2, 4, 5; 3 Mac. iii. 3, &c.⁶ Bell. i. 13, 5.

in Alexandria the special trade of exporting corn to Rome had fallen principally into their hands by favour of the Julii.

Relations such as this became all the more noticeable, as the Jewish communities not only separated themselves rigidly from the surrounding community, but at the same time maintained unbroken connection with their national and religious capital. Although variously modified in form, the foreign Jewish community still remained a portion of Israel; the same native customs reigned in the lowest cottage of the broker as in the richest palace of the banker. Besides, the Dispersal felt itself an integral part of the chosen people, and took care not to forfeit this prerogative. Hence the connection with the centre of Jewish worship was not given up even by the most distant communities. If it was not possible to visit the temple at Jerusalem, still gifts of money were sent, which were collected year by year, received at the central towns, and carried up to the temple by representative hierophants.

Once in his life, however, every orthodox son of Israel made his pilgrimage to the temple. By this means an extremely vigorous religious life was maintained in the individual communities themselves. We also find the Jews ecclesiastically organized wherever they live. If their means were insufficient to build a common hall, they had at least a place of prayer, a *proseuche*, i.e. some secure room situated on the water or on a hill-top, which enabled them to perform their prayers and ablutions undisturbed. On the other hand, it was the pride of the Jews to erect synagogues in the great capitals like Alexandria and Antioch, worthy to stand beside the most colossal buildings of the Greeks.¹ It may be imagined what impression must have been made upon the Gentiles, used as they were to mute ceremonial, by the worship of the Jews, with its lofty readings, its austere chants and vivid discourse on the highest enigmas of life; the more so, as the many revelations of Jewish customs did not lead them to expect any such ritual.

¹ Philo, *Flacc.* ii. 528 (*Mang.*).

But this attraction of life in a Jewish community was intrinsically heightened by the fact that these common halls of the Jews were the only harbours of a certain freedom and self-government that had escaped destruction at the hands of contemporary Cæsarism. The laws of the empire against societies were, with this exception, exceedingly severe, as there was always the fear that the clubs would become the haunts of political conspiracy. One piece of legislation, prompted by distrust, enacted under what conditions such unions might be tolerated, how many members they might have, how often they might meet, to what sum their common funds might amount. At last, toleration was only extended to societies whose object was the decent burial of their members.¹ The only exceptions to this limitation of the right of combination were the Jewish synagogues, whose assemblies were regarded as purely matters of worship. Yet here it was really a question of corporate life such as was nowhere else permitted by the laws of the empire.² Owing to the theocratic system, the chiefs of the synagogue were at the same time the organs through which the body of Jews exercised the rights of self-government and administration accorded to them. Thus the synagogue became the special focus of common life. Its chiefs became its judges, with more or less extensive powers. Even where the community had not civic autonomy, public feeling was strong enough to prevent purely Jewish concerns from being carried to any tribunal but this.³ "Durst any of you," says Paul, with this in his mind, "who has matter of dispute with another, to go to law before the godless and not before the holy?" Instead, the synagogues appointed arbiters to decide between Jew and Jew. It was,

¹ Mommsen, *De Collegiis et Sodal. Rom.*, Kiel, 1843. Cf., in particular, Hadrian's letter to Pliny, in *Plin. Ep. lib. x.*

² Thus Augustus had to warn the proconsul of Asia expressly not to apply the laws against *hetæriæ* and mysteries to the assemblies of the synagogue.

³ Apion, ii. 39; 1 Cor. vi. 1, seq.

however, above all, in matters of ritual that the chiefs of the synagogue exercised stern discipline. Woe to him who by lax obedience to the law or by heretical assertions had given offence to the sensitive conscience of the Jewish community: he was instantly brought to punishment before the synagogue itself. "Five times," we read in Paul, "have I received of the Jews forty stripes save one."¹

It followed that while the Jewish communities were conceded an autonomy that nowhere else was permitted to continue in such small bodies, the attractions of this communal life was intensified by the vast extent of the nexus in which each synagogue was bound up. At one time, circular letters arrived and had to be read aloud, or letters of their own issued; at another, matters of general concern were brought before the assembly of the individual community, and news of them sent to others. Regular intercourse was also maintained with the centre of the theocracy, the Sanhedrin at Jerusalem taking care to keep the whole of the Dispersal acquainted with the calendar of festivals or important decisions of the legislature and other occurrences of note.²

So even the remotest synagogues would often receive a guest who brought stirring news; and where a ruler of the synagogue perceived a strange brother in the ranks of the devout, he would send his servant to him with the message: "If you have any word of exhortation for the people, say on."³ News passes to and fro; even in the wildest and remotest provinces of Asia Minor the school of Jerusalem finds obedient offshoots, to which the wandering Pharisees are ever-welcome messengers, carrying news as they do to the severed and isolated members of the people, and bringing them into connection with Zion.⁴

If, then, the furthest common hall belonged to a vast system that covered the whole world, how many threads must first have met in the synagogues of Antioch, Alexandria, Ephesus and

¹ 2 Cor. xi. 25.

² Vol. i. p. 67, seqq.

³ Acts xiii. 15.

⁴ Matt. xxiii. 15; Ant. xx. 2, 4; Gal. ii. 12; i. 7.

Rome. Hence the members of the synagogue speak with lofty scorn of the empty bustle of the Greek agora, the objects of whose activity, the theatre and the circus, appeared to them infinitely petty.¹ Even the Gentile population had a suspicion that the synagogue dealt with something above the common level, that it contained a tiny patch of free soil saved from the crushing uniformity of the Roman empire.

2. THE PROPAGANDA.

A people so ubiquitous and active, yet clinging together so firmly as the Jews of this period, will always leave its mark on the history of civilization. In the case before us, the religious result was the most important, for this was precisely the sphere in which Judaism had a mission at this time. Cultivated men held it as enlightenment to believe that there is one Deity, not many, and that the soul does not die with the decay of the body. But this was the belief of Judaism, not as the abstract propositions of a philosophical system, but in a form that appealed more to the heart, the form of a positive religion, assured by sacred books and a glorious history.

A second consideration may be added. While the national cults of the time were on a downward path, that of the Jews had had its heroic period a century before with the Maccabees, whose psalms and songs of victory still echoed in every heart. While all other nations looked to the remote past for the golden age, the time when their faith found its revelation, the Jews lived in the promise of a day of glory soon to dawn, when

¹ One may compare the scornful mention of the *μεγάλα δίκαια* in matters of the stage and circus, made by the Asiarchs to the assembled city communities in the central town of Ephesus, in the seventh Heraclitic letter (Bernays, 65), where the Jew's utter contempt for the useless noise of Greek popular assemblies finds expression.

Jehovah would pour out his spirit upon all flesh and the young men should see visions.

We must not either underrate the advantage that accrued to the Jews of the Dispersal in having the service of the temple, the material basis of their cult, withdrawn from their own sight and that of their Gentile fellow-citizens, so that their cult appeared to be free from all material elements. The one thing needful to a spiritual conception of the religion of the Old Testament was for the Jews of the Dispersal to stay within the bare walls of the synagogue, far from the display of the temple, the places visited by pilgrims, and the material sanctuaries of Palestine, and to build firmly on the spiritual meaning of their faith, instead of attaching their devotion to the ceremonial of sacrifice, or their worship to clay and stone. The national, historical side of religion and its spiritual capacity of truth, which to the Jew of Palestine coincided, appeared obviously separate to the Jew of the Dispersal, because for him no temple, no holy place, no processions and national festivals, hid the religious thought behind a veil of sense and traditional pomp. Divine service in the synagogues, with its reading, its interpretation and open discussion of the text, was exactly suited to bring into prominence the reasonableness, morality and eternal truth of Mosaism, and to clear the kernel of religion from its historical husk. Thus the Jewish synagogues became the first churches of a purely spiritual worship of God, and it can be understood that they became more and more filled with thoughts of the future.

Proud, conscious of victory, sure of the future, believing firmly in the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the son of the Jewish Dispersal confronted the outworn religious existence of paganism as it then was. Without reverence for the past of the nation he lived amongst, with no sense of the grandeur of Homer's world and the youth of the Hellenes, he attacked paganism with the mordant and destructive irony of hostile criticism. But while opposing all the institutions around him with the deepest irony,

he had set up his own theocratic state among the loosened joints of the polity that had received him; and this state began assiduously to spread its network over paganism, and dreamed of uniting the "Gentile world" with Jerusalem. For Israel was everywhere; and where it was, it would rule, and rule assuredly in connection with the ancient city of David. If the Jews in Judæa, considering their claim to be the chosen people, must often have consoled themselves since the beginning of the Roman period with the remembrance of the wars of the Maccabees and the prospect of a better future, their scattered kin recognized instead that Israel's superiority did not consist merely in the prospect of future dominion over the world, but was already secured to them in the present by Israel's purer religion and better morals. The synagogue was filled with pride when it looked forth from the spiritual world of the prophets in which it lived, and on every side saw senseless idolatry, and heard of a mythology that related all manner of scandal about its own gods.¹ The spreading worship of the emperor, the flood of obscene nature-worship, the laxity of morals and the practice of unnatural vices in the light of day, made the Jews still prouder of their inheritance.

Paul's recognition of God's wrath against the Gentiles in the idolatry and immorality of the world, strikes a profound note of Jewish feeling. The position of the Jews is perfectly characterized in the apostle's address to them: "Behold, thou art called a Jew, and retest in the law, and makest thy boast of God, and knowest his will, and approvest the things that are more excellent, being instructed out of the law; and art confident that thou thyself art a guide of the blind, a light of them which are in darkness, an instructor of the foolish, a teacher of babes, which hast the form of knowledge and of the truth in the law." It was precisely this proud consciousness that led the Jewish quarter, in other respects narrowly exclusive, to offer their religious treasures to the Gentiles. Besides, the Gentile

¹ Jos. contr. Ap. 2, 34; Rom. i. 2.

assault had already provoked them to assert the advantages of the Jewish doctrine of God as compared with the Gentile religion. Where, as in Egypt, Asia Minor and Greece, the Greek language made the interchange of thought easier, literary discussion took place between Jews and heathens, in which, if race-hatred had allowed itself to be conquered by reason, victory could not have failed to rest with the Jew.

As, however, experience taught Jewish writers that an open defence of their faith was usually thrown aside unread by the Gentile public, they actually resorted to the device of putting the monotheistic thought and Messianic hope of their religion in the mouth of heathen authorities. Religious themes such as these found it advantageous to make use of the mythical bard Orpheus; for among the Greeks he had become a collective personality, whose name had been affixed by preference to all products of the speculative theological cast from the time of Herodotus onwards.¹ Orpheus, indeed, had founded the mysteries of Dionysus Zagreus; and the deeper sayings about all-embracing Zeus and retribution hereafter, current among the people, were all called Orphic wisdom.

This presumably Orphic literature was so highly esteemed as to be publicly expounded in the schools of rhetoric. It became all the more effective when commingled with Jewish productions; and thus as early as B.C. 160, one of the fathers of Alexandrian literature, the peripatetic and courtly scholar Aristobulus, hit upon the thought of putting the praise of Judaism in the mouth of the mythical bard, and of judaizing other well-known Orphic verses. These he offered to the public in a commentary on the five books of Moses, which was intended to prove that the Old Testament had been the source of Plato's and Pythagoras' philosophy, as well as of the songs of Orpheus, Hesiod, Homer and Linus. This the ingenious Jew proved by interpolating verses which he had composed himself, and which naturally enough turned out sufficiently Jewish. One of these proofs has come

¹ Herod. 2, 53.

down to us, in which Orpheus appears in support of Abraham, the Jewish law and the sabbath.¹ "God's self," says the Thracian singer, himself son of a river-god and the muse Calliope,

"God's self I cannot know; Him clouds conceal,
Whom yet commandments ten to man reveal.
Him to behold might mortal ne'er attain,
Save one; the water-born, on tables twain,
Moses, received the knowledge from on high."

Of even more imposing authority than the Thracian Orpheus was the ancient Sibyl. She, who had prophesied to Agamemnon's host as the Erythræan, and dealt with Tarquin as the Sibyl of Cumæ, now delivered her reverend voice for Judaism. In fact, among the verses passing current as Sibylline, there were many oracles in which the *Jewish* propaganda directs itself to the conscience of the Gentile world, in order to summon it to the true knowledge of God and a purer life, and to show it the Jewish people as "the nation appointed as the guide of life for all mortals."²

The earliest attempt of this kind is the collection of old pagan theogonies and prophecies, preserved in the third book of Sibylline prophecies, which a Jew, living in Egypt in the time of Ptolemy Philometor, about the middle of the second century B.C., collected, revised and prefaced³ with a hymn elsewhere⁴ preserved. Starting from the building of the Babylonian tower and the confusion of tongues, the Sibyl, "Noah's daughter-in-law," here relates the history of the world in a strange mixture of Old Testament narratives and heathen theogony. She identifies Hesiod's Uranus with father Noah; Saturn, Titan and Iapetus, with Shem, Ham and Japhet; and she makes the God

¹ Euseb. Præp. Ev. 13, 12; apud Justin, De Monarch. 2; Cohort. ad Gentes, 15. Other fragments in Clem. Alex. and Euseb. Præp. Ev. vii. 14; viii. 10.

² Sib. iii. 195.

³ Sib. iii. 97—807; cf. Friedlieb, xxxvii. For the position of the question, cf. Schürer, Neutest. Zeitgesch. 514, seq.

⁴ Apud Theophil. of Antioch, Ad Autol. 2, 86.

of Abraham interpose against the Titans' presumption. The characteristic note of the converted Sibyl's narrative, where David's kingdom, and not Rome, becomes the central influence of the world, is the pride of the Maccabean period, the period when Israel once more acquired political significance, and when the Egyptian Jews found an object for their patriotic aspirations.

The finishing touch of reality was given by a collection of eight oracles, which the editor plentifully interlarded with matter of his own and expanded with reminiscences of Ezekiel, Daniel and other prophets. Now the essential part of his additions lies in the fact that he suggests a motive for the ancient forebodings of evil in the heathen vaticinations; namely, prophetic reference to the perversity of worship and the neglect of the true God. Messianic salvation, however, is offered in prospect to Phœnicians, Egyptians, Greeks and Latins, by the Sibyl of Cumæ, if, humbled by adversity, they will reject idols and turn to the true God. As it lies before us, this collection has the appearance of a thick layer of conglomerate, composed of pieces of very different ages, which in later times underwent frequent interpolation and enlargement.

To the same period as the Jewish Sibyl and Aristobulus' Orphica belong the words of warning,¹ for which some Jew, well read in Aristotle and the Pentateuch, borrowed the name of the gnomic poet Phocylides of Miletus, in hope of obtaining more willing hearers for a Biblical moral. His purpose was to bring home to his Gentile fellow-citizens that class of laws which, according to the Jewish view, bound all men, even those who were not Jews; or which, to speak after the later school, God had not revealed to Abraham for the seed of Abraham, but to Noah for all mankind.² The warning he puts in the mouth of

¹ Ποῖημα νουθετικόν. Cf. J. Bernays, Ueber das Phokylideische Gedicht. Ein Beitrag zur hellenistischen Literatur. : Berlin, 1865. The Christian revision, in Sib. ii. 55—153.

² The author composes these prayers principally from the Decalogue, the nineteenth chapter of Leviticus, and Deuteronomy. He has also cast several proverbs of Solomon into classical hexameters with great dexterity. The

Phocylides, to keep on good terms with the Jewish quarter, might with great justice be ascribed to himself: "Let strangers receive equal honour among the citizens, for we all have to endure uncertain life abroad."¹

The time of Phocylides or thereabouts may also be the date of a piece of Jewish self-glorification that has come down to us under the title of the "Letter of Aristeeas to his brother Philocrates," and is accepted by Philo and Josephus as simple truth.² The book treats of the origin of the Septuagint, a theme that gave ample opportunity to insist upon the loftiness of the Jewish law, the pomp of the temple, the wisdom of the high-priest, and, in passing, to enjoin the privileges of Egyptian Jews. While, however, the writer's object was more self-glorification than conversion, later writers throw themselves into a very different propaganda. Just as Aristobulus had brought the Thracian bard, so a later writer brought even Sophocles to the circumcision, by putting a friar's sermon against the Greek gods whole course of this poem can only be explained by the portions of the Bible he had before him. He had chosen to prefix the name of Phocylides to his moral sayings from the Bible, because the stringing together disconnected sentences was known as the peculiar characteristic of Phocylides' style. Dio Chrys. ii. 79 R. It was thus all the easier for Aristotle, the Old Testament, and the wisdom of pagan oracles (l. 162), to be combined and win support for a good morality, essentially Jewish from its rigid conception of the ties of kindred and the duties of truth and honour, down to the precepts of kindness to animals and of forbidden meats. Its purpose was, not so much to summon the heathen to be converted to Judaism, as to dissuade them, in the name of one of their own race, from practices that could not fail to be particularly offensive to a Jew. In the later additions, for the most part, some of which come from a Christian, some from a Jewish hand, still further demands are made in this direction, as, for example, in the Sibyl (2, 91—96), a series of warnings is inserted after verse 30, in which the prohibitions of meats are still further extended. For the later writer is not satisfied, like Phocylides, if a man has no meat weighed to him in the market of animals that have died a natural death or been mangled; his warning goes farther: Eat not of the blood and abstain from the flesh of sacrifices.

¹ l. 39, seq.

² The letter itself in Merx' *Archiv für wissenschaft. Erforschung des alten Test.*, Vol. i. pp. 241—312, 1868; cf. *Jos. Ant.* xii. 2; Philo, *Vita Mos.* in *Mangey*, 139, seq.

in the mouth of the God-fearing tragedian.¹ Similar polemics are conducted by the two Apocrypha, "Bel and the Dragon" and the "Epistle of Jeremiah," the age of which is very difficult to fix, but which pour out the most biting sarcasms of Jewish contempt for Gentile worship.

This, too, is essentially the object of an Ephesian Jew who must have come into close contact with the apostle Paul, and about the middle of the first century addressed Heraclitean epistles to the citizens of the city of Artemis, in order to explain to the perverse people of Ephesus why their gloomy philosopher had never smiled in his life.² A son of the synagogue assumed the sour mask of the "mob-reviling" Heraclitus, in order to protest emphatically against the vices of heathendom and the follies of their worship, and at the same time to break a lance for monotheistic truth, for Jewish laws of meats, and the rights of slaves, eunuchs and all oppressed races.³ The same series, further, of apologetic tendencies is continued by Eupolemus⁴ in historical writings, Artapanus⁵ in a work on the Jews, and Demetrius⁶ in his narratives from the Hebrew antiquities.

Finally, there are many interpolations by means of which Jewish copyists were able to smuggle their beliefs even into the classics, as, e.g., in the *Odyssey*, Ulysses' boat must serve to teach that God made the world in six days, while the text has: "Now was the fourth day, on which all was completed."⁷

It is clearly seen from these fragmentary remains of a pseudonymous Jewish literature how, under the cloak of great names, public opinion must have been worked upon on Israel's behalf. There was nothing for the moral consciousness of the time to take offence at in such a game of hide-and-seek. It was merely the use of a perfectly ordinary form of authorship, shared by

¹ In Clem. Al. *Stromata*, 5, 4; in Bentley, pp. 462, 529.

² J. Bernays, *Die heraclit. Briefe*: Berlin, 1869. ³ Cf. Epp. 4, 7.

⁴ Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* ix. 17, 26, 30—34, 39; Clem. Al. *Strom.* i. p. 343, ed. Sylburg; Joseph. *Ap.* 1, 23.

⁵ Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* ix. 18, 23, 27. ⁶ *Ibid.* 21, 29. ⁷ *Od.* 5, 262.

philosophical schools in their endeavours to impress public opinion. But of course the main object was to meet the disposition of the time to ascribe the most infallible truth to the most ancient religions. Ancient testimony was to accredit the high antiquity of the Jewish religion. Thus the man above mentioned, Artapanus,¹ actually identified the lawgiver Moses with the mythical Musæus, called by the Greeks the most ancient of poets; he declares, indeed, it was Moses who brought writing to mankind, and who was wrongly worshipped by them as Hermes.

Conformably, then, with this high antiquity of the Jewish religion, everything existing among the heathen in the way of true knowledge of God was but a dark offset from the bright stream of Old Testament revelation. To this effect the Peripatetic and court-theologian, Aristobulus, informed his king, Ptolemy Philometer: "Plato took our legislation as his model, and it is certain that he knew it in its entirety. . . . The same is true of Pythagoras, who, moreover, hid from us no few of his doctrines."² In the same strain, when the Greeks of Alexandria set up the nobility of their religious book, the immortal Homer, against the Jewish vaunts about their law, the Jewish Sibyl replied uncensured:

"My words, my verse, the Chian singer took;
His were the hands that first unrolled my book."³

Now if we take a general survey of the contents of these Jewish treatises for the conversion of the pagan world, they betray a surprising knowledge of the religious condition of the time and its needs. With unflinching tact they put forward from the treasures of Mosaism those thoughts which harmonize with the dualistic Greek view of the universe, without ever raising the question of ritual and its requirements, then regarded in Palestine itself as matters of supreme importance. In particular, there were two influences by means of which Judaism expected to make an unflinching impression on all religious minds: first,

¹ Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* 9, 18—23.

² *Ibid.* xiii. 12, p. 663.

³ *Sib.* 3, 425; cf. *Wisdom of Solomon*, x.—xii.; contra *Ap.* 2, 39.

the sublime conception of God in the Old Testament; and secondly, the doctrine of the last things, the impending judgment and promised kingdom of God. Monotheism and Messianic hope, belief in one God and the victory of good over evil in the world, are the two fundamental truths to which this pseudonymous Jewish literature reduces its Judaism. The fine exordium of the Jewish Sibyl appeals to the Gentile world in the full utterance of a deep-seated consciousness of God:

“There is One God, eternal, infinite,
 Supreme, invisible, yet seeing all,
 Himself by mortal beings ne’er beheld.
 Him worship, Him, sole God, and Lord of all,
 Instead of sacrifice to sprites and shades.
 Come! nor for ever darkness seek and night.
 Behold how glorious shine the sun’s fair rays.
 Learn, then, and in your hearts set deep this truth:
 There is One God, who sends you rain and wind,
 Storm and forked lightning, famine, pestilence,
 Snowdrift and ice and tribulation sore.
 Who can recount them all? He holds the sway
 Of heaven, He rules the earth, the Lord
 Who is sole God, Creator, Sovereign;
 Who also made the form of man erect,
 And shapes the nature of all mortal things.”¹

Whatever other objections may be made to the originality and spiritual tendency of these Hellenistic writings, they are dominated throughout by an actual passion for monotheism, and the lofty preaching of one sole, pure, spiritual God makes all the more impression, as it is everywhere set off against the dark background of heathen idolatry. Thus what the Sibyl introduces is at bottom a purely educational method in order to work upon the Gentile conscience. As soon as she has awakened repugnance, not only to the folly, but also to the wickedness of idolatry—as soon as she has strengthened the belief in one sole, spiritual, invisible God—she offers a hand to help her reader to attain in his own person the worship of the true God. For

¹ Sib. Frag. i.; Friedlieb, p. 5.

the praise of the people follows, all unsought, the picture of Gentile perversity :

“They care not for the orbit round the sun,
Nor for the ocean-depths, nor the sea-waves,
Nor sneezing omens, nor the auguring birds,
Nor for deceivers, wizards, perjurers,
Nor silly fables of ventriloquists ;
Nor they from planets tell Chaldean lore,
Nor watch the stars : all this is but deceit.”¹

“Neither did the mischievous invention of men deceive us,” says the author of the Book of Wisdom, with pride ; “nor an image spotted with divers colours, the painter’s fruitless labour, the sight whereof enticeth fools to lust after it.”² But what except the nobility of its law was the source of Israel’s infinite superiority ? To hear the Hellenists speak of it, one would believe that the law “that is for a curse,” contained nothing but precepts of pure humanity, purity of heart and human kindness, of mercy and universal brotherhood. The common tactics of the Sibyl, Phocylides, the Book of Wisdom, Philo and Josephus, in presenting the Jewish law to paganism, are to disregard entirely the books on ritual, and to represent the whole as a collection of purely humanitarian precepts, which must be assured of the most universal acceptance.³ According to this representation, the universal laws of reason, love and morality, are all that the Pentateuch contains. “Since our laws contain the most perfect righteousness,” says Josephus, “we must through them become kind and genial towards all, and we desire this spirit of humanity to become manifest in our disposition.”⁴

Thus the author of the Book of Wisdom could boldly assert before the mocking and vicious populace of Alexandria, that Wisdom, the first created of all spirits, a breath of mighty power, the principle of all life and godly existence, had established her habitation in the Jewish law, and that there was therefore no

¹ Sib. iii. 221—228.

² Wisd. Sol. xv. 4.

³ Most extensively in Jos. Ap. 2, 24, seq. ; Ant. xvi. 6, 8 ; Sib. iii. 234—247.

⁴ Ant. xvi. 6, 8.

salvation outside Israel. The only way to true morality was by joining the synagogue. Such a step, moreover, was compelled by the threatening penalties, the ever clearer signs of the time, and even the pagan oracles themselves, which the Sibyl recalled to the memory of the people.¹ "To him," however, who turned to the true and only God, and gave up the worship of dæmons and the unclean creature,

"To him will fall the lot of endless life,
And he will live 'mid Eden's greenest bowers,
And taste the precious bread sent down from heaven."

Thus all the fairest scenes and promises of the prophets were finally set before heathendom. As soon as the world is converted to the Jewish God and the Jewish law, concord, love, faith, hospitality, will reign on earth, the trees will grow green, the flocks increase, wolf and lamb will feed together, and the suckling play with the dragon. That will be the time when there will remain but one law and one temple, and

"Then from the lip these sweet words rise in song ;
Come all, and fall upon the ground and pray
To God, immortal king, most high and great.
And to the temple let us send, for he
Is Lord alone ; and let us one and all
Ponder upon the law of most high God."²

It is in the nature of such missionary pamphlets to ring the changes on the fundamental thoughts of their religion to satiety, and, by adapting them to the comprehension of the Gentile world, to dilute the original strength of holy writ, and weaken its rhetorical beauty. The like breadth of unction and wide-sweeping repetition of thoughts for ever the same, are assumed by the Jewish Sibyl, who, not without justice, was called the storehouse "in which are commingled rich affluents from the flattest waters of sermonizing, as well as from the living streams of the history and poetry of individual nations."³ Doubtless the Greek Bible would have exercised a very different proselytizing effect if it had had an entry into Gentile homes such as was secured by

¹ Sib. iii. 675—680.

² Ibid. 710—728.

³ Bernays, l. c.

the scholarship of Alexandria cloaked in the disguise of the Sibyl. But it had a direct effect only on those Gentiles who were already inclined at heart to visit the schools of the Jews.

Nevertheless, these pseudonymous Jewish writers had a great influence on the thought of their time. Their biting sarcasm was scarcely needed any longer to shatter the foundations of the established religion. In this they had been forestalled by Greek philosophy itself. But quite apart from the indirect and indeed imponderable influence of Jewish theism upon that of the Platonic schools, these pseudonymous writings provided for their contemporaries a series of positive Jewish conceptions, as can be proved without difficulty. An express reference of Virgil to our Sibyl¹ shows at once that Roman paganism, not excepting the priestly colleges, was fully persuaded that this Jewish oracle was the genuine, primitive utterance of the Cumæan Sibyl. Now the part that impressed Rome among the Jewish conceptions was the eschatology. That dark horror of waiting judgment and the expectation of a universal catastrophe, such as we meet with in inspired utterances and historians of this period,² arise ultimately from the apocalyptic view of contemporary Judaism. It seems, too, as if the synagogue had continually fostered this belief with special declarations; at all events, the Sibyl contains many oracles which connect the message of wrath with special occasions. Roman theology—and here, too, the Stoics again stand in the foreground—hastened to translate this superstition into Latin. Conformably with the teaching of the Academy and the Stoics, that the year of the world consists of ten secular months, the expectation of the Messianic kingdom meant to the Roman augurs that the year of the world was drawing to a close, and the month of Saturn, the golden age, was now to return.³ So sang Virgil in the year 40 B.C.:

¹ *Ecl.* iv.

² *Tac. Ann.* 6, 28; 12, 43. 64; *Hist.* 1, 3; *Suet.* 4, 6; *Dio Cass.* 60, 35.

³ Cf. Ladewig, *Virgil's Gedichte*, on *Eclogue* iv. The prophecy itself, which refers to the son of Asinius Pollio, was referred to Christ by Eusebius

“ The final age, whereof the Sibyl sang,
 Has come at last ; and now is born anew
 The mighty cycle of the centuries.
 Now too returns the Virgin, now returns
 The rule of Saturn ; and from heaven on high
 Descending, unto earth a child is born.”

A more definite opinion of the interpreters of oracles was, that the ninth month of the world ended with Julius Cæsar's death, and with it the rule of Diana. Thus the last period, that of Apollo, had already begun ; and since the secular months were of unequal lengths, and the whole Roman world longed for the unrest of the second triumvirate to end, there was a natural inclination to make this last period as short as possible. Virgil therefore, though only half in earnest, thought it was already on the wane, and came to an end with the year 40, Asinius Pollio's consulship. The first æon in the cycle of years returns to the world with Pollio's consulship (which was also the date of the coronation of the first Herod). But in this golden age of Saturn, a picture of which Virgil unfolds before us, we have no difficulty in recognizing the Messianic age of the Sibyl—that is to say, of the Hebrew prophets, the features of which are here reproduced by Virgil. The singer sees a child descending from the height of heaven, to bring the golden age to earth. The earth will offer her gifts to this child without toilsome tillage ; the full-uddered goats will come to him of their own accord, and peace takes up her abode on earth. The ox will fear the lion no more ; flowers will spring up round the cradle ; serpents die, poisonous herbs wither away, and the exotic balsam grows wild. When the child is grown up, the golden age begins. Commerce ceases, for every land brings forth all products of itself. The vine-dresser toils no more in the sweat of his brow ; the very steer that draws the plough is relieved of his galling yoke ; wool no longer needs dyeing, for even in the meadows the lambs stray in purple and saffron and scarlet. To spin these days the Parcæ

(*Vita Const.* 5, 19) and Augustin (*Civ. Dei*, 10, 27), &c. Cf. Vol. i. p. 31 (Eng. tr.).

whirl their spindles in unison, and the world lies unsatisfied under the weight of heaven, and land and sea yearn for the consummation :

“ Oh that my latter end of life would last,
And inspiration to recount thy deeds ! ”

In this manner the old saying of Isaiah, “ Unto us a child is born ; unto us a son is given ; and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, mighty God,”¹ was reflected in Virgil’s consciousness. It is true, however, that the turn he gives to the glorious promise brings us down at once from the religious heights in which the Sibyl moved, to the low sphere of literary adulation. The child he refers to is the son of his patron Pollio, C. Asinius Gallus, in youth the companion of Herod’s sons,² who, far from bringing the golden age, was starved to death under Tiberius.³ His junior Ovid once more deferred the hope of any immediate prospect of the golden age, which Virgil would date from the peace of Brundisium. For Ovid, the age of Saturn lies behind in distant obscurity ; but he, too, pictures the age of peace, the subsequent degeneration of mankind, and later still the deluge sent by celestial powers, in colours which, unknown to himself, he owed to the despised Jewish people.⁴

Thus not only Jewish monotheism, but also the concrete hopes of Jewish religion for the future, had become known to the Romans. It may well be believed that conceptions which had risen from the gloomy Ghetto and the despised synagogue to the loftiest regions of the cultivated world, even finding an echo in Octavian’s circle, must have found proportionately louder accord in the lowest strata of the people. Among these, the Messianic promise was taken at its own valuation, not as a poetic dream, but as a sober prophecy. This glad news was eagerly welcomed among those portions of the populace who knew, from bitter experience and not mere phantasy, that theirs was the age of iron, and that the earth was bowed down under the weight of

¹ Isaiah ix. 6.

² Vol. ii. 15 (Eng. tr.).

³ Tac. Ann. 6, 23.

⁴ Ov. Metam. 1, 89—437.

violence and sin. What appeared as a useful poetic motive to the most cultivated minds of the Augustan period, was a real hope to the ordinary man sighing for redress. He listened with holy devotion to the whispers of the grey-headed Jew, the murmur of the aged Jewess.¹ To him, the words of the prophets were an offer that made earnest acceptance advisable; for, excepting the idolater sunk in sensuality, they promised to show the repentant the way to the sacred presence of God, and told of the day of the eternally beautiful and good behind the sorrows of the triumvirate and Cæsarism. Of course the classes of the people here spoken of have left no literary witness of their thoughts and hopes; but the force of their conviction is attested by their firm resolve to cross the bounds of the despised Jewish quarter, and, under the instruction of Hebrew mendicants, to obtain the initiation that entitled them to enter the synagogue.

3. THE PROSELYTES.

It is clear, from every mention made of the Jews by Roman and Greek historians, that the Gentile population as a whole had nothing but outspoken aversion for these Eastern aliens in their cities, with their personal exclusiveness and the exclusive observance of their homes. Nevertheless, the synagogue still offered a strong attraction to religious natures; for the lofty conception of God in the Old Testament, the nobility of the Psalms and Prophets, drew into the pale of Jewish worship many who had drifted from their own circle of gods, especially in a time which was given up to the formation of sects in such various directions.

The same emptiness of public life which turned the intellectual youth to literary pursuits and produced a brilliant epoch of poetry, drove the poor in spirit into the synagogue, which had

¹ Juvenal, vi. 541, seq.

the power to add cheerfulness to life. "There is not a single city, Greek or other," says Josephus,¹ "which had not been reached by the custom of the seventh day kept holy by us; not one in which the fasts, the feasts with lights, and many of our prohibitions with respect to meats, were not observed. Moreover, they seek to imitate our mutual concord, our liberality with our property, our industry in handicraft and endurance in suffering for the Law's sake. But the most wonderful of all is that the Law, stronger than the attraction towards sensual enjoyment, has established itself impregnably. As God diffuses himself through the universe, so the Law has advanced through mankind." In this, indeed, Josephus has not said too much, for there are not wanting examples of whole communities, like Paul's Galatians, pressing forward to be circumcised.² In Rome,³ Alexandria,⁴ Antioch,⁵ Damascus⁶ and other great cities, the friends of the Jews could often be counted in no smaller numbers than the Jews themselves:—the women especially, who found in the synagogue the consolations that the public worship no longer gave. In Damascus, the vast majority of women openly preferred the Jewish hymns and a quiet seat in the latticed space of the synagogue, to the hideous, noisy processions of the Syrian goddess and the chilly spaces of the Hellenic temples.⁷ Thus when Paul frequently finds none but women in the places of prayer and gains them for his church,⁸ or when Ovid⁹ recommends the dandies of the capital to review the beauties at the doors of the houses of prayer, both illustrate the quiet attraction exerted on the feminine mind by the grandeur of the Old Covenant, which here holds them fast despite all the faults to be found with the sons of Abraham. In general, then, the

¹ Ap. 2, 11 and 39. Similarly in Philo, *Vita Mos.* Mang. 137. Seneca in August. *Civ. Dei.* 6, 11; in *De Superstit.*, ed. Haase, iii. p. 427.

² Gal. v. 2; Ant. xx. 2, 2.

³ Tac. Ann. 5, 5.

⁴ Strabo in Jos. Ant. xiv. 7, 2.

⁵ Ant. iii. 3, 2; Bell. ii. 3, 3.

⁶ Bell. ii. 20, 2.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Acts xvi. 14, xvii. 4.

⁹ *Ars Amat.* 1, 76.

attraction of Judaism for its contemporaries must only be ascribed to the magnetic influence which goodness, however veiled, always exercises upon the good. Other motives can only play a secondary part.

Beside this quiet missionary activity of the Greek Bible and the Jewish synagogue, proselytizing went on busily through the Pharisees, who traversed land and sea to enlist recruits for Judaism. Among the more notable scribes, Rabbi Hillel and Gamaliel were specially credited as being friends of the mission to the Gentiles. Gamaliel's son, too, Simon, afterwards president of the Sanhedrin, used to say: "If a heathen comes to enter the covenant, hold out a helping hand to bring him under the wing of God."¹ Jesus had long since remarked the Pharisees' activity in this direction, and blamed them when, as so often, the Gentiles were puffed up with the vanity which had led them to circumcision, saying: "Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, ye make him twofold more the child of hell than yourselves."² Paul passed the same judgment on the Judæo-Christian Pharisees: "For neither they themselves keep the law; but desire to have you circumcised, that they may glory in your flesh."³

The activity with which many Rabbis threw themselves into this pursuit recalls in many respects the zeal of the first Christian missions. Thus a Jewish merchant, Ananias, converted the exiled prince Izates of Adiabene; and when the latter returned from exile to Adiabene, he found that meanwhile all the women of his family, led by the old queen Helena, had been won over to the same belief by a second Jew. Before long there appeared a third, Rabbi Eleazar, who insisted upon the completion of the Jewish law, and further compelled the king to be circumcised.⁴ Filled with the same zeal, the young Pharisee

¹ Leyrer in Herzog's R. Encl., article "Proselytes," p. 242.

² Matt. xxiii. 15.

³ Gal. vi. 13.

⁴ Ant. xx. 2, 2, seq.; Bell. ii. 19, 2; v. 2, 2; 4, 2; 6, 1; vi. 4. Obviously, from frequent references, a matter of great pride to Josephus.

Josephus, who barely escaped from shipwreck, found nothing more pressing to do in Puteoli than to introduce himself to the believer Poppæa and interest her in the concerns of Jerusalem.¹ In short, the reason of the Pharisees thus compassing land and sea was to gain recruits for Judaism.

Moreover, the other part of the Lord's saying found abundant fulfilment. The Rabbis themselves do not unreservedly praise the converts whom they had been so zealous in gaining. Even if the majority had adopted the little honoured religion from undoubtedly pure motives, still this does not exclude the influence of worldly considerations in individual cases. Jewish freedom from military service was attractive; it was not, perhaps, without special appropriateness that, in the year 19, the Jewish community at Rome, who had already offended Tiberius in many ways, were punished by him for the affair of Fulvia with nothing more or less than a military levy.² While this immunity and commercial connection often determined the conversion of the average man, among those of better position marriage with a rich Jewess was generally the inducement to submit to circumcision.³

Besides these, we hear of proselytes from the king's table, who adapted themselves to Judaism with a view to the little Jewish court; "lion-proselytes," who had turned to Jehovah in consequence of sad experiences, or from fear of misfortune; in terror at a public calamity or personal danger, as once the inhabitants of Samaria during a visitation of lions;⁴ or thirdly, proselytes from fear, such as the tribune Metilius, commandant of Antonia, who assumed Judaism in the year 66, after the saving of his life.⁵ As, indeed, these names show, the Rabbis

¹ Vita, 3.

² Tac. Ann. 2, 85, perhaps thinks primarily of the proselytes: *quatuor millia libertini generis ea superstitione infecta*. Cf. Suet. Tib. 36; Ant. xviii. 3, 5.

³ Ant. xx. 7, 2, 3; xvi. 7, 6.

⁴ 2 Kings xvii. 26. Cf. Leyrer, Herzog's R. Enc. 12, 242.

⁵ Bell. ii. 17, 25.

themselves were quick to suspect the motives of their protégés; and those who were thus branded may really have become doubly children of hell. But still it would be folly to try to explain so significant a phenomenon as proselytism by fortuitous and impure motives. The vast majority of devout Gentiles certainly sought in the synagogue nothing but the true God.

With regard to the position of the proselytes within the society of the synagogue, the scribes have for centuries discussed the question of legislating for the proselytes with their usual minuteness. The extent of the obligations imposed on the friends of the Jews was doubtless very different at different times.¹ At first the synagogue advanced two steps towards Gentile seekers. It was far from demanding fulfilment by the Gentile of all the precepts under whose discipline the Jew himself had grown up. That suppression of ritual, found in the literary glorification of the law, corresponded rather to the mild practice of the synagogue, which only required the believing Gentile to abstain from all matters which gave great offence to the sons of Israel.

The precepts of the law itself offered an analogy to such a relation as this. Ancient Israel suffered the stranger within their gates on condition that he kept the sabbath,² and did not blaspheme Jehovah,³ that he neither ate blood nor any strangled animal, and in general avoided all "abominations." So, too, at this time, the Gentile thirsting for salvation was admitted to Israel's houses of prayer on condition of avoiding what was an abomination to Israel. To define this more closely, seven injunctions appear after the year 70, interdicting the proselyte of the gate from blasphemy, idolatry, homicide, unnatural crimes, the eating of blood, and, finally, theft and insubordination. Starting from these precepts, the Rabbis feigned

¹ The laws about the proselytes are collected in the tractate Gerim, published by Raphael Kirchheim, in his collection *Septem Libri Talmudici*: Frankf. a. M. 1851. Cf. further, Schürer, *Neutest. Ztg.*, and Lipsius, *Apostelconcil*, in *Schenkel's Bible-Lexicon*, 1. 204.

² Exodus xx. 10; Levit. xvii. 12.

³ Levit. xxiv. 16.

them to be a law given to Noah, by which all nations were bound, while the Mosaic law was binding only on the sons of Abraham. These "commands of Noah" are first recognizable in the Gemara, but various approximations to them are seen in rules of the same kind for Gentile believers. These rules require them to avoid all that stirs Jehovah's wrath and cuts off his good will. The proselytes of the gate are universally regarded as bound to respect the religious feelings of Israel by hallowing the all-holy name and the Sabbath, and by abstaining from leaven in the week of the Passover, and from eating the flesh of the sacrifice or blood. This is required by an interpolation of the pseudo-Phocylides :

"Blood taste not, neither flesh to idols given."¹

Moreover, it is not improbable that the professed duty of the first Christians to abstain from meats offered to idols, and blood and fornication,² simply represent the demands made of its proselytes by the synagogue.³ God-fearing Gentiles, it appears, were allowed to participate in Jewish edification in this world and the kingdom of God in the next, if they served God according to their own lights. Besides, as regular sacrifices for the Cæsar had to be offered in the outer court of the temple, and indeed were offered regularly until the outbreak of the war,⁴ there was an altar ready in the temple at Jerusalem, which gave believing Gentiles, and by-and-by unbelievers of rank, an opportunity of partaking in the highest act of Jewish worship.⁵ The proselytes were thus the less likely to be excluded from the synagogue, to whose erection and support they were frequently, indeed, the most liberal contributors,⁶ although the precise conditions of their admission are unknown. Probably the "seat of the unlearned," afterwards found in Christian synagogues, was

¹ 1. 32 ; Sib. ii. 142.

² Acts xv. 29.

³ Cf. Lipsius, in Schenkel's Bib.-Lex. 1, 204.

⁴ Bell. ii. 17, 2.

⁵ Ant. xvi. 2, 1 ; Philo. Leg. ad Cai. 1033 ; John xii. 20 ; Luke vii. 1 ; Acts viii. 27.

⁶ Luke vii. 6.

originally a Jewish institution,¹ so that by this means separate seats were reserved for believing Greeks.

It follows that, in the interest of the synagogue itself, circumcision and subjection to the whole law were not made conditions of participation in the salvation of Israel. Some wise teachers even expressly prohibited Gentiles who sought salvation, from assuming an equality with the Jews in this external matter. In the time of Claudius Cæsar, for instance, the Jewish merchant Ananias, herein greatly praised by Josephus, opposed the intention of king Izates of Adiabene to raise himself by circumcision from a proselyte at the gate to a proselyte of righteousness. "Izates," he said, "could honour the Lord equally well without circumcision, if he would only follow those usages of Jewish worship which were of prime importance."² Few indeed were so indulgent; and just as this king of Adiabene let himself be forced into circumcision at last, the proselytes of the gate, like the Galatians of the apostle Paul, were more and more strongly urged not to stop half-way, but to be incorporated in the community of Israel by the act of circumcision, by baptism and the offering of a solemn sacrifice. These were then called proselytes of righteousness.

Generally speaking, there was such fear and dislike of circumcision, that by far the smaller part of those who felt attracted by the religious views of the synagogue were also inclined to subject themselves to this repellent rite. The reason why Judaism was embraced by an incomparably larger number of women than men, is that no such preliminary awaited them. In their case, simple baptism in the river and an offering sufficed. However, if—to quote Paul—many Gentiles, in defiance of their fellow-citizens' contempt, perfected in the flesh what they had begun

¹ Considering that Ovid bids seek the beauties of the city in the synagogue (*Ars Am.* 1, 75), and Juvenal is asked, "Where in the house of prayer shall I seek thee?" it was not only formal converts who could lawfully visit the synagogue.

² *Ant.* xx. 2, 5.

N.B. Note (1) should refer to "unknown," last line but one, p. 123. Read here: 1 Cor. xiv. 16.

in the spirit,¹ that is to say, sealed the spiritual conception of God with the crudest symbol from the old time of natural religion, it only shows how deeply they were impressed by the other advantages of the synagogue.

This doubly graduated forecourt of the Jewish community was pre-eminently one of the channels by which Jewish conceptions and morals permeated to Gentile families. Allusions to the way in which Judaism was insinuating itself everywhere were popular in the time of Augustus,² and as time goes on, this inclination to Jewish customs is more and more deplored.³

Still this widening of the circle raised great scruples within the synagogue itself. It was hard to bring the Gentile born to strict Jewish correctness. The religious enthusiasm which had brought some to Judaism, pleased the scrupulous mind of the Pharisees as little as the selfish motives which determined other conversions. The Hellenistic scribe reasonably suspected that Greeks whose conversion was merely due to sympathy with monotheism, might desert again to another monotheistic school as easily as they had been won, as indeed often happened in Alexandria.⁴ The rabbi of Palestine includes all proselytes under the name of "the scab of Israel." He reproaches them with being those who delayed the advent of the Messiah, and refuses to marry the descendants of proselytes before the fortieth generation.⁵

The censure of the kindred they left was naturally still bitterer than that of the party to whom they attached themselves. Tacitus wonders how it could be possible for Romans to let themselves be circumcised, to renounce their gods, and desert parents and children. He is at least right that such converts are doubly children of hell. Many remarkable instances of men's indifference to their native land and their nearest kindred, even to their own flesh and blood, had indeed occurred in such conversions to

¹ Gal. iii. 3.

² Hor. Sat. 9, 69.

³ Tac. Hist. 5, 5; Juv. Sat. 3, 296.

⁴ Ap. ii. 10, 11.

⁵ Quoted in Leyrer, in Herzog's R. E. s.v. Proselytes.

the synagogue.¹ After such experiences, it became the universal view of Roman statesmen that Judaism and indifference to the welfare of Rome were identical.

“Nay more: wont to hold cheap the laws of Rome,
They learn the Jew’s laws; keep and honour them,
The code that Moses taught in secret writ;
To show the way to none but of the faith,
The longed-for spring but to the circumcised.
Their father’s fault, who spent each seventh day
Idly neglecting all the ties of life.”²

It would be easy to multiply such expressions of contempt, to which the wider circle of the Jewish community were exposed on both sides; but to do so would make no change in the great historical significance of the factor in question. The proselytes of righteousness had become Jews; but so far they had generally become Jews from religious motives—not for the sake of the Jewish ritual law, but attracted by the great fundamental truths of the Old Testament, the doctrine of the one God and the holy purpose of the world.

They had accepted the burden of the law as an unessential part of the bargain, without being able to admit it as a rule in the sense attributed to it by the Pharisees. The proselytes of the gate, however, remained Gentiles—that is to say, God-fearing Gentiles, who recognized the one true God in Jehovah, who prayed to him, and found edification in his revelation and its exegesis in the synagogue, without indeed wishing to accept the crude traditional forms of the cult, in addition to the eternal truth. Briefly, there existed, thanks to this body of proselytes, a *monotheistic church*, which, outwardly embodied, and provided with definite rights and duties, belonged to the union of synagogues, and by this means formed a ubiquitous organization. Its less strict regulations gave it greater facilities of sending emissaries to feel their way into thousands of purely Gentile homes. Thus this border-population that had settled between

¹ Tac. Hist. 5, 5.

² Juv. Sat. 14, 95—110.

the synagogue and the temple, soon became as important to the world as Judaism itself.

A typical picture, in a certain sense, of these circumstances is offered by the Roman Jews in particular; for, in accordance with Ovid's "*orbis in urbe erat*," the most important phenomena could be studied on a small scale in the capital. We learn from inscriptions that there were several synagogues at Rome—one of Augustus, one of Agrippa, one of Volumnius, a *synagoga campi*, one of the Subura, one named Elaia after the symbol of the olive.¹ Their believers excel all others in showing the emancipated capital a life strictly ordered by law, so that it becomes a saying with Augustus, "No Jew keeps his fasts more strictly;"² and Martial makes merry over "the hungry mouth of the sabbath-keeper." The honours at the disposal of the synagogue were highly prized and actually engraved upon the tombstones.³ Indeed, these graven tombstones of the Jewish cemetery in the Trastevere pre-eminently show the deep religious sense of the pilgrims who lay down to rest beside the Tiber, far from Jerusalem.

This spirit of true religion, then, displayed its power even here, and a considerable community of proselytes had gathered around these synagogues. Here, too, women predominated. Many brilliant names are to be found among the female proselytes of the capital, daughters of the *gens* Fulvia, Flavia, Valeria, Veturia, &c.⁴ Even Nero's consort, Poppæa, was so devoted to the synagogue that she begged to be buried as a Jewess; and Nero therefore, to the horror of the aristocracy, actually introduced a Jewish coffin into the tomb of the Julii, instead of the usual cinerary urn.⁵ A tombstone tells of a Roman lady of rank,

¹ Corp. Inscr. Gr. 9902, 9903, 9904, 9905, 9906, 9907, 6447; Orelli, Inscr. Lat. 2522.

² Suet. Aug. 57.

³ Grätz, Gesch. d. Juden, iv. 123, 506, 507; Renan, Paul, 134; Schürer, Neut. Zeitgesch. 636.

⁴ Ant. xviii. 3, 5; Suet. Dom. 15; Grätz, iv. 123; Renan, Paul, 129—135.

⁵ Tac. Ann. 16, 6.

named Paula Veturia in the world and Sarah in the community, who went over to the synagogue with all her slaves. Seventy-six years old at her conversion, she lived in the synagogue fifteen years more, admirably exemplifying Israel's promise that the righteous live long in the land which the Lord their God gives them.

Thus the Jewish propaganda had spread its meshes over all circles of society, and it is not without cause that the historians of the capital are precisely those who raise the bitterest lamentations over the proselytism of the Jews. Every troubled heart, every mind terrified by oppressive dreams, sought comfort and salvation among the Jews.¹ Not least, superstition attached itself to the Mosaic rites, as Horace, for example, speaks of a mother in the Trastevere devoted to the synagogue, who killed her fevered son by undertaking the prescribed ablutions in the Tiber with him.² Caught by the synagogue, individuals renounced kindred and family;³ heads of families brought children and slaves to Judaism, fasted on Thursdays, fasted on the sabbath, and maintained the laws of the old covenant about meats.⁴ The distinction of one day from another, of one meat from another, the expectation of great catastrophes to come, fix the stigma of superstition on these proselytes; but their superstition was already so universal that Augustus sets a special seal of commendation upon it, by giving one of his grandsons the opportunity of going abroad to sacrifice at Jerusalem.⁵ The same appears in the sly hits at Jewish tendencies now common among the wits of Rome. Ovid finds the Jewesses agreeable and the synagogue convenient;⁶ Horace represents his friend as keeping the long day;⁷ Juvenal declares he was met in the street with this question: "In what house of prayer am I to

¹ Juv. 6, 544.

² Sat. ii. 3, 288, seq.

³ Tac. Ann. 5, 5.

⁴ Juv. 14, 95; Hor. Sat. i. 9, 70; ii. 3, 288.

⁵ Suet. Aug. 93; cf. Hor. Sat. i. 5, 100; 9, 20.

⁶ Ars. Amat. 1, 36.

⁷ The *tricesima sabbatha*, if the feasts lasting more than one day are included: Sat. i. 9, 70.

seek thee, Jew?"¹ Occasional jests such as these mean almost more than the rhetorical indignation of the great historians and the bitter earnest of the Claudian laws.

The first to recognize and deal with this growth of Judaism in the capital as a danger for the empire was the politic and vigorous Tiberius, who on this point broke with the Julian tradition. By the year 17, Tiberius had poured his wrath upon the Jews. The Jews, in their deputations from Syria to complain of the misgovernment of the province by Creticus Silanus and Cnæus Piso, had made themselves especially conspicuous by their complaints about their procurators.² At that time Tiberius feared a serious disturbance, which he hoped to exorcise by the ill-fated mission of Germanicus. The proposed remedy was unavailing; and the emperor's hate was soon directed upon the importunate petitioners. Josephus, Tacitus and Suetonius, inform us that in the year 19 simultaneous proceedings were taken against the missions working in the name of Jehovah, and the priests of Isis. The latter had taken to infamous pandering; on this account Tiberius pulled down their temple, flung the image of their goddess into the Tiber, and crucified the priests.³ Similarly, some Jewish teachers were guilty of an offence against Fulvia, the wife of one Saturninus, closely connected with the court.⁴ A Jew, who had been forced to leave Jerusalem for some breach of the law, found in Fulvia a ready listener to his instruction. But following the native instinct of the Pharisees, to devour the widow's household and for a pretence make long prayers, he induced his pupil to make considerable gifts of purple and gold to the Jewish temple. He

¹ Sat. iii. 296. Nevertheless, a certain reverence for Jewish usages was universal, and Ovid respects the day

qua flebilis Allia luce
Vulneribus Latiis sanguinolenta fuit,
Quaque die redeunt, rebus minus apta gerendis,
Culta Palæstino septima festa Syro.

² Ann. ii. 42, 43, 71.

³ Ant. xviii. 3, 4.

⁴ Perhaps Ælius Saturninus, Dio. 57, 22.

received the gifts in company with three other Jewish teachers. When Saturninus was informed that the pious men had purloined both purple and gold and used them for their own purposes, he laid an information before Tiberius.

Roman Judaism was thus involved in the fate of its bitterest foes and most successful rivals, the priests of the All-goddess. The emperor laid the matter before the Senate, and demanded measures to check the growth of the Jewish propaganda. Thereupon the question was raised as to the great privileges with which the Jews had been distinguished, the most considerable among which was the exemption from military service. This was the point selected for making an example, either to remind the Jews that their privileges were revocable, or to strike at those proselytes who had escaped military service by their conversion. In fine, "the fathers resolved that four thousand freedmen of military age should be chosen from those infected with this superstition, and transported to the island of Sardinia to put down the pirates." If the unhealthy climate were to carry them off, adds Tacitus in the spirit of the emperor, the loss would not be irreparable.¹ The Jews, like the Egyptians, were compelled to burn the vessels and robes used in worship, and finally a term was fixed at which Jews and proselytes were either to renounce their religion, or quit Italy under penalty of life-long slavery.² However, neither decree of the Senate attained its purpose. The consuls, indeed, Marcus Silenus and Lucius Norbanus Flaccus made a levy in the Ghetto. Four thousand Jews and proselytes of military age were impressed and shipped off to Sardinia; but as the majority refused military service as contrary to the law, other punishments had to be devised. Most of them probably perished in the quarries of Sardinia.³

In like manner, the banishment of the Jews had no lasting effect. The family of Herod from the first made an exception at court itself; and Caligula, who succeeded to the throne,

¹ Ann. 2, 85.

² Suet. Tib. 36.

³ Ant. xviii. 3, 5.

expressly repealed the laws and penalties against atheism aimed at the secret societies.¹ Thus under Caligula and Claudius, the Jewish population of Rome became even stronger than before;² and Claudius in particular, Agrippa's patron, passed for a great friend of the Jews. The lively interchange of flight and return, departure and arrival, must now inevitably have contributed towards establishing all the religious tendencies of Judæa upon the banks of the Tiber. If the Jews expelled by Tiberius had in part gone to Palestine, only to return after Caligula's accession in the year 37, they brought back with them the tidings of a Baptist movement in Judæa, of the Messianic communities of the Galileans, and of the prophet of the Samaritans, so that there was no lack of material for controversies soon to be in every mouth.

4. THE JEWS OF ALEXANDRIA.

After a conflict between two spiritual forces, the one which comes off victorious will be found to have undergone a change. The capacity of nations, in particular, to maintain their individuality is limited, and proportionate to the parity of spiritual power in their opponents. Thus in intercourse with kindred races, with whom his forefathers had fought and been reconciled, the Syrian Jew remained himself more than the Jew of the great Greek cities, in whose crucible his characteristic features had been melted away down to the unalterable Semitic residuum. The Jew of Alexandria and Antioch speaks Greek, using the words, that is to say, not the genius, of the language. The literary youth of the Roman Ghetto swears "by the temple of the Thunderer," if Martial is to be trusted.³ In fact, the Jews of the time, without giving up their individuality, began to show their well-known capacity for moulding themselves to any form, and investing

¹ Dio, 59, 6; 60, 6.

² Dio, l. c.

³ Martial, xi. 94, 7.

themselves in the garb of foreign culture. Among such transformations, which the spirit of Judaism underwent more than once in the course of development, one of the most remarkable was Hellenism.

The significance of Alexander the Great in the history of the world, is that he overthrew the barriers between East and West. The new culture arising from the commingling of the Asiatic and Hellenic spirits usually receives the name of Hellenism. Its most remarkable form is Jewish Hellenism, which sprang up at the very point where East and West met in closest embrace. The kingdom of the Lagidæ and their capital Alexandria were simply a patchwork of Oriental and European civilization. The politic dynasty of Ptolemy Lagus had been as much attached to the religious and national traditions of their country, as the Seleucidæ had been intent upon merging the culture of Asia Minor in Greek enlightenment. In Egypt the people had been saved; only the government and the army were Macedonian. Thus the new dynasty, by a politic union with the priests, were enabled to establish upon the despotic foundations of the Pharaohs' kingdom, a position which in Strabo's time still appeared the first in the world.¹ While the admirable Macedonian government put Egypt on perfect equality with the other great powers, the splendour of its court, the magnificent buildings and fanciful luxury, recalled the ancient cities of Assyrian, Babylonian and Persian monarchs.

Sound political sense and the activity of the court were backed up by the favourable position of Alexandria on the sea. In front lay the harbours beside the Pharos, which received the ships of Asia Minor and Europe; behind, the Mareotic lake, which held the products of India. Between the two sheets of water, the city of the conqueror of the world stretched along the neck of land in the shape of an outspread Macedonian cavalry-cloak, connected by an enormous mole with the island of Pharos, where stood the colossal lighthouse which was accounted one of the

¹ Strabo, xvii. 1.

seven wonders of the world, and to this day has left its name to kindred buildings. Alexander's city, unlike the irregularly built towns of Asia and Europe, had broad streets suitable for the passage of riders and vehicles, divided and adorned upon a regular plan by noble colonnades.¹ "The city," says Strabo, "contains most beautiful public squares and royal palaces, occupying one-third of its whole extent. For while each king, from love of splendour, added some new ornament to the public monuments, each also added a new palace for himself to those already existing, so that here one can echo the cry which Homer makes the disguised Odysseus utter at the sight of the palace-buildings of Ithaca: 'One work touches upon another.' All, too, are connected, not only with one another, but also with the harbour and the external walls." The city was indebted to the river and the sea-winds for its moderate climate, to the Egyptian architecture for its cool dwellings, and to splendid aqueducts for its wholesome water. Thus Alexandria became the mart of three quarters of the world. For here the merchants of Italy and Spain, the trader from India and Babylon, and the dark-skinned son of the Nubian desert, moved amongst the Greeks (who preferred to be called Macedonians) and the native Egyptians.²

But it was not trade only that flourished here; the Ptolemies had taken a noble pride in offering learning a magnificent refuge in their home. The inquirer found all memorials of literature and art collected in libraries and museums, used and enlarged by a circle of scholars, who had entered upon the task of collection with the Oriental piety for tradition, and preserved the works of the Greek spirit with Egyptian fidelity. Influenced on every side by these spiritual movements, the people of Alexandria became good and bad, as the case might be, through their proverbially quick emotions and thoughtless unrest, their combative wit, bold expressions, and readiness to mutiny in spite of all incapacity for military service. The

¹ Diodor. 17, 52.

² Strabo, l. c.; Diodor. 17, 52; Plin. H. N. 5, 10; Dio Chrys. Or. 32, p. 373.

numerous populace in particular was a contradictory mixture of Egyptian sensuality and Greek frivolity. This motley host of bigoted, sluggish, "unpatriotic" Egyptians,¹ of voluble but lazy Greeks, and industrious Jews, was, moreover, involved in perpetual quarrels, and, as time went on, stood in increasing need of the brute force of the Roman proconsul to keep them from tearing one another to pieces. Yet the Alexandrians looked to Rome with pride. They still remembered well the time when Rome was a small city in comparison with Alexandria.² They knew, too, that the capital must starve without Egypt's corn;³ they maintained that the Nile was the most sacred river in the world, and believed themselves to share in this privilege. "When any one praises the Nile," says Dio Chrysostom to the Alexandrians, "you are as proud as if you yourselves came flowing down from Ethiopia."⁴

In this rivalry of the three nations, Egypt's oldest guests, the Jews, had gained an advantage through the favour of Rome. Alexander long ago had granted them the privileges of the Macedonians; the Ptolemies had favoured them, and immigration had trebled their numbers during the calamities of the Maccabean wars. They had then even built a temple in the neighbourhood of Heliopolis, intending to deliver the worship of Jehovah from the oppression of the Seleucidæ, and place it under the protection of the Lagid dynasty.⁵ Standing in need of the sovereign's protection, the Jews strove to deserve it by their loyalty. We can judge of it from one instance. The translators of the Alexandrian Bible prefer to call the "hare" *δαρύπους*, or "furry-foot," instead of *λαγός*, to avoid the necessity of writing that Lagos was classed among the unclean. Among the Romans too, very unlike the unruly Jews of Palestine, they were highly respected for having rescued Cæsar in the Alexandrian insurrection, and ever after supporting Roman interests in Egypt.

¹ Strabo, Geog. 17, 1.

² Diodor. 17, 52.

³ Plin. Panegyr. c. 31.

⁴ Or. 32, p. 373.

⁵ Ant. xii. 9, 7; xiii. 1; Bell. i. 1, 1; vii. 10, 2—4.

Thus during Roman times the number of Egyptian Jews had grown to a million, for the most part settled in the capital.¹ Two of the five sections of Alexandria were called the Jewish quarters, because the Jews were in the majority there; but this division had not prevented them from securing the best places of business in the other three quarters as well. Their own quarters were none other than those advantageously situated beside the eastern harbour and the Canopus canal. For this reason they had got the corn trade into their own hands even before Cæsar increased their privileges in gratitude for their loyalty.² For the same reason the harbour police was also in their hands.³ Synagogues, pleasantly surrounded with plantations, stood in the various quarters of the city.⁴ Their principal glory, however, was the chief synagogue, of whose great size and magnificence the Talmud can still tell.⁵ In this way the Alexandrian Jews had, in the course of three centuries, grown to a highly respected community. They elected their own tribal ruler, who bore here the name of Alabarch, and whose family counted among the first in the kingdom. The sons of the Alabarch married queens,⁶ and could even become governors on condition of being converted. Equality of rights showed that the once despised nationality had essentially united with the civilization of the empire: and in fact, by the intercourse of centuries with the Gentile world, the Hellenizing of the Alexandrian Jews had gone to the full extent permitted by the Oriental character of the Semite.

The Greek Bible shows how soon the Alexandrian Jews had forgotten their native tongue and accommodated themselves to the language of the country. This Bible, proceeding from several hands, seems to have come into existence under the first Ptole-

¹ Philo, In Flacc. Mang. 2, 523.

² Jos. Ap. 2, 4 and 5; Jos. Bell. ii. 18, 7. 8; Ant. xiv. 7, 2. 10, 1; xix. 5, 2; Philo, In Flacc. Mang. 525.

³ Ap. 2, 25.

⁴ Leg. ad Gai. M. 565.

⁵ Grätz, Gesch. d. Juden. 3, 29.

⁶ Ant. 5, 1.

⁷ Cf. Lipsius, Alex. Rel. Philos. in Schenkel's Bib.-Lex. 1, 87.

mies; while the necessity of providing the civil law and religious edification in Greek, shows that the original tongue was no longer understood there. This translation of the Septuagint, in which Semitic thought first attempted to represent itself in Hellenic form, became, like the German Bible in the sixteenth century, one of the most important foundations of renascent culture. It was the means of making the oriental spirit understood by the occidental. The Septuagint has therefore been called, not without justice, the first apostle to go out into all the world and teach all peoples.¹ Those who as yet had only opened their ears to the sweeping cadences of a Cicero or the sweet harmony of Greek tragedy, heard for the first time the thunders of the Prophets and the sad monotone of the Psalms; and while the world grew weary of the pomp of the Verrines and deaf to the Philippics of a Demosthenes, the human heart opened more and more to the simple beauty of the holy book, so that Philo ventured to express the hope that the Scriptures, once in their Chaldæan tongue accessible but to few, would in their Greek garb bring salvation to the majority of mankind, or perhaps to all humanity.²

The Greek Bible, however, re-acted upon Judaism itself sooner than on the Gentile world. The Greek language uses the same word to express "word" and "reason." Herein lies the profound sense, that in their manifestation both are so completely blended that a change in the words produces a change in the thought also. The Logos of the Greek Bible differed from that of the Hebrew, and thus there was immediate danger that the thoughts of the Scripture might become associated with those of Greek wisdom. The prophets were now interpreted by the literature of the Hellenes. The things remained the same, but they were no longer illuminated by the sun of Palestine, but by the clearer light of the Ionic sky. No one had a finer perception of what this fact signified than the Rabbis of Jerusalem. They felt perhaps that Shem could not remain the same if he

¹ Grätz, *Gesch. d. Jud.* 3, 36.

² *Vita Mos. ii.* Mang. 140.

spoke the tongue of Japhet, and with this true perception insisted that, as God had revealed his law on Sinai in the Hebrew language, it must be preserved in Hebrew. If it was forbidden to write the law on the skin of unclean animals, it was ten times as much forbidden to pollute it with the language of the heathen. Thus the day of the Bible-feast, on which the Jews of Alexandria made a pilgrimage to the island of Pharos, was regarded by the pious in Palestine as a fast-day and day of misfortune, like that on which Israel danced before the golden calf set up before them by Aaron.¹ The severance between Hebrews and Hellenists, widened by the schools, henceforward turned chiefly upon the Greek Bible. There was a different word, and consequently often a different law, in individual instances.

So far, then, the prophecies of the orthodox had been fulfilled to the letter. But the Hebrews failed to see, on the other side, that without the Greek Bible the Hellenists must have been lost to Judaism. The question has often been put, how it came about that local customs were adopted by so few of all the Israelites, who had been pushed towards the west from the days of Alexander to those of Vespasian, while, where two or three were gathered together, they formed a community that clung tenaciously to the belief of their fathers, so that in Gades they were not Spaniards, nor Macedonians in Philippi. The reason was not that they lacked the capacity of changing their modes of thought and character—where the Jew wished, he had the capacity to an extraordinary degree—the reason was, that although these men of Israel had for generations ceased to understand the language of Canaan, though they had grown up with all their material interests involved in those of their present abode, though the existence of their Hebrew brethren had become stranger to them than the customs of the heathen land in which they lived, still in every country the God of their fathers spoke to them through the mouth of the Greek Bible. It was this book, so lamentable to the Rabbis, that kept millions

¹ Philo, *Vita Mos.* ii. 140, seq.; *Soferim*, 1, 7, in Grätz, 3, 429.

in the old faith, to win fresh millions for whom the Hebrew text would have remained a buried treasure.

In another direction, however, the Septuagint served to maintain rather than to fill up the gulf between Jew and Hellene. As Luther's Bible produced a new German, so the Septuagint produced its own idiom, which was by no means easy to Greek or Roman without something further. The popular speech of Macedon, in which the translators' experience lay, had now levelled the differences of the old Greek dialects. But the smooth-flowing speech of the great city needed to undergo a certain violence, a certain deepening and re-casting, to say what was said by the prophets of Israel, but had never entered into any Greek heart. In this way arose the Greek translation, which represents the original text poorly enough, in spite of its Hebrew syntax. But at a time when the text created difficulties even in Palestine, this translation, in spite of all deficiencies, came into general use even outside Alexandria. As the Septuagint was thus naturalized instead of the original Scriptures, and practically became the only book read by the western Jew, and the source of his culture, there arose a peculiar Hellenistic idiom, Jewish-Greek, spoken in all the Dispersion of the west. Thus they had at all events a dialect of their own within the inevitable supremacy of the Greek language; and a special literature gradually grew up in this dialect, established beside the national Hebrew literature as a faithful expression of the spirit of the Dispersion.

In the first place, this Alexandrian literature arose from exegesis or imitation of Biblical books—such as Aristobulus' work on the Pentateuch, the revised Ezra, the Epistles of Baruch and Jeremiah, the additions to Esther, the history of Bel and the Dragon at Babylon, and the additions to Daniel.

Soon, however, the gifted race of Alexandrian Jews, well adapted to literary productions, devoted itself to the imitation of Greek authors. Mention has already been made of the pseudonymous writings which recommend Israel and its law under Greek disguise. Besides, the pure joy of artistic creation came

into play.¹ One Ezekiel treated the exodus from Egypt in the form of a drama, in which the chief personages, Moses, his wife Sepphora, Raguel, and even God, speak in metrical dialogue. A certain Philo sang of Jerusalem in epic verse; Theodotus made an heroic poem upon the rape of Dinah and the struggle of Jacob's sons with the men of Shechem. As historians, Demetrius and Eupolemus strove to win the laurels of Thucydides. Even the novel-writers of the latest Greek period found a successful rival in the author of the "Chaste Susannah." As a matter of course, the same scruples which the Hebrews had put forward against the use of the Greek language, arose in the Hellenistic community itself against the application of the forms of Greek art to sacred material. At all events, the Epistle of Aristeas tells highly edifying stories, how one Theopompus was punished with madness for having included the Jewish lawgivers in his secular history; while the tragic poet Theodectes, for producing something from the law upon the stage, was made blind until he struck out the Biblical situations and reconciled Heaven with his drama. It cannot be denied that there was a certain inner justice in such opposition to the Hellenizing of Biblical material. At all events, it was not through imitation of ancient forms of art that the Alexandrian Jews became of importance to the world. Indeed, the Jew's gifts do not generally lie on this side, as his mind tends towards regularity. Hence he is endowed with a refined subtlety, which at this very time was absorbed, not without result, in the speculations of Greek philosophy.

¹ The following fragments are taken from Euseb. Præp. Ev. ix. 17—39, collected in Müller's *Fragmenta Hist. Gr.* 3, 207—230.

5. THE ALEXANDRIAN RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY.

Philosophy played so great a part in the spiritual intercourse of Hellenic cities, that the Jews for their part could not but enter into it, on the ground that it became persons of cultivation to reflect upon the principles of things, to conceive of the world as a connected whole, and to replenish the "food of inherited opinion" with the spiritual nourishment of self-won wisdom. Israel in Alexandria did not therefore propose to give up their faith. They thought rather of ascribing to Moses the place held in Hellenic thought by Pythagoras, Plato or Aristotle. Indeed, the Mosaic conception of the world seemed to veil itself in the dualistic views of contemporary philosophy. The colourless God of the philosophers, better than the good and nobler than the noble, who reigns over the world in unapproachable remoteness, seemed to be the same of whom Isaiah said that before him the nations of the world were as a drop in the bucket, the same of whom Solomon confessed that a heaven of all heavens cannot contain him. Did not Plato's narrative of the fall of the soul correspond to the Fall as told in Genesis? Did not all the complaints of the *Porch* over the corruption of mankind sound like an echo of the prophets and psalmists? If the salvation of sinful humanity and their intercourse with the Deity beyond were secured to the Platonists and Neo-pythagoreans of the day by means of intermediate beings, what were these but God's angels who descended Jacob's ladder—what but the spirit of God that brooded over the waters, his wisdom, that the Scripture itself calls his first-born?¹ Granted that in the opinion of the Neo-pythagoreans this mediation should be undertaken by ascetics and holy men who had shaken off the bonds of sense, what sect could tell more of such seers and prophets than Israel, whose leaders once had spoken with God in the dim dawn of antiquity?

¹ Prov. i. 20; viii. 1; viii. 22, seq.

Thus it was Plato's monotheism, with its dualistic scheme and its scorn for the world, that Hebrew thought was first able to grasp. It became the point of view from which the whole spiritual work of the Hellenes lay clear before the Jew. This belief in one infinitely noble and blessed Deity in another world was also recognized by his holy books. What Plato says of the ideal world and the fields of truth did not seem strange to the Jew, because the world of ideas was identified either with the Eden of Genesis withdrawn to heaven, or with the Messianic kingdom of the prophets that was to come from heaven. There is no difficulty in explaining on psychological grounds how the children of two intermingling civilizations inclined to adopt views which were current in both; and how they could believe they were in agreement and shared the same opinion, when in reality the two conceptions rested on opposite hypotheses. Still, in the course of time, these conceptions, whose identity was at first only a matter of opinion, must actually have approached one another. We have already spoken of the influence of Oriental religions upon Platonic philosophy. It was the same with the Jews. As Platonic philosophy was absorbed into Semitic, the Old Testament conceptions likewise changed their shade and meaning. The translators of the Greek Bible had breathed so deeply of Greek air, that they endeavoured unconsciously to adapt the childish conceptions of the East to the balanced thought of Alexandria.¹ The appearances of God are generally referred to visitations of angels or visions,² and the interpreter ignores the places where God speaks of his mercy or other characteristics which do not square with Plato's divinity.³ The outlines of Platonic dualism appear more clearly, when, in the

¹ Cf. Lipsius, *Alex. Relig. Phil.* in Schenkel's *Bible-Lexicon*, 1, 88.

² *Exod.* xxiv. 9—11, where the Rabbis in the Babylonian Talmud, *Megildah*, 1, fol. 9, reproached the Alexandrians with their mistranslation. Cf. *Numb.* xii. 8, where the LXX. makes the sight a vision, *Gen.* xxxii. 30, where it conceives of an angel, *Numb.* xiv. 14, and of the Shechinah. So *Job* xxix. 25; *Ps.* xlii. 3, &c.

³ *Gen.* vi. 6; xv. 3; xix. 3; xxiv. 9—11, &c.

eighth verse of the Orphic poem quoted above, Aristobulus, perhaps one of the joint translators of the Septuagint, calls God, not creator, but artificer of the world, thus assuming a pre-existing matter set over against God from all eternity. "His Almighty hand," says the Book of Wisdom with direct Platonism, "made the world of matter without form."¹

In the lack of earlier information, Aristobulus, a courtly scholar of king Ptolemy Philometor, about 160 B.C., is usually regarded as the originator of this Judæo-Greek philosophy. He dedicated his Commentary on the Pentateuch to his prince, with a preface² in which he besought the mighty lord not to object to such expressions as the "arms, hands, feet, goings of God, but take them figuratively (*φυσικῶς*)." He means that such expressions should be explained as occurrences and developments in nature. By the "hand of God" is to be understood his power; by his "standing," the fixity of the universal order. "God stands," says he in his exegesis; that is to say, "heaven never became earth, nor earth heaven, nor sun the full moon, nor moon the sun." Similarly, God's speaking is to him only a pictorial expression for the action of the absolute First Cause, "for on each occasion it means, God spoke and it was done."³ The application, then, as said above, of Platonic conceptions to the relations between God and the world, brought with it far-reaching changes in the thought of the Old Testament.

Dualism being accepted, it was necessary to accept also the intermediary principles, as God himself in his state of bliss could not come into contact with sinful matter. Now several books of the canon met this necessity, for they rhetorically personified the Divine Wisdom and almost established it as an individual being apart from God. "Whence cometh wisdom?" asks Job,⁴ "and where is the place of understanding?" "God understandeth the way thereof," he answers, "when he made the weight for the winds, and weighed the waters by measure then

¹ Wisd. xi. 17.

² Euseb. Præp. Ev. viii. 10.

³ Ibid. xiii. 12.

⁴ xxviii. 20.

did he see it and declare it to men." In the same way as Wisdom is here given objective existence so that God himself can behold it, it appears in the Proverbs as a being that can also speak to men. She stands upon a high place by the wayside and calls men to her with a loud voice. Jehovah prepared her in the beginning of his way, before all his works; she was born before the mountains and hills; when he appointed the foundations of the world, she was beside him as a worker and was his daily delight.¹ In Sirach,² finally, we see Wisdom appear in the assembled council of God as the first created of all spirits. Her glory is that she, created in the beginning before time was, proceeded from the mouth of God. She covered the newly created earth like a cloud (cf. Gen. i. 2). She penetrates and rules all creation and all nations, but has her seat in a special sense amongst Israel, and is, as it were, embodied in the book of their law.³ In this sense Aristobulus also conceived of the "power of God" as powers separate from God, but of Wisdom as a mediator between God and matter.⁴

But this poetical idea of God's wisdom appears in a very different light in the Book of Wisdom, which may have been composed at Alexandria in the reign of Caligula. This contemporary of Philo, indeed, endows the "Wisdom of God" with all the attributes of the Stoic doctrine of the Logos, and thereby gives clear and tangible expression to what was before a vague poetic conception. The name of "Logos" was first given by Heraclitus to the eternal law of the world's course, the regular movement in the world. With him, the moving principle is based on the fact that the first cause of the world unites its opposing conditions in itself, and thus keeps all in a state of flux. "In the Logos are the living and the dead, the waking and sleeping, the young and the old. For when the one changes, it is the

¹ Prov. viii. and ix.

² Sir. 24.

³ Prov. xxiv. 9; cf. further Baruch iii. 36; iv. 1.

⁴ Cf. the quotations given above from Eusebius, *Præp. Ev.*; also Heinze, *Lehre vom Logos*, p. 188, seq.

other; and when the other changes, it is the original once more.”¹ In this sense the Logos is called a boy playing at dice,² since he keeps the world rolling. The law of contradiction must pre-exist in the foundation of all things, for movement and harmony, its last result, depend upon it. “That which is cut in two fits together, and the loveliest harmony arises from that which is at variance with itself.”³ “Combine all and not all, the agreeing and disagreeing, concord and discord, and out of all arises one, and out of one, all.”⁴

Thus life in the world is like the form of the lyre, which divides and re-unites. In the same sense Heraclitus called war the father of all, for no harmony is possible without opposition, nor any living being but by man and woman.⁵ The Logos is therefore the eternal law of the world’s movement shown in strife, i.e. the play of contraries. It seemed to the philosopher that this world-moving principle found its purest representation in fire, and thus it appeared as if Heraclitus regarded fire as the original element.

For a time, then, the idea of the Logos re-appeared in the history of Greek philosophy. Plato speaks of a divine reason, partaken of by the soul of the world and the human soul, but calls it νοῦς. God placed this reason in a soul, the soul in a body, and thus built up the whole, thereby completing the best and fairest work.⁶ The soul of the world is the middle term by which it was possible for reason to enter into matter, the link between the Idea and the *μὴ ὄν*. Thus we have a transcendental νοῦς or λόγος, at the same time immanent in the world and humanity, corresponding to the Platonic dualism. Aristotle, on the other hand, applying his general theory that ideas are in things, thought of Nous, too, as immanent in the world, while applying the name of Logos to human thought and the ethical

¹ Plut. Cons. ad. Ap. 10, 106 D. In Heinze, loc. cit. 12.

² Clemens, Pædag. 1, 90 C; Hippolyt. ix. 9. *παῖς αἰὼν ἐστὶ παίζων πεττεύων*.

³ In Heinze, p. 14.

⁴ Aristot. De Mundo, 5, 396, b; 20.

⁵ In Heinze, 15.

⁶ Plato, Tim. 30 A, seq.

standard indwelling in man. It is not until the Stoics that the conception of the Logos is restored to its complete rights. In opposition to dualism, the Stoics drew up a coherent system of monism. Although in this view of theirs everything is material, still the very idea of design actually dwells in matter. The world, in its totality and its individuals, is ordered for the best. It must therefore have an indwelling, selecting, creative principle; this principle is the sovereign Logos. Matter, in itself immovable, becomes through the Logos a living world.¹ It is the Logos that continually shapes the world, and thereby maintains it. This is the sense in which the hymn of Cleanthes is composed: "Nought happens on earth without thee, O Dæmon, nor in the ethereal pole of heaven nor in the sea, save what the wicked do in their own blindness of heart. Thou canst make the rough smooth; thou dost bring order out of confusion, and the hostile is friendly to thee."² Hence human life, too, must move in harmony with him, the Dæmon of the world.

It is not too much for later and degenerate forms of Hellenistic thought to insist on representing this Logos, the creative power of the Stoics, which works towards an end, as entirely material and corporeal. The Logos is subtle, universal, ethereal matter. It is often represented as *πνεῦμα*, i.e. as a breath permeating the world and all bodies, and keeping the whole together; giving form and consistency to things, and producing the cycle of life.³ Figuratively, it can also be described as light or heat, like the fire of Heraclitus, which streams through the universe.⁴ Then, on account of its creative activity, it is also called *σπέρμα* or *λόγος σπερματικός*. For all *σπέρμα* is a breath or *πνεῦμα*, a part

¹ Seneca, Nat. Quæst. Prolog. 14; Consol. ad Helv. 8, 3; Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 14, 36.

² Stob. Eclog. Phys. i. p. 32.

³ Tertull. Apologet. 21: Hæc (sc. Logon) Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat. Sext. Pyrrh. 3, 218; Diog. Lært. 7, 148.

⁴ Cic. Nat. Deor. i. 14, 36, seq.

of the λόγος. So far, therefore, as the Logos produces forms from itself, it is seed; so far as it receives them again, fire.¹ In this sense, Augustine says of the Stoics that they called Jupiter; (the Logos) *progenitor genetrixque*, because he sends forth all seeds from himself in order to receive himself again into himself. The type-forming powers, then, are connected with the individual portions of seed, so that the individual σπέρματα themselves are again described as λόγος.² All life, then, depends upon these functions of the Logos. In the actual world, the seed, unfolding according to its peculiar law, is ready for all developments. The whole course of the world proceeds according to inner and absolute necessity, from the first unfolding of the seed up to the return of things to the seed, whence the same order of things once more begins in exactly the same way. This eternal order is the εἰμαρμένη, the concatenation of cause and effect, without which nothing happens,³ and which "connection" in the last resort is simply the Logos.

If, then, it can be said that the whole of Nature moves κατὰ λόγον, it follows that man participates in the Logos in a special sense. The higher being received the further gift of reason, in which the Logos itself attains consciousness. By means of reason, man succeeds in bringing himself into harmony with the universe—that is to say, arrives at the *naturæ convenienter vivere*, which is the end of Stoic ethics.⁴ It is natural, too, that his Logos is thought of as thoroughly material. It comes into being with the soul through the engendering which communicated the germ of reason to the child;⁵ wherefore reason in man is only a part of the universal world-reason, which is itself thought of as material. This, and this alone, is the basis of the

¹ Plut. Comm. not. 35 (1077 B).

² Plut. Def. Orac. 29 (426 A); Stob. Ecl. i. 372; Seneca, Quæst. Nat. iii. 29, 3.

³ Locc. ap. Heinze, 125, loc. cit.

⁴ Zeno's ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν. Plut. Cum. Princip. Philos. 2 (777 B, seq.)

⁵ Plut. Stoic. Rep. 41; Placita Philos. 4, 11.

great regularity of the universe. Reason is one and the same in men and things. Nature, not man's decree, determines what is just. The wise man finds this law by consideration of the world's course, and virtue is only experience of what takes place in Nature.¹ "There is but one Logos in the universe," the hymn of Cleanthes declares in lofty strains, "everlasting, shunned by the wicked amongst mortals; unhappy they, who, ever longing to possess the good, regard not God's universal law, nor hearken to that, which if they reasonably obeyed, they would lead a good life."²

During imperial times this doctrine of the Logos was by far the most wide-spread and popular method of explaining life in the world and representing the connection of things. Now while elsewhere Jewish thought felt drawn to Plato's dualism, the author of the "Wisdom of Solomon" preferred to describe the world-forming "Sophia," which in later books acts as intermediary between God and man, as the subtle and universal natural law of the Stoics which penetrates every pore. "Sophia" is identical in his view with the Stoic Logos, for he occasionally exchanges their names,³ and thus Wisdom is designated by all the attributes of the Stoic Logos. "There is," it is said, "in 'Sophia' an understanding spirit (*πνεῦμα*), holy, one only, manifold, subtle, lively, clear, undefiled, plain, not subject to hurt, loving the thing that is good, quick, which cannot be letted, ready to do good, kind to man, steadfast, sure, free from care, having all power, overseeing all things, and going through all understanding, pure and most subtle spirits. For Wisdom is more moving than any motion. She passeth and goeth through all things by reason of her pureness." Though the description so far is

¹ Cicero, De Leg. i. 6, 13, speaks of a *ratio summa insita in natura, quæ jubet ea, quæ faciendæ sunt, prohibetque contraria*; cf. also De Leg. i. 12, 33; M. Aurel. ii. 4; Diog. vii. 87.

² Stob. Ecl. Phys. i. p. 32.

³ Wisdom of Solomon ix. 1; xvi. 12; xviii. 15, seq.; conversely, Philo, Vita Mos. Mang. ii. 155, calls the Logos "Sophia."

entirely that of the Stoic Logos, Platonic dualism re-appears when the writer continues: "For she is the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty: therefore can no defiled thing fall into her. For she is the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness. And being but one, she can do all things: and remaining in herself, she maketh all things new: and in all ages entering into holy souls, she maketh them friends of God, and prophets."¹ Under the influence, therefore, of Stoic and Platonic conceptions arises an independent hypostasis of the wisdom of God, which before was personified only in a rhetorical and poetical manner. Like the Stoic Logos, it is a *πνεῦμα*;² and as the Stoics designate their Logos a *πνεῦμα νοερόν*,³ the writer gives the same name to Sophia in vii. 22. Like the Stoic Logos, it penetrates the whole world as a subtle, omnipresent ether;⁴ like it, again, it is thought of as subtle matter.⁵ Its Platonic position as mediator between God reigning on high and the terrestrial world, has a still stronger tendency towards a personal shape. It is a breath of God, the pure effluence of the majesty of the Almighty, the reflection of the eternal light, the mirror of God's activity and the image of his goodness. It is that which sits upon the divine throne,⁶ initiated into the mysteries of God. It was present when he created the world, or rather it was itself the all-creative artificer of the universe (*πάντων τεχνίτης*).⁷

Now it is precisely in those places where independent existence is most definitely ascribed to the mediating principle, that the writer plainly calls it Logos as well as Sophia. "God hath made all things with his Word, and ordained man through his Wisdom," he says in ix. 1, with Hebrew parallelism. The Logos

¹ Wisd. Sol. vii. 22—27.

² i. 6; vii. 7; vii. 22.

³ Cf. Heinze, Logos, 195.

⁴ vii. 24; viii. 1.

⁵ As is shown by the Jewish conception of the absolute *πνεῦμα* and the epithets *πολυμέρες*, *λεπτόν*, *εὐκίνητον*, *όξύ*, *τρανόν*.

⁶ ix. 4.

⁷ Wisd. Sol. vii. 22; viii. 6.

saved Israel in the wilderness. "It was neither herb nor plaister that restored them to health, but thy Word, O Lord, which healeth all things."¹ So, too, the Word chastised Egypt. "Thine almighty Word leaped down from heaven, out of thy royal throne, as a fierce man of war into the midst of a land of destruction, and brought thine unfeigned commandment as a sharp sword; and standing up filled all things with death; and it touched the heaven and stood upon the earth."² One sees how the author read the Scriptures from the point of view of contemporary Platonists, that God must enter into relation with the world, devoid of God, by means of intermediaries. Thus the rhetorical personification of the Wisdom of God grew up into a metaphysical personality; and the author of the Book of Wisdom, as if he still had a suspicion that he was introducing an alien thought into the Scripture, is intent on proving minutely the operation of this intermediate being in sacred history.³ It was Wisdom that accompanied Joseph to his prison and consoled him; it was Wisdom that smote the Egyptians and disturbed their river; Wisdom that spoke through Moses and put psalms in the mouth of infants. Here, then, was the source of the Biblical conception of the Logos-Sophia, which thereafter played so great a part in Alexandrian and Christian theology.

Outside this doctrine of intermediate beings, the Platonic conception of the world further appears in the utterances of the Book of Wisdom upon the nature of man. The author holds the body to be no longer the home, but the prison, of the soul. "The corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things."⁴ He makes his Solomon acquainted with the Platonic pre-existence of the soul, to which, on its earthly journey, is given a better or worse husk according to its virtue. "I was a witty child," says the wise king, "and had a good spirit; yea, rather being good, I came into a body undefiled."⁵ Similarly, on

¹ *Wisd. Sol.* xvi. 12.² *Ib.* xviii. 15—16.³ *Ib.* x.—xii.⁴ *Ib.* ix. 15.⁵ *Ib.* viii. 19.

Platonic principles, it cannot be due to God that this body is perishable and subjected to pain, for no evils flow from the source of all good. "God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living. For he created all things that they might have their being; and the generations of the world were healthful."¹ "He created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of his own eternity; nevertheless through envy of the devil came death into the world, and they that do hold of his side do find it."² These verses contain the unmistakable expression of the feeling that dominates the Platonic and Neo-pythagorean schools of the time—on the one hand, the sense of physical and moral evil; admiration of divine perfection on the other. To explain the former without losing the latter, nothing remained but to establish matter or its governing principle as the enemy of God, and this was done by our author.³

In addition to the author of the Book of Wisdom, we come across other Jewish historians with the same blending of Platonic, Stoic and Jewish views. The fourth Book of the Maccabees, as it is called, bearing the title, "On the Dominion of Reason," is at great pains to support its Stoic principle by many examples from Jewish history, and so to prove the people of Israel the true Stoics. In the Epistle of Aristeas also, we find thoughts akin to those of the Book of Wisdom. The writer distinguishes the power of God from the one God, and makes this power permeate everything.⁴ Similarly, Jason of Cyrene, in our edition of his work (2 Mac. iii. 38), makes a power of God have its habitation in the temple at Jerusalem, as Heliodorus learnt to his cost.

Among the essentially Platonic and Pythagorean interpretations of the Old Testament, must finally be classed the fact that the conception of prophecy gains a specific sense of prediction. Jehovah in the Old Testament talked with whom he would: he

¹ Wisd. Sol. i. 13, seqq.

² Ib. ii. 23.

³ Cf. Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* iii. 2, 231.

⁴ In Haverkamp, 2, 116.

summoned his prophets from the meadows or from the mulberry orchard. Now it was held that God revealed himself only to the penitent and ascetic. In the sharp division between divine and human, unearthly ecstasy alone could make a man capable of receiving God's word. Now it was held that the prophets spoke in ecstasy, and their production, "the Holy Scripture," passes for a revelation imparted without any human co-operation. It is like an oracle issuing from the lips of the Pythia, but spoken by the God, not by her. Now for the first time we meet with those contemplative descriptions of the ecstasy of the prophets, who are carried away, are beside themselves, hear things unutterable, "accompany their words with many gestures of the secret art," or "in sleep behold God with the soul's waking eye;" descriptions such as can often enough be read in the later Jewish writings, obviously under the Neo-pythagorean theory of inspiration.¹

If then, as we saw above, the Hellenic world had drawn nearer to the monotheism of Israel and its deep conviction of the sinfulness of human nature—on the other hand, Judaism in Alexandria had undertaken to fit its religious convictions into the framework of the Platonic scheme of the universe. The Biblical doctrine of the sinfulness of all flesh grows to the fundamental antithesis between a sensual and a spiritual world; God's superhuman majesty rises to absolute incomprehensibility; the separation between the time of promise and the time of fulfilment, between the day of preparation and the hour of salvation for earth, becomes a belief in another world; the doctrine of resurrection becomes the dogma of pre-existence and immortality; the praise of the Divine Wisdom leads to its personification as a saving intermediary, and the simplicity of Old Testament prophecy is replaced by a doctrine of inspiration bordering on pagan divination.

¹ Philo, *Vita Mos.* ii., Mang. 108, 124, 135, 163, seqq.; *De Decal.* ii. 184; *Jos. Bell.* iv. 8, 3. Similarly the visions in the fourth Book of *Ezra*, i. 4; ii. 21, &c.

In other words, the recent Platonic dualism had taken the place of the Biblical conception of the world among these Alexandrian Jews. Consequently all were confronted with the problem on which the Stoa had spent its energies. This new view was to be read into the holy traditions, which no one was willing to give up. As in the case of the Stoa, the solution of this problem lay in an allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures. The letter of the Scripture was not to be touched; but where it contradicted the special theory of the world, it was given an allegorical meaning. Thus it is possible for the Epistle of Aristee to state that the Jewish ordinances about meats, truly expounded, contain the entire ethics of the Greeks. What the prohibition of certain meats really inculcates is, that no intercourse may be held with the impure. When it is forbidden to taste birds of prey, justice and righteousness are recommended. Animals with cloven hoofs may be eaten because their feet represent the severance between God's people and the ungodly.¹

It is only too clear, however, in other writers of allegories, that their new interpretations had an eye to the doubts of the Alexandrian Jews far more than the scruples of the Gentiles. For after these Jews had unconsciously adopted the Hellenic view of life, all manner of objections to the Bible narratives rose in the awakened intelligence of the great city, in spite of reverence for the religion of their fathers. Many things gave offence, others raised a smile. From the point of view of more modern conceptions, only dealing with great numbers and cosmic principles, the entire history of Israel was too petty and insignificant to display special revelations. In this state of affairs the allegorical method entered the lists against the very children of Israel, to teach them that a deep mysterious meaning lay hidden behind the antique histories which they derided. Although the refined and sophisticated generation of the great city found the merits of these perennially youthful narratives of patriarchal history fall far short of divine revelation, still they

¹ In the copy in Jos. Haverk. ii. 116.

accepted the doctrine that these narratives imparted deep philosophic truths under the guise of metaphor. Just as the Stoics saw the harmony of the universe in Hera hung upon the chain, and in the mutilated Uranus the limit set to the generative power of substance, so Jewish allegorists found in Abraham the symbol of searching activity, and in Sarah the personification of virtue. Their wanderings in Palestine and Egypt represent allegorically all the errors and perils that reason and virtue are liable to in this evil world.¹

To hear Philo begin his essay on the wanderings of Abraham with these words—"Go forth from thy land and thy kindred and thy father's house into a land that I will show thee"—recalls an exegesis of Genesis from the lectern of the synagogue. The meaning, adds the preacher, is that when God wills to purify the soul, he constrains it to depart from three places—the body, perception, and human means of expression. His country signifies the body, for of the body it is said, Earth thou art and to earth thou shalt return. Kindred signifies sensible perception, for this is brother or sister to the very soul. The home in which the soul dwells is the word, for the soul dwells in speech as man in a house. To attain to God, the soul must not only renounce the body, but depart from it and soar above it; must turn from bodily pleasures, must deliver itself from the deceptions of sensuous perception, and plunge into a depth that brings no word to utterance. Then it will fulfil the word, "Go forth from thy land and thy kindred and thy father's house." A similar thought finds objective expression in the story of Jacob. The patriarch's arrival at Bethel as the sun set, was not worth mentioning in the course of the revelation, although it is immediately stated that Jacob saw God there. This allegory was intended rather to show mankind that the natural light of perception (the sun) must be withdrawn in order that philosophy (Jacob) may behold God intuitively, it being well known that speculation is a thought with closed eyes.²

¹ Philo, *De Migr. Abrah.* Mang. ii. 15, seq. ² *Quod a deo Somnia*, 1, 638.

The laws in the Scripture were treated in the same way as the narratives. The punishment threatened against the wife¹ who, to aid her husband in a quarrel, seizes hold of his adversary immodestly, only means that there exists in the *psyche* a tendency towards the sensual that must be removed.² Thus a thing intelligible in itself was stamped as a hieroglyph, and vivid narrative transformed into insipid allegory, as much because an extravagant doctrine of inspiration allowed no revelation of unpretending stories, as because the sophisticated taste of the great city had grown incapable of understanding the loftiness of these simple narratives. So it came about that, while moral exposition, Pharisaic casuistry and Rabbinistic cycle of legend played the chief part in Hebrew synagogues, "philosophizing," to use Philo's expression, went on in those of Alexandria—that is to say, devotion to research and the consideration of nature. The *parash* and *haphtar* of the sabbath were forced to provide a basis on which to introduce themes of psychology and physics, or Stoic speculations on the soul of the world, or, at best, general moral precepts. Traits of nationality, in the highest degree offensive to the old believers, had made their way into the synagogues of the Hellenists.

These seceding Alexandrian Jews, however, became as strikingly eager to convince the world of their belief, as the fanatical schools of the Hebrews. The Gentiles round about them sought a satisfying religion that would not run counter to their circle of ideas, while the Hellenists were as firmly convinced as the Hebrews that this religion of the future was their own reformed Judaism. Moreover, it was easier for them than for the Pharisees of Jerusalem to satisfy the philosophical demands of the new period. After melting down the solid meaning of the Old Testament into the most arbitrary of allegories, they could find no difficulty in casting it into any mould they pleased. For their exegesis, which the simplest fact could upset, it was but a trifle to transform the general outlines of the

¹ Deut. xxv. 11, seq.

² Philo, De Special. Legibus, 2, 329.

old Jewish conception of the world into those of the Platonic scheme; and thus we actually see the great Jewish writers of this period, Philo and after him Josephus, reproduce Mosaism in such a way that it seemed to satisfy all postulates of the existing religious consciousness. As once the Jew Mendelssohn in Berlin tried to persuade the eighteenth century that the natural religion their thinkers dreamed of was neither more nor less than Judaism, with its dogmas of God, virtue and immortality,—so in the then capital of enlightenment, the Jew Philo set forth such a Judaism as bore all the qualities demanded by the time as signs of a true revelation of the Deity, viz., origin in dim antiquity, communion through a divinely blessed mage and worker of miracles, recognition of the irreconcilable contrariety between God and the world, harmony effected between both through intermediate beings, and belief in a beyond and a just retribution.

Now little as the Old Testament really contained these requisites, it must not be supposed that the Alexandrian Jews were fully conscious of self-deception in representing it under Hellenizing forms. From the nature of the case, some such attempt must necessarily have arisen within Judaism. Here in Alexandria they had unconsciously arrived at the data of the Greek view of the world; and this view, grand and noble as it was, lacked one thing alone—a firm religious conviction. How could the reformed Jew there fail to believe that his religion, reconciled with the spirit of the age, was the one that the nations waited for? No little rivalry, no little Jewish exaggeration and inaccuracy, crept in withal. There was no lack of advertisement. But, on the whole, it must be recognized that it really was a great stroke for Philo's system to have embraced the Jewish and the Greek world. To be sure, Philo deserved the usual title of penetration less than any one, as with him the discriminating functions of the intellect operate with extraordinary weakness. But to display so much inward unity in eclectic combinations, to regularly achieve passable consistency in the union of disparate

ideas, to lend the semblance of deep exposition to forced interpretation, and to find a point of view at which Plato and Moses seem to say the same thing—all this was only possible to one so poetically gifted as the prolific author of Alexandria. The essential justification of this method is shown withal by its productive activity, increasing for centuries, whilst all other bastard representations of contemporary eclecticism died out in the second generation.

6. PHILO.

Among all the wealthy families of Alexandria, that of the alabarch Alexander stood pre-eminent. It held the same central position there as the house of Saramalla in Antioch. Of old and nominally priestly descent, wealth had given this family an influence equally respected in Egypt, Palestine and Rome.¹ Ascending from the outer court of the temple at Jerusalem through any of the nine gates to the court of the Israelites, a new-comer was struck with the folding-doors of each of these gateways, made of bronze and Corinthian copper, and covered with gold and silver. Then the astonished visitor was told, "This wealth was lavished on the nine gates of the temple by Alexander, the father of Tiberius."² We read, too, of this same man, that when an exiled prince asked him for 200,000 drachmas, he granted the loan without more ado.³ This Egyptian Cræsus, Alexander, head of the Alexandrian Jews, was a well-known character at the imperial court.⁴ For many years he had managed the affairs of Antonia, Tiberius' sister-in-law, and of

¹ Ant. xviii. 8, 1; xx. 5, 2; Hieron. Catal. Script. 11; Euseb. Hist. Eccl. 2, 4; Philo, De Animal. c. 8. In Aucher, 1, 124—172.

² Bell. v. 5, 3.

³ Ant. xviii. 6, 3.

⁴ Concerning him, cf. Brüll, Alabarchs, in Geiger's Jüd. Zeitschrift, 1864, 4, 3rd yearly vol., p. 276.

her son Claudius, and had been entrusted with their seal.¹ Antonia stood high in Tiberius' favour,² and this re-acted upon the position of her friend. We see this from the fact that he named his son Tiberius Alexander; and this son, as the reward of his conversion, was admitted into the ranks of the Roman aristocracy. First an officer, then procurator of Palestine, the son of the Jewish alabarch finally rose to be governor of Egypt, a position only attainable by unconditional adherents of the imperial house. One of his sons wedded Bernice, daughter of king Agrippa, but died early; the other, Demetrius, also son-in-law of the Jewish king, succeeded his father as alabarch.³

From this illustrious family, befriended by the imperial court and married to kings' daughters, sprang Philo, alike in politics and in learning the spokesman of the Alexandrian Jews. Brother or nephew of the alabarch Alexander,⁴ he was intimate with the affairs of his native city, although political life did not suit his inclinations.⁵ He complains rather of the jealousies of the men who had been driven against him in the waves of political strife. Still his manner of writing was not perhaps uninfluenced by the fact of his being one of those fortunate mortals who can take their own line, free from all material cares, and in possession of all the aids to literature. Thus he is the best representative of those cultured Jews to whom wealth made possible a certain luxury of mind. From youth upwards he had studied the Greek Bible at home, and had advanced in Hebrew as far as reading the words and attempting critical derivations,⁶ and for this purpose was educated in Greek philosophy and the encyclo-

¹ Ant. xix. 5, 1.

² Leg. ad Cai. 2, 669; Ant. xviii. 6, 4.

³ Ant. xix. 5, 1; xx. 5, 3.

⁴ Cf. on this point, Ewald, 6, 259. The former according to the express assertion, Ant. xviii. 8, 4. The pieces translated by Aucher from the Armenian, 1; 44, 123, 161, presuppose the latter.

⁵ Philo, De Legibus Special. Mang. ii. 299.

⁶ One of the most remarkable is the derivation of "Elohim," according to which "Elohim" are the allies of El, as those of Cronos are Cronioi. Fragin. Hist. Græc. Vol. iii. p. 568, 18.

pædic sciences of Alexandria's most highly-paid sophists. Thus prepared, he lives in intimate communion with the Pentateuch and his favourite prophet and "hierophant," the sensitive Jeremiah; but he pays equal respect to the holy Plato.¹ He speaks of the holy societies of Pythagoreans, and is acquainted not only with Parmenides and Empedocles, but also with Zeno, Cleanthes, and other Stoics.² Equally fair to Gentile views, he does not deny the existence of natural forces corresponding to principles denoted by the names Mars, Apollo, Poseidon; and sometimes even acquiesces in the name for the thing.³ He plunged deeper into Pythagorean speculations, indeed, than suited with sober sense, and the explanation of things from the meaning of numbers and the sex of ideas, the jingling categories of male and female, maiden and maternal, begetting and begotten, may have tickled the ears of his contemporaries, but to us they are a confused noise. On the other hand, he was also interested in making acquaintance with the natural sciences which flourished in the previous decades,⁴ and thus few contemporaries can have surpassed him in breadth of knowledge. Yet his historical significance rests not on this, but on the peculiar intermediate position occupied throughout by Hellenism between the culture of East and West, and stamped, as it were, upon the story of his life. In spirit, in society and in politics, placed between Rome and Jerusalem, he makes a pilgrimage to the temple of his fathers. Before him, the son of a priestly family, the gates of the court of the priests open, and the scion of so meritorious a house is permitted to offer sacrifice, like a priest, in Jerusalem itself.⁵ Moreover, none is so fit as he to transact affairs at Rome, where Antonia, Caligula's

¹ Hagar, M. 519—545; De Provid. 2, 42.

² Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. Introd.

³ Leg. ad Cai. Mang. 561.

⁴ De Animal. in Aucher, l. c.

⁵ Fragment in Euseb. Præp. Evan. 8, 13; In Mang. 617; De Prov. ed. Aucher, 2, c. 107. Fui ego ibi tempore, quo in patriæ templum mittebar ad orationem hostiasque offerendas.

grandmother, is his patroness; for it is said of him that he will not knock at the palace-doors in vain.

As to his family life, opinions differ. The highest morality was not to be found among the rich Jewish aristocracy. Still one anecdote, based upon well-known Roman narratives, declares that Philo's wife renounced all ornament, saying that his presence was ornament enough.¹ But he himself expresses his feelings very plaintively about the happiness women can give. The celibacy of the Essenes meets with his approval, "because woman is a self-loving, excessively jealous creature; strong enough to shake man's morality and to allure him with endless artifices. For she devises flattering speech and other hypocrisy, as if on the stage; she bewitches sight and hearing; and as her triumph is to fool men, she deludes the sovereign reason. But when children come, the woman is filled with pride and assurance; she speaks out impudently what she formerly insinuated in wily dissimulation, and without shame compels one to do everything that is harmful to society."² It may be left an open question whether Philo is speaking from personal experience; but, at all events, he who has nothing more to complain of has not been hard hit by fortune.

A pious and happy man, honoured by his people, admired by his relations, with a reputation spread over the world by the ramifications of the Dispersal, Philo's whole being gives the impression of a personality which, removed from the hard struggle for existence, could speak the more tenderly and sympathetically of the universal wretchedness of mankind. Like his contemporary Seneca, he meditated in cushioned ease³ upon the stress of the finite, mourning this life as the captivity of the soul. He, too, has that weary senile mood, in which his contemporaries found nothing better to say of the world and history than that all has existed before and all is vanity. "In human

¹ In Aucher, l. c.

² *Apol. pro Jud.* ii. 634.

³ Cf., for example, his effeminate complaints over the political demands of life upon his leisure: *De Leg. Special.* Mang. 2, 299.

matters," he says in passing, "nothing has true existence. They are airy images without real being, nowise different from dreams. If you will not count the fate of individuals as such, consider the lot of mankind as a whole. Does it not offer the spectacle of a ship tossed to and fro by the waves, now progressing, now receding, with winds now favourable, now contrary? For the divine word, which the multitude are wont to call happiness, moves in a circle, and traversing cities, lands, nations, distributes to each his own lot."¹ Thus we see even this chosen favourite of fortune visited by the suffering of the world; to him the time is out of joint, and this mood of resignation and contempt for the world is one reason amongst a hundred others that led him to study.

Inclination, leisure and the set of the times, had made him a philosopher. Although the encyclopædic sciences, in his own words, attracted him like fair slaves, he gave his heart to philosophy alone, their queen.² He could not have been intended for exact methods, for he devoted himself even to philosophy rather with imagination than with severely accurate reasoning. In his speculations it seemed even to himself as though he soared through the universe with sun and moon and stars.³ His intellectual work was sheer enjoyment; the kind of eclecticism with which he interweaves the flowers of Greece and Israel, bringing together lofty conceptions albeit incapable of union, shows that in him the first place was held, not by strenuous thought, but by a cultivated capacity for spiritual enjoyment, just as his allegorical dreams show feeling more than profundity. He is not wanting⁴ either in that playful rabbinical dialectic which delights to pulverize the contradictions of opponents one against another; like all Jews, he is incapable of letting things act quietly on each other, and has a quibbler's readiness to seize on the para-

¹ Quod Deus sit Immut. M. 298, seq.

² De Congr. Quer. Erud. Gr. 1, 550.

³ De Spec. Leg. M. 299.

⁴ The most conspicuous proof is the ironical inquiry, Leg. ad Gai. M. 557, seq., what claims Gaius has on the Deity, in which he develops a really entertaining quibble.

doxical side of things, and so to overlook the point of chief importance.

But in him this rabbinical hair-splitting is tempered by an appreciation of everything beautiful, fitting in a man of culture and rank; and in words at least he never fails to recognize other than Jewish achievements. He can value the profundity of heathen myths; he speaks with reverence of the old heroes who cleared water and sea of monsters and handed down salutary discoveries. He who first pressed out wine, the dispeller of care, thereby distracting man's gaze from the dreary present and flattering the heart with a rosy future, might be sure of his entire gratitude, whether his name be Liber or Noah. He has a sympathetic tear for the fine myth of the Dioscuri, one of whom was born mortal, the other immortal, and who share their lot in brotherly love; nor does he fail to kindle at the thought of Heracles making safe ways for trade and travel.¹

An amiable piety, seemingly more sentimental than strong, suits well with this sensitive being. He shares with all men of the enlightenment a tendency to moralize; for the greater the distance of God from the immediate consciousness, the greater the breadth and detail with which he can be demonstrated in nature and history. The careers of Flaccus, Isidor, Apollonius, Gaius and so forth, make it clear to the reader *ad nauseam* that the reprobate is miserably overthrown, that the debauchee of his time is consumed by worms, that many a one has spoken blasphemously to his own destruction, and the enemies of Israel in particular shall not rejoice in their hostility during their last hours.² But our garrulous Hebrew can speak words of wisdom withal; and no one has read unmoved the introduction to his account of the times of Caligula, where Philo, looking back upon

¹ Leg. ad Gai. M. 557. While the Book of Wisdom, vii. 2, and Jesus Sirach, i. 15, designate the Law of Israel as the dwelling-place of Wisdom, it is characteristic of Philo, in the tractate Q. Omn. Prob. Lib., to make the Logos the source of Solon's and Lycurgus' legislation.

² Cf. the various examples in the Leg. ad Gai., and the edifying example De Nominum Mut. M. 587.

the days of oppression that now lie behind his people, asks of his own despondency, "How long shall we old men be children still, hoary in body, but childish in soul? When shall we cease to think that passing happiness stands still, and the eternal nature of things underlies change? This is the victory of the present over the heart, that it cannot raise itself above the thing which to-morrow is not."

Thus his writings breathe throughout the spirit of a time in need of religion. He has not peace, but seeks it; and while he maintains that all contentment is to be found in the Scripture, still the thoughts and forms that first rise in his deepest emotion are those of Greek culture. It was perfectly natural for one of such temperament to think that the philosophical conception of the world which he had adopted, thanks to Plato and Zeno, had come to him from the Book of books, whose directly divine origin he had never doubted. Thus it was possible for him to be entirely honest in developing that unreal theology which taught the world, only too effectively, that the deeper bases of the new Greek views were only to be sought in the Old Testament.¹ Besides, he feels himself siding with the Greek philosophers in opposition to Egyptian nature-worship, and in this struggle against the worship of animals, Greek philosophy and Judaism become so thoroughly identified in his consciousness, that he actually derives the former from the Jewish law.²

The method of his speculation has already been spoken of. Plato would have devised new myths to clothe his thought. Myth was ready to Philo's hand in the narratives of the Old Testament, and indeed he finds the motives of his speculations imaged in the figures of the patriarchs. Their chief motive is repugnance to sensuality. The earthly world is alien to the men of God; the world they belong to is heaven. They are pilgrims and strangers upon earth; their home is virtue, in which they

¹ Cf. for what follows, Ewald, *Hist. Isr.* 6, 283, seq.; Keim, *Jesus of Naz.* i. 216, seq.; Heinze, *Logos*, 204, seq.; Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* v. 226, seq.

² Cf. Bauer, *Philo*, Strauss and Renan, p. 61, seq.

live as in their tent, while they fly from everything opposed to God. The symbol of this flight from the world is Abraham, who severed himself from Chaldaea, the land of material contemplation and star-worship, and wandered by the royal way to the King of all. The Stoic idea of the steadfast cheerfulness of the wise man rises beside this Platonic thought of retreat from the world. The virtuous man turns his back upon everything that can disturb his inward joy—grief, fear, pleasure, ambition. He surrounds himself with peaceful calm, that dwells far from the noise of cities and the assemblies of men. Thus he is free and steadfast, as virtue requires. The representative of this Stoic cheerfulness is Isaac, whose very name points to a Democritean laugh. The wise man, wrapped up in the calm of existence, also shares in its pure and unmixed joy. He alone can laugh, which is not granted to the bad man. The practical problems of life, courage and steadfast persistence, enduring through struggle, are represented by Jacob, who crosses Jordan with nothing but a staff and returns with a multitude. The duties of politics and their intrigues, again, are shown in Joseph, the governor of Egypt, who, as suits the equivocal pursuits of statecraft, is no longer a type of pure virtue.

These, more or less, are the central points round which Philo's writings group themselves, writings over whose authenticity, sequence and connection, no adequate research has yet been made. On the whole, there are four tractates which may be regarded as of chief importance: *De Mundi Opificio*, *De Abrahamo*, *De Josepho* and the *Vita Mosis*,¹ to which last a parallel is given in the treatise *De Decalogo*. The book on the creation of the world, *De Opificio*,² combines the Platonic doctrine of the creation with the Stoic doctrine of the Logos, and joins to these the rabbinical speculations on the mysteries of the number seven. The Mosaic story of the creation is told as far as the corruption

¹ Cf. Br. Bauer, Philo, Strauss and Renan, p. 138, seq.

² Cf. also the Commentary of J. G. Müller, *Des Juden Philo Buch von der Welt Schöpfung*: Berlin, Reimer, 1841.

of Adam and Eve by the serpent, when the writer concludes by recapitulating the dogmas of Moses concerning God's relation to the world. The three books of the Allegories of the Law, the essay on the Cherubim, and the books on the History of Mankind, *De Confusione Linguarum* and *De Agricultura Noë*, are to be regarded as explaining and continuing this principal work.

A second series of works choose the lives of the patriarchs as the object of allegorical speculation. Among these, the book *De Abrahamo* must rank as chief. Philo himself states at the conclusion that he wished to point out in it that the laws do not contravene nature, that the very life of the patriarch was the law and the unwritten commandment, and that the law revealed by Moses only formed a commentary on the life of the patriarchs. Further extensions of these allegories are contained in the works *De Migratione*, *De Profugis* and *De Mutatione Nominum*.

In the group of writings headed by the *De Josepho*, Philo turns to the questions of practical philosophy. He says that, having described the three oldest ways of salvation in the careers of the patriarchs, one through knowledge (Abraham), one through the influence of a gifted and uncorrupted life (Isaac), the third leading to the end by the struggle of practice (Jacob), he wishes to describe the fourth, that of the politician (Joseph). Starting from this practical point of view, he relates Joseph's life, and introduces reflections upon the mutability of all things, admonitions upon moderation in enjoyment, warnings upon the misuse of advantages. As pendants to the story of Joseph come the two tractates *De Somniis*, distinguishing between dreams given by God and such as are aroused by the universal Spirit, and others which fly up from the spontaneous activity of the mind.

Finally, the book on the life of the lawgiver undertakes to exhibit Moses to the world as him who, in the words of the Jewish Sibyl, is "the guide of life appointed to mankind." The *De Decalogo* claims equal precedence in this group so far as it

deals independently with the life of Moses in detail. Here Philo himself refers to his previous description of the patriarchs as the unwritten laws, as his reason for now wishing to develop the ideas of the written laws. He takes the ten commandments in order, and at the conclusion recapitulates their cardinal doctrines. The works *De Monarchia*, *De Specialibus Legibus*, *De Præmiis et Poenis*, *De Execrationibus*, *De Nobilitate*, *De Præmiis Sacerdotum*, *De Victimis*, *De Caritate*, and other less important treatises, again follow these leading tractates. Still it cannot be asserted that any clear distinction of subjects is made in this copious store of writings. The presentation of Philo's system cannot therefore belong here, but the various portions of it must be collected from the several writings.

The starting-point of Philo's speculation is the antinomy that man may be certain of the existence of God, but still cannot either ascribe to God any attribute or any limitation. It may be possible to affirm that God is, but not what he is. With the development of Greek philosophy before us, there is no doubt as to the source from which Philo took the idea of pure being, to which absolutely no quality can be attributed, and which Greek thinkers used also to call God. Philo, however, pushes the negation of all positive qualities so far, that even he begins to doubt whether it is possible to affirm anything more than the existence of God. "If," he says,¹ "it is written, 'I am thy God,' it is not a correct statement, for God is relative to no other thing." It is astonishing to learn that this God without attributes is the God of the Jews. When God in the thorn-bush spoke to Moses by an angel, he said, according to Philo: "Teach the children of Israel, I am that which exists, that they may learn to know the difference between the existent and the non-existent, and at the same time be aware that no individual name belongs to me, who alone am true being."² The Jewish prohibition of uttering the most holy name simply means, therefore, that no attribute fits God, because he is better than the good,

¹ De Mutat. Nom.

² Vita Mos. i. Mang. 92, seq.

nobler than the noble, more blessed than blessedness. This absolute being of God expresses itself no less clearly in the tetragrammaton of his unutterable name. The name Jahweh has four letters, "for everything is included in the number four—point, line, surface, mass—the measure of all things and the harmony of tones."¹ Here, then, is indicated the identity of the Mosaic and Platonic conceptions of God.

Beside God, we find in Philo a primeval chaos, that is to say, indestructible matter. This, too, admits of no direct attributes, being formless. This chaos is the *tohu wabohu* of the Mosaic cosmogony. Obviously as this dualism brings us to the theory of the world set forth by Greek philosophy, Philo had not the least doubt he had derived it from the actual Scriptures. "The lawgiver," he tells us in the introduction to his book on the Creation, "recognized the necessity of a twofold cause, the active and the passive, infinite reason and inanimate matter." By maintaining the identity of the *Timæus* and Genesis, Philo put the problem of his philosophy in a simple form. Like the Greek thinkers, he had to fill the yawning chasm between this chaos and God, and he believed that the requisite determinants were also to be found in the Mosaic idea of God. As God alone attains to real existence, so also he alone attains to originating activity. He acts as fire burns and snow chills. "Moses, recognizing this, called the Deity, as creative, Elohîm—as maintaining or directing, Adonai."² The divine act of creation, however, is always spoken of in Scripture as an act of speech; it is, then God's "Word," through which chaos becomes the world; and hence the Logos or Word, the guiding principle of the world, the Stoics' reasonable world-soul, is found to be equally a part of the Mosaic view of the universe.³ It is the irresistible tendency of God's will not to leave chaos as it is. Then a prototype of a purely spiritual world (*νοητὸς κόσμος*) arises in the divine Reason as the prototype and originating force of the actual world. The

¹ Vita Mos. Mang. 152.

² Ibid. 150.

³ De Sacrific. Abr. i. 175; De Decalog. ii. 188; De Profug. i. 561.

divine Reason, however, becomes active through the Word, the Logos; and at the moment when God spoke the creative word (Gen. i. 3), it entered into chaos with all its force, whereupon the actual world grew out of the ideal, of which it is but the image. We, now-a-days, following the laws of *our* thought, would base these states and activities of God on properties of his being; but Philo rather conceives them as powers separating from God as they arise. He finds the dualism of existence and activity, as shown in his Elohim and Adonai, personified in the two cherubim. Following a mode of thought common to all antiquity, the active Word also becomes, in his view, a separate entity, as it could not exert any force without a material basis. The Word is a second God, or the first-born Son of God, just as the world is called the second son.

Meanwhile, no means have been given for effecting the passage of the Logos to the world; but as the word of men resolves itself into many words, which yet derive their meaning from a fundamental "word," and are united by it, so the Logos divides into many Logoi; the prototypes and originating forces of individual things spring from it, standing in the same relation to individual things as the Logos itself stands to the world. But as the Logos, though scheme and originating force of all, is at the same time a person, so these originating forces of individual things are no less personal entities, the sons of God, angels, or, as Philo also calls them in Greek, *charites*.¹ Here too, however, Philo lives in the assurance that all sons of God sung of in the Psalms are simply the forces, thoughts and ideas, of the Platonic Deity. But with true oriental vagueness of thought, this personal conception of individual forces does not prevent the sum of these forces, the Logos, from being directly represented as a person. If the Logos is the power that contains all powers, the world-thought resting in God, the prototype of the world, the idea of ideas, the book in which all entities are registered, the parent city whence

¹ Cf. Cherub. Mos. 148; Vict. Offer. M. 261; Conf. Lingu. M. 431.

spring all other powers like colonies,¹ still it is at the same time a person, the archangel, who encompasses all other angels beneath his wings; it is the Son of God, it is itself a God proceeding from God. Above all, however, it is a mediator. It stands on the border-land between God and things, which exist through its power. It is the deputy and ambassador of God, who bears God's mandates to the world, the interpreter who explains to it his will, the vicegerent who fulfils it, the instrument by which God has fashioned the world.² Again, just as it is through the Logos that God comes down to earth, so conversely the Logos is the representative of the world in its relations with the Deity, the high-priest who offers intercession on its behalf, and in his holy vesture unites the sensible with the supersensible, the variegated hem of the skirt with the crowning ornament of the divine.³

Here too, however, it can once more be plainly seen how the various functions of the oriental mind do not work with equal acumen as amongst occidentals. To suppose that a second divine person is offered in this world-artificer and mediator between God and the world, is to run directly counter to Jewish monotheism. The mediator is after all no more than a force, and that a property of God. It is one with God as a shadow is one with the body, the image with the type; in short, here at once we have in its entirety that see-saw theology which is able, by means of a confusion of attributes, to regard two persons as one, or one as two, as occasion may require, and which hereafter was to fill the world with the noise of its Gnostic and Nicene speculations.

In the second rank of the mediating powers, next to the Logos, Philo reckons the Logoi above mentioned—angels, dæmons or charites, as he calls them, now in Hebrew and now in Greek.

² L. Alleg. Mang. 47.

² De Somniis, Mang. i. 665; Quod D. Immut. M. 1, 298; Conf. Ling. Mang. 427; De Agricult. Mang. 308.

³ Migr. Abrah. 452; V. Mos. M. 155.

These include, as in Plato and Zeno, an infinite number of powers; the proof of their necessity is that the world as it is could not have its sole origin in the Logos. If God could not create the world in person, without suffering some loss of purity, still less could the Logos have introduced evil into the world. Rather the co-operation of subordinate spirits is to be recognized in the creation, as God said, "Let us make men." Through the limited power of these spirits to subdue the sinful essence of matter, evils come into the world and wicked deeds burden mankind.¹ "God thought fit," it is said,² "not to create the path of evil himself in the reasonable soul, but to leave the fashioning of this part to his servants." The Mosaic "Let us make men," therefore indicates once more the identity of Genesis and Plato's Timæus, which likewise makes God at the creation of man summon the other gods to form the perishable parts.³

But as evil does not originate from God, so neither does punishment. It is his nature to scatter blessings over the world; vengeance he leaves to his spirits. The penalties laid down in his laws come not from him, but from Diké, who sits upon his throne; who, by her nature hating evil, undertakes its punishment as her peculiar task.⁴ And as a king leaves the distribution of his humbler gifts to his servants, God grants mankind only the highest gifts—virtue, health, &c.; while the avoidance of sin,⁵ the healing of sickness, the supply of food, are the task of his ministers.⁶ Moreover, regarded from the human point of view, this communion with powers, charites or angels, is the only suitable course. We are made so weak, that we could not but draw back shuddering before the aspect and majesty of the Almighty; we should not only be unable to bear

¹ De Mundi Opif. i. 17; De Profug. i. 556.

² De Confus. Ling. 1, 432.

³ Cf. the history of creation in the treatise De Profugis, with Plato, Tim. 41 B, seq.

⁴ De Decalog. ii. 208.

⁵ De Profug. i. 556.

⁶ Leg. Alleg. iii. 1, 122.

his punishments, but even his blessings, if they were bestowed on us only by himself without the mediation of his servants.¹

Finally, the assumption of such intermediate beings—and Plutarch gives great credit to the Jews for this discovery—is supported by the unity of the world. Between heaven, where God reigns, and the earth, where man holds dominion, lies the air. But God could not leave this element unpeopled, the source, indeed, as it is of all life. Thus the correlation of the world at once requires the assumption of a world of angels populating the air.² Finally, the arrangement of the world of angels as a hierarchy belongs to this harmonious completeness of the universe. This hierarchy is conceived of as a duly ordered court of God.³ In the highest place stand the forming and directing powers; in the first rank of which, again, goodness, mercy and benevolence, stand together; while justice, legislation and punishment, serve in the second rank—conceptions in which Philo might only have intended to offer an explanation of the Biblical passages about the Cherubim. To him, the Logoi are just as much religious conceptions as the Logos, and he finds the worship of these ministering gods by no means to be rejected. He certainly disapproves of the adoration of statues and pictures of the gods; but to offer prayer to such powers as the sun, moon and stars, which rank with him among the perfect, reasonable beings, seems to him just and right, so long as the lord over the servants, whom he has created, is not forgotten.⁴

After Philo's theories of God and the angels, those of the world and man must be more closely examined, by reason of the great influence they exercised upon the authors of the New Testament. The first idea Philo brings to Hellenism from Plato is that of a heavenly world—in Jewish phrase, a Jerusalem on high. God foresaw, as we are told in the *De Mundi Opificio*,

¹ De Somn. i. 642.

² De Somn. i. 641; De Gigant. i. 263; in Heinze, op. cit. p. 212, seq.

³ De Sacrif. Abr. i. 176; De Monarch. ii. 218; De Abrah. ii. 19.

⁴ De Decal. ii. 191; De Mundi Opif. i. 17, 34; De Vict. Off. ii. 262.

agreeably to Plato's Timæus, that nothing in the phenomenal world would be perfect that was not formed after a typical and intelligible idea. Now while in Plato the ideal world is that which exists from eternity, Philo's Jewish belief in God required it to be a creation proceeding from God. When, therefore, he intended to fashion this visible world, God first completed the intelligible world with a view to forming the material world upon an immaterial and wholly divine pattern. As the architect who wishes to build a city carries in his mind an exact plan of what is to be, so God first thought out the patterns, then modelled the intelligible world, and thereafter completed the visible world, using the former as plans to work by.¹ Now the site of this heavenly city is God, or the Logos itself. This is the sense in which the Logos is the book in which the essences of all things are written.² Indeed, the Logos is simply this intelligible world, exactly as the architect's thought is the imagined city.³ The Logos, as the sum of all the patterns of the world, is the ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα, and, so far as constituting its unity, the ἰδέα ἰδεῶν.⁴ On the other hand, the world is a replica of this ideal world, so far as the nature of matter allows.

Up to this point the connection of the two is that of seal and impression, type and copy,⁵ and this relation re-appears between the λόγοι and the individual forms dependent on them. If, however, we ask how the λόγοι came to enter into matter, the answer is, they are living forces, by means of which God forms the world, being himself unable to come into contact with matter. So they produce properties in that which is void of properties, form in the formless; they fashion the shapeless mass, define where no definition was, and individualize each object.⁶ Regarded more closely, this creation by the Logos, like thought itself, consists of a sifting, parting and separating, such

¹ De Mundi Opif. 7, seq.

² Leg. Allegor. i. 47.

³ De Mundi Opif. i. 5.

⁴ Ib. i. 5.

⁵ De Profug. i. 547, seq.; De Migr. Abr. i. 452.

⁶ De Monarchia, ii. 219; De Vict. Off. ii. 261.

as are the operations of the mind itself. Thus it is said, the Logos was sharpened by God to the greatest keenness, and has to shape the world by dividing it. When it has reached the simple and indivisible, the *τομεύς* begins anew upon the intellectually cognizable, dividing it into innumerable and infinite parts, until these are like immaterial lines. The Logos first divided matter into light and heavy, by separating the fine from the coarse. Then it divided the finer particles into air and fire, the coarse into earth and water. So, again, it separated warm and cold, wet and dry. It divided the dry into mainland and islands, the wet into sea and rivers, the air into summer and winter, fire into wholesome and destructive. In the same way the soul is divided into rational and irrational parts, speech into truth and falsehood, perception into accurate and inaccurate.¹ The same conceptions appear in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where the writer says in the praise of the Word: "The Word of God is quick and powerful and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart. Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight; but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do."² Philo then gives the name of division to what Heraclitus calls strife, the play of opposites. The Logos, in the one the Father of War, in the other is called the *τομεύς*. "The dividing powers penetrate into the heart of bodies and things without causing any destruction, while they divide and separate their inner nature to the best possible."³ In Stoic phrase, the Logos divides into forms of seeds throughout the world, and makes its way through matter as one that divides and analyzes by means of the law of opposites enunciated by Heraclitus, or rather borrowed from Moses.⁴

The Logos now has to maintain the world it has created. As

¹ Qu. Rer. Div. Hær. i. 491, seq.; Quæst. in Gen. Aucher, i. 64; ii. 44.

² Heb. iv. 12, 13.

³ Qu. Rer. Div. Hær. i. 518.

⁴ Quis Heres. Divin. l. c.

a separator and principle of definition between quick and dead, it sets itself as a barrier before the holy against the oppression of the profane, as once it spread like a cloud between the Egyptians and the host of Israel.¹ The order of the seasons, the courses of the stars—in brief, the permanence of the world—are secured by the immutable Word, without whose support earth would dissolve into water, fire kindle the air, water extinguish the fire.² In this connection, the Logos signifies the indissoluble band girdling and binding all things.³ It is the universal support, the cement filling Nature's gaps, the vowel that turns consonants into a word.⁴ In the same sense it is also called the pilot or helmsman of the universe.⁵ Its operations are not external, but effected by permeation into the finest pores of the world, so as to mould the special content or kernel of the whole phenomenal world. It puts on the world as a bright garment; the four elements are its visible covering, without which it would be utterly imperceptible to mankind.⁶ As the *σπερματικός λόγος*, it produces a renewal from within of species, genera and orders, by causing each being to produce fruit, thus uniting the end of beings with their beginning, and the beginning with the end.⁷ In the same way the Divine Power is spoken of as filling everything, and giving fixity and permanence to the world, being more exactly described as *πνεῦμα*, a subtle, divine matter penetrating every pore of the universe.⁸

Here, then, we have the unmistakable *λόγος σπερματικός* and the *πνεῦμα διὰ πάντων διεληλυθός* of the Stoa. Philo borrows Zeno's doctrine of reason diffused through the universe, although such propositions disagree entirely with his own doctrine of a tran-

¹ Quis Heres. Divin. l. c.

² Vita Mos. ii. 154; De Plant. Noeh. i. 331; De Profug. i. 562; De Confus. Ling. i. 425.

³ De Profug. i. 562. *Λόγος δεσμός ὧν τῶν ἀπάντων.*

⁴ Qu. Rer. Div. Hær. i. 499.

⁵ Vita Mos. ii. 155.

⁶ De Profug. i. 562.

⁷ De Mundi Opif. i. 9; Leg. ad Gai. 553, seq.

⁸ Qu. Deus sit Immutab. i. 278.

scendental God. But these speculations are connected with the Jewish doctrine of Wisdom no less than with the Stoa. Functions elsewhere ascribed to the Logos are occasionally given to Sophia instead.¹ It is Wisdom that takes up the intelligible world into itself, and realizes it in the visible world; Wisdom is the separator who divides opposites, and so articulates the real world.² In other words, the Logos is also called σοφία, as Philo himself says plainly (Leg. Alleg. i. 56), ἡ δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ θεοῦ λόγος. The reason why Philo regularly uses the Greek term instead of the Hebrew (Prov. viii. 23) lies in the fact that he had taken up his intellectual position far deeper within Greek philosophy than his younger contemporaries, who employed Philo's thoughts to expand the Jewish doctrine of Wisdom in the Book of Wisdom.

Finally, in his doctrine of man, as elsewhere, Philo unites conceptions from the Stoics, Plato and the Old Testament; but this doctrine is of special importance for us, as exercising considerable influence upon the apostle Paul. Its starting-point is Stoic. The universal Logos is in man as in the whole world. The human spirit is even a portion of the Logos.³ "It would be impossible for the human mind, enclosed in the small bulk of brain or heart, to grasp such immensities of heaven and earth, unless it were a portion of that divine Soul, or, indeed, of the universal Soul."⁴ Thus man is composed of the same four elements as the earth; but there is a fifth material that revolves in a circle and stands higher than the other four. This is the material of the stars and the whole of heaven; of this, too, the soul consists.⁵ This οὐσία, ἐξ ἧς αἱ θείαι φύσεις, is the ether of the Stoics and the fire of Heraclitus,⁶ as well as the substance of our human spirit.

Here the philosopher squares the Stoic opinion with the Old

¹ De Ebrietate, i. 361, seq.; Leg. Alleg. i. 75.

² De Profug. i. 575.

³ De Mundi Opif. i. 35.

⁴ De Mutat. Nom. i. 612; cf. Heinze, Logos, 257.

⁵ Qu. Rer. Div. Hær. i. 514; Q. D. S. Immut. i. 279.

⁶ De Som. i. 625.

Testament view that the blood is the seat of the soul, by making the blood the crude material of the soul, whose supreme element, however, is the πνεῦμα θεῖον. The idea of the πνεῦμα is thus constantly taken in the material sense of the Stoa as a heavenly ether.¹ Once, indeed, it is described, as in Paul, as the heavenly radiance of which the divine glory itself consists, namely, the reflection of the blessed and thrice blessed nature, the Logos.² This is the sense in which Philo can say, with the Mosaic account of the creation, that human intelligence, the ruling portion of the soul, was created in God's image.³

However, the Mosaic history of creation is of importance to Philo only so far as it shows him a new point of identity between Mosaism and Platonism. In the twofold account (Gen. i. 26) of Adam, who is made in God's image, and of the first man (Gen. ii. 7) who became a living soul by the breath of God, Philo sees a proof that the ideas of objects were separate from them and formed before them by God. Thus he draws a Platonic distinction between the archetype of man and the copy. The γενικός or οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος is the one who was first formed, according to the original account of creation, while the real, natural man was not made till afterwards upon the model of the former. This earthly Adam is tangible, partakes of earthly qualities, consists of body and soul, is male or female, and of mortal nature; while the other, which was made after God's image, is an idea, species, or seal, intelligible, immaterial, neither male nor female, and of immortal nature.⁴ Male and female were united in the heavenly man.⁵ It was not till later that God completed the species by creating man, the earthly Adam.⁶ The former was the true image of the Logos; the latter is only the copy of the heavenly man transferred to matter. "The former is

¹ Qu. Rer. Div. Hæer. 480, seq.

² De Concupisc. ii. 356.

³ De Mutat. Nom. i. 612; De Spec. Leg. ii. 333; De Monarch. ii. 225; De Mundi Opif. i. 33.

⁴ De Mundi Opif. i. 17, 32.

⁵ Leg. Allegor. i. 69.

⁶ De Mundi Opif. i. 17, 32.

the heavenly man, the latter the earthly. The heavenly man, begotten in the image of God, has no part in the common transitory existence of earth. But the one of earth was fashioned of fragments of matter, called by God a clod of earth."¹ Thus, too, speaks Paul (1 Cor. xv. 44): "If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body. So also it is written, The first man Adam became a living soul. The last Adam became a life-giving spirit. Howbeit that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; then that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is of heaven."

Though, then, the earthly man completely fails to realize the idea, he still partakes of the Logos, according to Philo. His soul is formed after the image of God, though oppressed with an earthly body. Man's task, therefore, is to restore the image of God in himself to its pristine brightness, to become ever more like God, the *ἐξομοίωσις πρὸς τὸν θεόν*,² the *ἐπισθαι Θεῷ* or *ἀκολουθῶς τῇ φύσει ζῆν*,³ as required by the philosopher, passing from the Mosaic to the Stoic expression. On the other hand, this is no easy task for man, since material propensities are inherent in him ever since his creation. Indeed, this creation of the earthly man is by no means a spontaneous act of the Logos, as might be supposed from the passages cited so far. It is a punishment of the soul for previous sin. As the whole world, we are told in the treatise on the Creation,⁴ is filled with body and soul, the tracts of air also must be full of souls. The purer among these, and those dwelling further from the earth, are never so infatuated as to leave the air for the earth, but remain constant in their spirituality, and serve the Father of the world as messengers and intermediaries. Some, however, whose place in the air was nearer the earth, were captivated with the pleasures of sense; they assumed mortal bodies and sank into matter. The greater part thus entered upon the path of destruction; a few

¹ Leg. Alleg. ii. 1, 69.

² De Mundi Opif. i. 35; De Caritate, 404

³ De Migrat. Abrah. i. 456; De Plantat. Noë, i. 337.

⁴ Op. cit. p. 13.

only, who choose the career of philosophers, manage to return by the path of philosophy after long wanderings.

But beside this echo from Plato's doctrine of the soul stands the other version,¹ more nearly connected with the Old Testament, that the earthly man had fallen because he was under the charm of sense, being made of earth and subject to the law of sex. He, the parent of mankind, embraced sensuous pleasure or woman; preferred baseness and falsehood to eternal truth; and thus, as the servant of sensuality and wickedness, brought an unhappy and degenerate life upon mankind.² This is the starting-point for the sinful course of human history. Paganism chose the creature in place of the Creator, and offered it divine honours; even Israel, which remained true to God, heaped up sin upon sin; and now the flood of evil desire pours over mankind from this one source. Like a wood-fire, its smell clings for ever about the vessels it touches. No one is immaculate; no day, says Job, is without sin.³

Given such premisses, it might be expected, as the logical conclusion of this special system, that the Logos or archetype of man would appear as a mediator and lend a helping hand for the salvation of the earthly Adam's degenerate descendants. But however necessary this concatenation of beginning and end appears to us, it was only carried out by those disciples of Philo who were also disciples of a higher Master, already recognized by them as the heavenly pattern of mankind, as the Word become flesh. It may be that Philo also knows of a salvation—more precisely, indeed, salvation through the Logos, which is the actual type of the soul, the source of its life, the means which enable it to discern between good and evil. But instead of drawing the Logos down from heaven, like Christian theology, Philo's teaching rather is to show how the soul has

¹ Leg. Alleg. ii. 49.

² Opif. Mund. M. 1, 32; Leg. Alleg. p. 49; cf. Keim, *Der gesch. Christ.* 141; Jesus of Naz. 1, 218.

³ Qu. D. S. Immut. M. 284; Mut. Nom. M. 585.

power to raise itself up to this, its divine pattern, by means of the higher aid it gives.¹ This power belonged to the Jewish prophets, who renounced marriage, the world and all earthly things. So to this day the Jewish ascetics remain types of the subjection of the body; so to this day the soul of the wise strives to burst the barriers of the body; it is blessed in feeling the influx of the divine light, and attains in boundless joy the sense of the divine which the soul has longed for from the first moment it was wrapped in the cerements of the body.

We find, then, two disconnected views of human nature standing together in Philo. The one appears to be absolute pessimism; the other, absolute optimism. The soul's journey in the body is the harshest captivity; the body is a repulsive prison,² which the soul longs to flee away from, as Israel from Egypt. It is a corpse that man drags about with him,³ a grave or a coffin, whence death alone will re-awaken the soul into true life. So long as we live in the body, no communion with God is possible.⁴ We are sinners from our birth; our very entry into flesh was a sinful act;⁵ and not a day of our life remains without sin.⁶ Although so harsh a scheme of human sinfulness may make it seem necessary to follow Christian theology in requiring some objective help from God, Philo did not draw this conclusion. A true eclectic, he puts side by side with the Jewish affirmation of universal and helpless sinfulness the ideal drawn by the wise man of the Stoics, who has lifted himself from the depths of corruption by his own efforts. On the one side is the Hebrew conscience and the sound of penitent psalms; on the other is Greek self-sufficiency, intoxicated with the rhetoric of the Stoa, to whom virtue alone suffices. He who by his own power has become at one with God, is priest, king and prophet, son and disciple of the Word, its companion, nay—even a son of God.⁷

¹ L. Alleg. M. 61; De Plant. M. 332; Q. D. sit Immut. M. 279; De Abr. M. 37.

² De Ebriet. M. 372.

³ Leg. Alleg. M. 100.

⁴ Ibid. M. 95.

⁵ Vita Mos. M. 157; De Nobilit. M. 440.

⁶ Mut. Nom. M. 585; Q. D. Immut. M. 284.

⁷ Vita Mos. M. ii. p. 106. Also the Stoic treatise, *Quod omnis probus liber*.

In spite of all, however, we must not overlook those passages where Philo, in almost Christian fashion, emphasizes the need of an objective salvation by the mediation of the Logos, and advances a doctrine of reconciliation which can almost be called Christian. More than once it is emphatically stated that man of himself cannot do the slightest good unaided by the Logos. The Logos is the light that scatters the darkness of the soul.¹ It feeds the soul on its everlasting Word.² It is the bread God gives us to eat; the drink he offers to refresh us,³ the manna in the wilderness, the heavenly bread that quickens the soul. Nor is it only the meat and drink of the soul; it distributes both itself. It is the high-priest, who at the banquet takes the draught of eternal grace and offers himself in the cup he fills with unmingled wine. It is the οἶνοχόος·τοῦ θεοῦ and the συμποσίαρχος.⁴ In the kindred picture, where the higher principle is represented as feminine in σοφία, Wisdom is always called the nurse who soothes thirsty souls; the milk which God lets drop from above upon souls eager to see and learn,⁵ or the fountain whence the waters of wisdom gush forth unceasingly in many streams.⁶ He who receives the Word into himself, possesses the knowledge of all things human and divine, and their causes.⁷ The Word, moreover, is the γενικὴ ἀρετή, the root of the four cardinal virtues,⁸ and therefore not only theory, but also the standard of human actions, a standard embodied in the Mosaic law.⁹

In these manifold functions the Word is figuratively called now the father, now the spouse, now the friend of the soul,¹⁰ the

¹ Leg. Alleg. 120.

² Ib. i. 122.

³ Ib. i. 121; De Somn. i. 690, seq. and 82; Q. Rer. Div. Hær. i. 484.

⁴ Q. Rer. Div. Hær. 499, seq.; De Somn. l. c.

⁵ Q. Det. Pot. Ins. i. 214, seq.; De Confus. Ling. i. 412.

⁶ De Ebriet. i. 370; De Profug. i. 566, 575, 554; De Gigant. i. 265.

⁷ De Congr. Erud. Gr. i. 530, 544.

⁸ Leg. Alleg. i. 56; De Posterit. C. i. 250.

⁹ Vita Mos. ii. 142; De Vict. Off. ii. 253.

¹⁰ Leg. Alleg. i. 117; De Migr. Abr. i. 456.

guide to whom one must commit oneself,¹ and under whose guidance life glides gently along like a voyage under the steering of a skilful pilot.² He is the taxiarch, standing in whose battalion one can devise no folly.³ When the Word enters into a soul, all vain conceptions vanish and evil grows weak; but if it again depart, error and sin at once return.⁴

According to Philo, the Word first appears as a personal helper in the Old Testament. He is the servant of God who wrestled with Jacob and bade him change his name.⁵ He is God's vicegerent, who makes known God's will to the world,⁶ the interpreter who expounds it,⁷ the angel who rescues the godly from destruction.⁸ He is the mediator and arbitrator,⁹ the priest of the individual soul, the high-priest of the world,¹⁰ the paraclete¹¹ and supplicator (*ἰκέτης*), for whose sake God is gracious to mankind, and of whom God himself said: "I am gracious to them according to thy word."¹² The whole activity of the Word culminates finally in this function of high-priest. In the visible covenant, indeed, the high-priest brings the whole people with him as soon as he enters the sanctuary, by virtue of the symbols he bears on his person. Nevertheless, he needs the intercession of the Word, the paraclete, for the remission of sins and to procure abundant grace. The true high-priest, however, who is the actual Word, the president and mediator of the holy community, extending from God to man as from summit to

¹ Q. omn. prob. liber ii. 455; De Mutat. Nom. i. 595, seq.

² Leg. Alleg. i. 671.

³ De Humanitate, ii. 396.

⁴ De Somn. i. 671; De Profug. i. 563.

⁵ De Mutat. Nom. i. 591: *ὑπὸνέτης τοῦ θεοῦ*.

⁶ De Agricult. i. 309: *ὑπαρχος τοῦ θεοῦ*; De Somn. i. 656, seq.: *ἐξάρχων*.

⁷ Leg. Alleg. i. 128: *ὁ ἐρμηνεύς λόγος*; De Mutat. Nom. i. 581: *ὁ ὑποφότης θεοῦ λόγος*.

⁸ Leg. Alleg. i. 122.

⁹ De Somn. i. 642: *μεσίτης* and *διαιτητής*.

¹⁰ Q. D. sit Immutab. i. 292, seq.; De Somn. i. 653.

¹¹ Vita Mos. ii. 155: *παράκλητος*.

¹² De Migr. Abr. i. 455.

base, represents the whole human race and brings opposites together.¹

We find the thoughts that prepare for the Epistle to the Hebrews, where Philo in this sense says of the functions of the Word as high-priest:² "The Father, by whom all things were begotten, made it a special gift to the archangel and eldest Word that he should separate the creature from the fashioner by fixing the limits of each, and yet unite them, on the one hand by beseeching aid of the eternal for the anxious mortal, on the other by transmitting the commandments of the Lord to his subjects. He rejoices in the gift, and speaks of it with pride in the words: 'And I stood between you and the Lord' (Numb. xvi. 48), as neither unbegotten, like God, nor begotten, like you, but in the middle between the extremes, serving as surety to both; on the part of the begetter, that the race of mortals should never be utterly abandoned; on the part of the begotten, that a merciful God will never completely neglect his own work." On the other hand, Philo describes the operation of the Word upon individual souls more or less as later Christian writings represent the operation of the Holy Ghost. "So long," he says, "as the divine Word has not entered into our soul, the soul remains in ignorance whether it is doing the right or leaving it undone. It often believes it is carrying out something good when it is perpetrating a great crime. But as soon as the Word enters, like the brightest ray of a lamp, we recognize that the purposes are impure, and the actions blameworthy, which we undertook in ignorance of the better course. The Word bids us clear all this away in order to purify the dwelling of the soul and heal the various diseases which infect it."³

The Word, then, re-establishes conscience, and therefore is also called *ἐλεγχος* (a title appropriated by the fourth Evangelist).

¹ The earthly high-priest: Vita Mos. ii. 152. The Logos as high-priest: De Monarchia, l.c.; De Somn. i. 653; Q. D. sit Immut. i. 292.

² Q. Rer. Div. Hær. i. 502, seq.; in Heinze, l.c. 285.

³ Q. D. sit. Immut. i. 292; in Heinze, Logos, 275.

As such, he is the divine angel who leads us and removes stumbling-blocks from before our feet, so that we can walk without stumbling on the perilous path; while he continually gives us admonitions and warnings for the improvement of our whole life.¹ He is assuredly sent by God himself to shelter us, to chasten, and so redeem the soul.² The voice of the Word is best heard in solitude. God is to be thought of as one, and therefore solitary. He only reveals himself completely to one who withdraws from the busy crowd, who gives himself up entirely to the contemplation of God, and by ascetic practices becomes a member of his virtuous household, free from sensuality.³

Finally, however—and this is a last analogy between Philo and later Christian theology—he enters upon a detailed speculation concerning the intermediate position of the Word between God and his creatures. The Word stands lower than God, but higher than man.⁴ He ranks amongst created things, but is the eldest and first of all.⁵ In relation to God, he is the second God,⁶ the image of God, the shadow of his being,⁷ his first-born son, who stands nearest him of all beings,⁸ the Demiurge,⁹ by whom all things came into existence.

Again, he is only human, for where mentioned in the Old Testament he is called simply the *ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ* or *ἄνθρωπος* alone.¹⁰ Similarly, he is repeatedly called angel or archangel.¹¹ Here, then, are all the disputes over the nature of the Word

¹ Q. D. sit Immut. i. 299; in Heinze, l.c.

² Q. Det. Pot. Ins. i. 219.

³ De Vita Contemplativa.

⁴ De Somn. i. 683, seq., 689.

⁵ Leg. Alleg. i. 121: *ὑπεράνω παντός ἐστὶ τοῦ κοσμοῦ καὶ πρεσβύτατος καὶ γενικώτατος τῶν ὅσα γέγονε.*

⁶ Leg. Alleg. i. 128.

⁷ De Somn. i. 638.

⁸ De Confus. Ling. i. 413, 414, 427: *νιδὸς θεοῦ, ὁ πρεσβύτατος, ὁ πρωτόγονος.*

⁹ De Somn. i. 683.

¹⁰ As when Joseph (Gen. xlii. 11) says, "We are all sons of one man," referred by Philo to the Logos: De Conf. Ling. 411.

¹¹ De Conf. Ling. i. 427; Q. D. s. Immut. i. 501.

become flesh, whether man, angel, God, or God-man, ready to break out. No one will fail to recognize this as the source of those speculations which became more widely known as Christian theology after the theory of the Word was applied to Jesus. The whole of this theosophy tends to become positive religion. It was not only that Christians needed to find a philosophical expression for the office of their Saviour; these semi-religious ideas have a natural tendency to fix a meaning, so as to be able to offer the world an *à priori* conclusion as a present actuality for worship.

It follows that Philo was eager to trace the Stoic Logos in the histories of the Old Testament, because it was more to him than an idea; it was a real being. In his eyes it was the Logos that brooded over the waters as the spirit of God; the Logos was the dove that brought man the assurance of God's grace in the flood;¹ the angel who directed Hagar;² the fire seen by Moses in the bush;³ the manna that Israel received in the wilderness;⁴ the heavenly bread which their forefathers ate; the rock from which Moses made the water flow;⁵ the pillar of fire which went before Israel in the wilderness;⁶ the messenger of God who punished Balaam.

The Word takes all forms, and that of man especially. He is the leader of the three men who visit Abraham under the oak of Mamre, who have a calf slaughtered for them by the patriarch, and eat cakes with Sarah.⁷ Philo undoubtedly thought of the Logos when he declared that for God to put on human form was more conceivable than for a man to undergo apotheosis.⁸

Now Philo's doctrine of the Logos being thus grafted upon the Jewish doctrine of salvation, ceased to be merely a philosophical erection to accommodate dualism, and took the first step towards becoming positive religion. Through definite sav-

¹ Q. Rer. Div. H. Mang. 506.

² Vita Mos. 91.

³ Leg. Alleg. 82; 1 Cor. x. 3, 4.

⁴ Gen. xviii. 1—8; in Aucher, 2, 615.

⁵ De Somn. 656.

⁶ De Profug. 566.

⁷ Vita Mos. 106.

⁸ Leg. ad Gai. Mang. 562.

ing acts attested by the Scripture, the Word has proved itself a saviour, helper and redeemer to the fathers of old. It is, then, just and proper for men to offer him worship too; for if the worship of angels is pleasing to the godly, how much more the worship of the Word, who stands above all angels. So it only needed a stronger religious craving to arouse the wish that the Word might once more become man, as when he was seen wandering beneath the oaks of Mamre.

7. MOSES AS SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD.

If Philo did not go so far as to establish his doctrine of the Logos in positive religion, and to seek a practical as well as a theoretic mediation between God and man in the supreme mediator, it was primarily due to the vigour of his Jewish monotheism. Besides, he was free from any necessity to do so. He was already given an historical mediator, possessing all the attributes which the religious need of the time required of the guide and prophet, the type of wisdom and of humanity. King, therefore, of mankind and friend of God, he must be frankly called God. Not only does Philo consider the Law the visible presence of the Logos, but he not unfrequently calls the law-giver Logos.¹

And yet, though this is only metaphor, what more could be said of the Word if it became flesh, than what Philo actually had said of the lawgiver of Israel? "Moses," Philo declares, "enjoyed intercourse with the Father and Creator of all, and was held worthy of the same appellation, for he was called God and King of all his people. He was permitted to enter into the darkness, that is, into the formless, invisible and incorporeal Being who represents the universe."² In him, therefore, the

¹ Cf. the passages given by Keferstein, l. c. p. 108.

² Philo, Vita Mos. 106.

helper and mediator between God and man has already appeared historically, because, since he was to become the lawgiver, Divine Providence had shaped him as the living law and perfect reason, and designed him for this office before he had any inkling of it. "So he exhibited his life as a finished picture, and gave a noble example to be followed. Hail to all who impress his model on their souls, or at least keep their eyes fixed upon it!"

It is in Moses, then, that Philo finds the truth and the way of salvation given. It must not be overlooked that he has related the life of the lawgiver in his most carefully finished work, with the undisguised object of showing that the mage, seer or wise man, sought after by Stoic and Neo-pythagorean thinkers, can only be found in him whom Israel long since chose to be the guide of life. But the Moses of Philo, who borrows his glories from the utterances of pagan philosophers, has little in common with the Moses of the Pentateuch. Philo rifled the lives of other wise men to enrich one alone, and the bright trappings hung around the sublime portrait of the lawgiver still make a brave show, exhibiting him as nobler than Solon, more venerable than Pythagoras, more mysterious than the Chaldees, more in the confidence of the gods than the favourite of Egeria.

Thus he writes his *Life of Moses* to show that Judaism claims descent from the first of philosophers. "For only those states prosper whose rulers study philosophy, or actually are philosophers. Yet Moses was not only king and philosopher, but lawgiver, priest and prophet withal," and favoured of God from his cradle.¹

Miraculously saved from the eddies of the Nile, he attained princely rank through the charm and beauty of his childish features. "So he learned the arts of number and mensuration, the sciences of rhythm, harmony and metre, and the fine arts, such as instrumental music, oratory and poesy. The Egyptians further initiated him into the mystical philosophy depicted in hieroglyphic writing under the forms of animals. The Greeks

¹ Vita Mos. Mang. 134.

taught him the other branches of universal learning; wise men summoned from the adjoining provinces instructed him in Assyrian science and Chaldean astrology. The latter he also received from the Egyptians, who had attained wonderful proficiency in mathematics."¹

Thus educated, Moses was adopted by the childless princess, the king's only daughter. He would have become king of Egypt, and was already called the "young king," but with lofty Stoic wisdom drew back from the purple and humbled himself by taking the part of his enslaved people, and renouncing his position in the royal house. Driven from Egypt, he was set to herding his flocks as a preparation for becoming the shepherd of the multitude. In the loneliness of the desert, where the eye turns to the inner self, his first divine vision was vouchsafed him. In it God was revealed to him as absolute being without qualities. From the burning bush he received his commission to form a community pleasing to God, and gave irrefragable proof of his authority by ten extraordinary miracles of chastisement.² As a consequence of such deeds, Moses was permitted to leave Egypt with all his people.

The retreating people, indeed, required another winnowing; for when the very Scripture complains of the perversity of this people, it must be understood that many slaves and fellahs, as well as bastards of Hebrew men by Egyptian women, accompanied the chosen people, and were destined to give the lawgiver no little trouble in the wilderness.

With the exodus from Egypt, Moses reached the culminating point of his mission. He was to show the world the type of a wise man who unites in himself and displays in action those qualities which Pythagoras, Plato and the Porch, could only speak of. "He alone of all rulers that ever were, neither heaped up gold nor silver, nor demanded tribute, nor got him palaces nor lands, nor herds nor many servants; but thinking admiration of material wealth the sign of spiritual poverty, he con-

¹ l. c. p. 82.

² l. c. pp. 82—102.

temned it as barren of light, and honoured the resplendent wealth of the soul and strove eagerly after this."

So too the lawgiver was superior to all other earthly inclinations. His existence was stamped with the highest self-control, the purest virtue, the greatest sanctity. For the sake of these, he was held worthy to be called thereafter the friend of God. The Jews therefore are not wrong in ascribing a divine nature to the founder of their religion, and calling him God and King of his people. For in him all mankind were given the guide and the pattern to mould themselves upon, if they would attain a like peace with God.¹

While Moses thus attains the Stoic ideal by becoming like God through his own power, and so capable of serving as a guide to others, he is in the same way a new Pythagoras, as having become a mage and miracle-worker, showing his inward unity with the Godhead by unconditioned power over nature. "For it is not one part only of the world that is subjected to our God, but the whole world, and its several parts serve him like slaves, whatever his behests." "But if, according to the proverb, all things are in common between friends, and the prophet is called God's friend, it is not wonderful that in wisdom and power he shared the character of the divine. Not seldom he was rapt in ecstasies in which he was filled with the spirit, and prophesied the future, or sank mysteriously into the very depths of the Godhead."

As the friend of God, he must also partake of the power which God exercises over the whole world—earth, sea and rivers alike. With his staff he divided the flood, split rocks and made salt springs fresh. In prayer, his unresting spiritual eye penetrated all mysteries in heaven above or in the world beneath. His very body was in sympathy with the currents of the world-soul. In the turmoil of battle, his hands grew light when victory inclined to the side of Israel, and so pure æther prevailed over the material powers of heathendom; but they sank down heavy as lead

¹ Vita Mos. 103—107.

when matter gained a momentary advantage over the children of light.¹

Moses had attained this mysterious condition by asceticism, after the heart of the Pythagoreans. "He had first to purify not only the soul, but the body also, which was not indeed touched by any disease, but still defiled by all the weaknesses which have their root in human nature—eating, drinking and intercourse with women." He lived unmarried from the time he began to prophesy and utter oracles, since he held it necessary to maintain himself in perpetual readiness to receive the divine voice. He went without meat and drink once for forty days; while he really received better nourishment in the heavenly teachings he partook of, which first beautified his spirit, and then his countenance, through his soul; so that those who saw him afterwards could scarcely believe their eyes.² It was then that the Jewish law, worship and customs, were imparted to him in direct revelation. As to the Law itself, it contains neither more nor less than the revelation of the essence of God and nature, together with the practical injunction, "that he who is faithful to the law must strive to realize Nature's pattern, and direct his life according to the ordinances of the world."³ The meaning of the Pentateuch is therefore nothing but the Stoic's *naturæ convenienter vivere*. True, that a profane eye would discover no such meaning in the Pentateuch as is hidden in the volumes of the Porch; but here once more allegorical interpretation steps in, inquiring not what the text *says*, but what it *means*.

The same conclusion follows directly from the consideration that Moses was not writing a code for a simple city, like Solon for Athens, or Lycurgus for Sparta, but opened his book of the law by unveiling the law of nature and describing the creation of the world. "His reason for first giving an account of the origin of the whole universe is, that his own laws most exactly represent the constitution of Nature as a whole."⁴

¹ Vita Mos. 107—116.

² Ib. 116—147.

³ Ib. 141.

⁴ Ib. 142.

These revelations of the order of nature and the universe were pre-eminently the foundation of those ritual precepts in which man according to the flesh saw nothing but a dead weight of liturgical ordinances and empty ceremonial. God, for example, prescribed that the tabernacle should have fifty-five pillars, because the sacred number fifty contains the force of the right-angled triangle, the starting-point of all creation. "I will explain," continues Philo, "why I first add the extra five pillars to the fifty and then subtract them. Five is the number of the senses. In man, sense is now related to the external world, now united with the mind. It is the minister of mind in its intercourse with the external world. This is why I placed five on the border-land. For he made the pillars on the inside face towards the unapproachable parts of the sanctuary, which symbolize the objects of thought; while he made the outer ones face the fore-court, which symbolizes the objects of sense. He enforced the same distinction in their pedestals. They were of copper, because reason in us is the head and guide of feeling, and sense is its outside, and at the same time its foundation. Thus he represented reason by gold, and sense by copper."¹

The same symbolism makes the ten curtains which cover this house four ells wide, because it takes forty weeks to shape man in the workshop of nature. Their materials represent the four elements. Linen and purple represent earth and water; blue and scarlet, air and fire. The cherubim on the ark of the covenant symbolize the two fundamental powers of God, the creative and the regulating. The cover represents his mercy; it covers over sins. The length and breadth of the cover are given, but not its depth, for no one knows the capacity of God's mercy. The seven-branched candlestick signifies the seven planets, in the midst of which stands the sun, occupying the fourth place above and below, and ruling and illumining the fabric of the world. The table with bread and salt stands on the north side, because food comes both from heaven and earth, and the north

¹ Vita Mos. 147.

is the quarter whence the winds rush down from heaven. The altar of incense serves as symbol of things on earth which give rise to vapours.

In the same way as the temple presents a type half spiritual, half earthly, the high-priest in the vestments of his office is simply the creation in a new guise. His blue under-garment signifies the air, stretching down like a long robe from moon to earth, and enveloping all things. Its hem is hung with pomegranates, flowers and bells, reaching to the high-priest's ankle. The flowers are the symbol of the earth, from which everything springs and comes to flower; the pomegranates typify water;¹ the bells, harmony, uniting both.

As the lower world, earth and water, are represented about the feet of the high-priest, extending beneath the air, his under-robe, so he wears two emeralds on his shoulders as types of the sun and moon, and twelve jewels on his breast to represent the animal creation, sewn upon the square breast-plate, which corresponds to the four orders of creatures and the four seasons. High above all these types of the world, the pointed cap is set on his head as on a throne. Its plate of gold bears the most holy name of God, that is above sun and moon and stars. "Thus clad, the high-priest entered upon divine worship, so that when he began to offer up prayer and sacrifice after the manner of our fathers, he was accompanied by the whole world in the symbols he bore."³

It would be easy to give further proofs of the way in which Philo transformed all ritual precepts into acrostics, with an answer in terms of physical science; but it suffices to add to the examples already given the meaning of the crowning usages of Jewish worship—sacrifice, the sabbath and circumcision. As to sacrifice, Philo does not conceal from himself that the absolute and omniscient Being who possesses everything, neither demands sacrifice nor rejects it, as having everything already. It is only

¹ As *ῥοισμός* is derived from *ῥύσις*.

² Vita Mos. p. 155.

³ Ib. p. 155.

the disposition accompanying sacrifice which is pleasing to God, and this may exist where no flesh is burnt.¹ The sacrifice, therefore, does not effect a reconciliation with God; it is to represent that we have all merited death, and that even the best have become sinful by the mere fact of birth. The sacrifice, therefore, is of no value in itself, but is a symbolic action.²

It is otherwise with the sabbath. This is kept holy by the Jews in accordance with divine revelation, for the prophet's keen eye recognized that the number seven is impressed on the universe and glorified by Nature herself. "For Moses first found the seventh day born of no mother, devoid of female parentage, born of the father alone unbegotten and created without entering the womb. Then he saw not only that it was glorious and birthless, but also ever virgin, neither born of a mother nor a mother itself, neither born of infirmity nor producing infirmity. Finally, he learnt by careful research that the birthday of the world was being celebrated by heaven and earth and all that therein is, when they rejoiced and made glad over the seventh day that established the universe. This is why Moses, so great in every sphere, thought it right for the followers of his holy teaching to follow the guidance of nature and keep holy the seventh day."³ In this, however, Moses was only the discoverer of a law invented by Nature herself, as is shown by the fact that one nation after another took up the celebration of the sabbath, till soon there was not one but rested from work on the seventh day.⁴

The third Jewish usage, circumcision, is not so easy to trace. Still it has its deeper meaning.⁵ In the first place, Philo advances medical reasons for it, which need not be gone into. For the deeper meaning, it is suggested that circumcision is to call to mind the self-restraint necessary to man.⁶ It is a mate-

¹ Vita Mos. p. 151.

² Ib. pp. 156—158.

³ Ib. p. 167.

⁴ Ib. p. 137.

⁵ De Circumcis. Mang. 210, seq.; Special. Leg. 329.

⁶ The special meaning is that, by getting rid of the *ἀκροβυστία*, the *πύσθη* approaches the form of the *καρδία*, which is the seat of the spirit.

rial type of the circumcision of the lusts which delude thought, as well as an admonition to men to know themselves, and to put away pride, recognizing generation to be not a purely human act, but rather an operation of divine power.

If we now survey the whole of this apologetic allegorism, paganism, on its own principles of interpretation, might confess that after all it had derided in the Jews a great deal which it did not understand. But it still remained an open question why, if all these matters were only types of moral processes, it was not sufficient simply to put their morality into practice. If one has fathomed the secrets of the universe, why represent them symbolically in the temple? If he is penetrated by the sense of his own unworthiness, why symbolize them outwardly in the sacrifice? If he is resolved to keep his life pure, what is the good of actual circumcision?

Philo, however, puts aside these questions all the more quickly because he has a deep sense of their justification. The pure soul, who has thrown off the thrall of the body and earthly desires, may neglect the outward observance. So long, however, as we are neither free from the body nor living in the wilderness, we are in the bondage of the earthly form, and cannot have truth without its husk."¹

It is this that distinguishes Philo from those emancipated Jews met by Martial at the bath or the play, who vow by Jupiter that he keeps to the obligations of the law in spite of the rationalistic explanation he gives of them. "There are people," he says,² "who hold the written law to be the emblem of spiritual doctrines, and seek the latter with the utmost care, while they despise the former. Such as these I can only blame, for they ought to attend both to knowledge of the hidden and observation of the plain sense. But, as it is, they live only for themselves as if they were in the wilderness, or merely incorporeal souls; they know nothing of the city, of the village, of

¹ De Cherubim, i. 540.

² De Migr. Abrah. M. 1, 450.

their own house—nothing of intercourse with other men; they want to soar above the opinions of the common herd and seize the naked truth, although Holy Writ enjoins them to endure cares for reputation's sake, and to alter nothing in the laws, which have been given by extraordinary men divinely inspired. For though under the observation of the sabbath lurks a deep meaning, that God alone attains to activity, the creature being only passive, this is no reason for making the slightest change in the precepts which bid it be kept holy. We may not, therefore, make a fire on the sabbath, nor till the soil, nor bear burdens, bring complaints, deliver judgment, demand restitution of goods lent, call in debts, nor do any other kind of thing, though permissible on working days. And though every feast be in its essence nothing more than an emblem of spiritual joy and thankfulness to God, this is no reason for abandoning our accustomed festivities and usages. Though circumcision in the same way signifies renunciation of every passion and lust and godless thought, it is no reason for setting aside the ordained custom. For if we would only maintain the higher meaning, we should actually have to renounce sanctification in the temple and a thousand other necessary solemnities."

From this point of view, Philo enters the lists for Judaism as established. The Mosaism he believes in is Platonism; that which he practises is the ancient traditional faith of his fathers. Philo is conscious of no incongruity between the two, and, indeed, emphatically denies that there is any. The Jewish usage is the only form of humanity, the mode of life actually prescribed by nature. Experience proved this long ago. All other laws have been altered again and again, now by the populace, now by despots. "Only the laws of Moses remain unchanged, unshakable, indestructible; sealed as it were by Nature's sign-manual; uninterrupted from the day they were given until now; and they will assuredly remain imperishable for ever, as long as sun and moon and heaven and the universe endure."¹

¹ Vita Mos. Mang. ii. 136.

The spread of these customs among neighbouring nations gives the same testimony of their accord with nature. "Indisputably, more wonderful still is their appreciation and high honour outside Israel amongst almost all foreigners, especially those who prize virtue. They have secured extraordinary honour, such as has fallen to the lot of no other lawgiver. For neither in Greece nor in foreign lands is there, I venture to say, a single state which honours the laws of another. They hardly remain constant to their own laws, but alter them according to the change of times and circumstances. Athens rejects the laws and customs of Sparta; Sparta, those of Athens; from east to west, almost every country repudiates foreign laws. Our law alone is recognized by them all. It subdues all men to itself, and admonishes them to virtue—barbarians, Hellenes, dwellers on the mainland and on islands, nations of the east and of the west, Europeans, Asiatics, all peoples of the world."¹

From such facts, then, the Alexandrian philosopher might dare to hope, in those days of religious change, that Judaism would in future be the religion of the world. If in times of tribulation and defeat the advance of Judaism had already been so marked, what universal success must await the hour of its national restoration. "I believe," he says confidently, "mankind will drop their own observances, will give up their ancestral customs, and honour this law alone. For with the fortunes of the nation, its laws will shine more brightly, while the rest will grow dim like the stars before the rising sun."

Thus, then, we find in this great spokesman of Hellenistic Judaism no less confidence that the future belongs to Israel, than in those Hebrews whose fanaticism even then was preparing the way for a Jewish war. Philo, too, sees in Israel the guide of nations. As once the Logos (or one of the immediate dependants of the Lord of the world) moved before Israel in the pillar of fire,²—as the service of the temple at Jerusalem is simply

¹ Vita Mos. p. 137.

² Ib. p. 107.

the pleading intercession of Wisdom, the first-born daughter of God, imploring forgiveness of sins and divine blessings in the name of the world,¹—so among all nations Israel is alone chosen to serve God as his priest, and pray for all mankind that evil may be averted and good descend.² For Israel's souls belong to a higher order than those of the Gentiles, albeit in this world confined like bodies of men.³ On this, finally, rests also the promise of the Messianic kingdom, which Philo describes as a vast gathering of the Dispersal by a new appearance of the Logos, illustrating it by images from Isaiah.⁴ For him, too, this promise attaches to a definite personality, as he makes Balaam definitely prophesy: "Hereafter shall a man go forth from amongst you and rule over the nations. His rule shall spread from day to day and be uplifted high above all things."⁵

Thus Philo. He at least was convinced that Judaism, as he understood it, was the absolute religion sought by the nations. In his eyes all the problems of the time seemed solved, all doubts removed, all difficulties smoothed away, if only the evidence of his proofs were not maliciously excluded. Mosaism was indeed nothing but the philosophy by means of which it was possible to advance beyond all religion, while the old philosophers had simply borrowed from Moses. Judaism was the origin of culture—why not also its end?

On one side Philo did not deceive himself. He only said in the language of the Greek schools, what Paul was preaching in the synagogues at the same time, that Abraham, formerly the father of one people only, was henceforth the father of a countless generation. Christianity actually made the Old Testament the universal religion, only rejecting its ceremonial elements instead of changing their meaning.

¹ Vita Mos. p. 155.

² Ib. p. 104.

³ Ib. p. 124.

⁴ Cf. the passages from De Præm. and De Execr. in Vol. i. p. 196, seq. (Eng. tr.).

⁵ Vita Mos. Mang. ii. 126.

But these relics of the ancient natural religion, the usages which Philo is at such pains to justify, become more and more the burning question between the creeds. The more confidently Philo asserted that Judaism is only a spiritual religion, the more venomously did the sophists of Alexandria point to the extraordinary ceremonies of the Jews, for which they suggested the most revolting significance. The higher Philo had spiritualized the sensuous elements of Judaism, the deeper did Egyptians and Greeks drag them in the mire. But it must not be forgotten that the Jews began the strife with their polemic against heathendom, and were the first to profane what was holy with their derision. At the same time, it will seem only natural for the battle to assume the greatest proportions where Judaism had struck deepest root in every direction, namely in Alexandria.

8. THE RELIGIOUS STRIFE IN ALEXANDRIA.

The struggles between synagogue and agora which broke out everywhere in the latter half of Tiberius' reign, are represented by our Jewish authorities as essentially an outburst of Gentile intolerance. As a matter of fact, the Jewish attacks on polytheism were the first and the more severe, so that the Jewish side would be more deserving of blame, were the contending parties judged on the score of intolerance. The Jews were no more indulgent in dealing with the holy things of their opponents, than were these with the worship of Jehovah, blasphemy against which cut the Jew to the heart. So it is a constant trait of the pseudonymous treatises in praise of Judaism, to depreciate Gentile practices, apart from the religious thought on which they were based, as merely sensual customs. No one could expect the Egyptian to feel pleasure at being thus addressed by the Jewish Sibyl:

"Shame then! as gods to worship cats and snakes.
 You pray to birds and creeping things of earth,
 Gods who go thieving out of pots and pans,
 Nor dwell in the bright heaven, but all their care
 Is hunting moths and spiders for their food."¹

The Book of Baruch speaks with equal disrespect of the idols which the heathen carried through the streets, decked out like a courtesan for the dance. They bring in gold to their priest, who spends it in merriment with women, and their treasure is stolen unobserved by the ministers of their religion. "Fine gods, that are dusted daily, and on whose heads cats sit until they needs are driven away."² Most stinging of all must have been the attacks on the heathen colleges of priests indulged in by the appendix to the Book of Daniel, "Of Bel and the Dragon," where the holy colleges are represented as thorough hypocrites and slaves to their appetites.

It is no doubt true that, before this, infinitely more bitter things had been said and written by the Greeks themselves against the Olympians and their priests and augurs; but national pride would not suffer aliens to indulge their scorn of the national worship. Besides, a certain irritability, unparalleled before, still prevailed in the Egyptian religion; and the Romans were frequently astonished to see riots break out on the killing of a sacred cat, and in great conflagrations to find the inhabitants save the sacred animals first.

It is easy to see that Jewish curiosity could give great offence to such a population. Thus in the Hecataeus, the actual work of a Jew, is a story of a Jewish archer, Masollam. As it sat on a tree close by, he shot a bird, from whose movements the augurs used to direct the advance or retreat of the army. Then he cried out mockingly that if it had known anything of the future, it would have flown further off.³ If such things happened—and Jewish idiosyncrasies make it anything but unlikely—we can

¹ Frag. ii. Friedlieb, p. 7.

² Baruch vi.

³ Jos. Ap. i. 22.

easily see how insecure were the foundations of religious peace in Alexandria.¹

The first reaction against Judaism in Alexandria proceeded, as Josephus states expressly, not from the Greeks, but the Egyptians—an additional reason for ascribing it to wounded religious feeling in this sensitive people.² “The Egyptians,” says Josephus, “stood too low to walk exactly in the path of our doctrine, and when they saw how many came over to our faith, jealousy was stirred up.” It must have been this jealousy that guided the pen of the high-priest Manetho at Heliopolis, when in 250 B.C. he wrote his *Ægyptiaca*, a book undertaken at the request of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and particularly examining the relations of the Jews in Egypt.

Now it is exceedingly unlikely that Manetho had access to any ancient Egyptian account of the Jewish lawgiver and the exodus.³ He seems instead to have simply reversed the Jews' own story; so that where the Book of Exodus declared that the Egyptians were plagued with boils and blains, murrain and sickness, lice, destruction of the crops, sand-storms and so forth, because they would not let the people go out of bondage, the Egyptian priest, on the contrary, declares that the Egyptians drove out the Jews because this unclean people brought upon them such wrath from heaven. Pharaoh Amenophis, he asserts, wished to behold the gods, as once his ancestor Oros had done; but received the answer that the godhead would remain hidden from him till he had driven all lepers and unclean persons out of the country. So he sent eighty thousand sick to the quarries east of the Nile, where a leprous priest of Heliopolis, Osarsiph, organized them into a nation, and made it a law amongst them to spurn everything held sacred by the rest of the Egyptians, to hate what they loved, to spare none of the sacred animals, and to bend the knee before none of their gods.

¹ Cf. also Strabo, Geogr. 17, 1, for the mixed population and Egyptian sensitiveness.

² Jos. Ap. i. 25; ii. 6.

³ Cf. Hitzig, *Gesch. des V. Israel*, 68.

To the same extent, then, as Manetho's other accounts of the Hyksos' dominion over Egypt tally with Israel's account of their captivity in Egypt, the calumnious story of Israel's exiles being expelled lepers is perhaps only the Biblical story reversed, supported to some extent by the fact that leprosy has always been prevalent among the Jews. This account of Manetho's re-appears in an exaggerated form in the "Egyptian History" of Chæremón the elder,¹ who swells the number of the sick to two-hundred thousand. Then in the first century B.C. the grammarian Lysimachus added further details to the story from what he may have heard of Pharaoh's lean years, the leprosy of the Jews, and the drowning of their male infants. According to him, the crops failed, and king Bocchoris sent to inquire of the oracle of Jupiter Ammon why the land was chastised with scarcity. To this he received answer that he must purge the sanctuaries of unclean and "godless" men, and drive them into the wilderness; those who suffered from the itch or scab he must drown, and then reconcile every temple to the holy black earth. This was done. But a priest, Moses, gave a law to the "godless" who were sent into the wilderness, making a duty of those customs which the Egyptians professed to have discovered in the Jews; namely, of feeling goodwill to no man; of giving the worst instead of the best advice to every one; and of destroying the altars and temples of the gods, whence came the name of their capital, Hierosyla, i.e. sacrilege.²

These fables about the Jews, born of Egyptian hatred, were insignificant so long as no actual dissensions embroiled the Gentile and Jewish parties with one another. Still their repetition and exaggeration by philosophers like Posidonius of Rhodes and Apollonius Molon, Cicero's friend, shows that parties were no better disposed towards one another. In the time of the emperor Augustus, the preference shown to the Jews throughout the Roman dominions continually led to Jewish persecutions, by which the rank growth of these upstarts was

¹ Cf. Müller, *Frag. Hist. Gr.* iii. 495.

² Jos. Ap. i. 34, seq.

cut down, although Agrippa protected them to the utmost of his power.

In Egypt, this crisis occurred somewhat later, but with all the more violence, as the quiet times of Augustus and Tiberius had strengthened the superiority of Jewish trade in Alexandria to an unheard-of extent. It was now maintained that the Jews had originally been assigned a harbourless strip of land along the surf-beaten shore; but after all Alexander's new building, it had come to pass that they were settled close to the royal palace, and had the chief advantage from the building of the great mole, together with the Pharos and the Canopic canal.¹ Remembering the status elsewhere held by foreign colonists, the native Egyptians resented the equality which had crept in.² Their privileges were criticised, and it was credibly reported that the ill-starred Germanicus had refused the Jews the control of the corn during his stay in Egypt.³ It was firmly maintained, however, that under all circumstances the city of Alexandria recognized only one quarter of the city as lawful for the Jews, while they had factitiously secured two of the five, and further had acquired possession of numerous houses in the other three.⁴

All this worked upon the masses; and after Sejanus' administration displayed such undisguised ill-will to the Jews in the capital, still stronger opposition might be expected in the province. Add to this the conquest Judaism was now making over women everywhere in the great cities, the seductive brilliancy attaching to the Jews through Philo's learning, his brother's connection with the imperial house and the position of the Herods at court; consider especially the manifestoes of Jewish authors, which pseudonymously or without disguise explained Mosaism as the universal religion, to take the place of the old cults now covered with scathing contempt,—and it is clear that the religious war

¹ Jos. Ap. ii. 4. Perhaps the Rhakotis is meant, where a pastoral tribe had formerly been settled to watch the harbour. It was afterwards included in Alexandria and lay above the roadstead: Strabo, 17, 1.

² Ib. ii. 6.

³ Ib. ii. 5.

⁴ In Flacc. M. 525.

could now be only a question of time. For it could not be doubted that the Gentile population would at last remember their physical superiority after being worsted in the field of religion and business.

After the time of Tiberius, a scholar now enters the fray who had a keen intuition for the wishes of the multitude, and had made himself popular in Egypt by retailing fables about the Jews, as in Greece he used to win every heart by an apotheosis of Homer. He was the grammarian and sophist Apion, beyond question the greatest charlatan of his century.

A son of the Egyptian oasis, Apion was perhaps descended from one of the Greek families which had colonized the place, although Josephus would stamp him as a true Egyptian at any cost.¹ At all events he owes his temperament to the witty and frivolous metropolis, that knew everything, tried everything, and yet accomplished so little, where he has received his education. Like all the sophists, he boasted of being the greatest pupil of a celebrated teacher. Apollonius the grammarian was his spiritual father,² and soon the son of the oasis made such progress that he was able to take over the school of Theon in Alexandria on his own account. Restless, and gifted with assurance and untiring lungs, he was in no want of a considerable following. With tongue and pen he took part on principle in all the questions of the day, so that his surname Pleistonices was changed into Pleistoneices, the "Meddlesome."³ However, the Alexandrian citizens, who gave the name of public life to what we should call faction, dissension, wrangling and ineffectual uproar, gazed in admiration at the pugnacious bully, and gave him the freedom of the city as a mark of their respect, so that he always used to call himself emphatically the Alexandrian.⁴

Alexandria, however, soon became too narrow for his ambition,

¹ Ap. ii. 3. The population of the oasis, Herod. 3, 26.

² Cf. Suidas, in Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* 3, p. 506. ³ Cf. Müller, *l. c.*

⁴ Ap. ii. 3, a passage showing that Apion was not given the citizenship for his attack on the Jews, but showed his gratitude to his patrons by so doing.

and he took up his residence in the capital, to open a school of grammar and rhetoric there.¹ Meanwhile Apion seems to have gained no such reputation here as among the factious Alexandrians, who regarded clap-trap as a merit. The Romans instead found Apion affected by the *vitium ostentationis*,² and it was no secret that the emperor Tiberius called him in his caustic way the cymbal of the universe (*cymbalum mundi*), while his malicious audience, including Plinius Secundus, thought Fame's kettledrum (*tympnum Famæ*) a more fitting name.³ Perhaps he punished the capital for this cool reception by his speedy departure; at all events we find him later in the public service of Alexandria,⁴ while in the time of Caligula he took up peripatetic lecturing, and, as Seneca complains, filled all Greece with his quackery.⁵ He does not seem to have taken up his permanent residence in Rome again until the reign of Claudius.

His chief gift was undisguisedly rhetoric, and even his opponents marvelled at his fluency.⁶ Then his literary range was inconceivable; there was hardly a single subject on which he would not have shown some knowledge. He wrote on Homer, on the use of metals in medicine, on the elements, the epicure Apicius, Egyptian antiquities, and the dialect of Rome; on the Jews, the great magicians, Aristophanes and the Pyramids; on Pythagoras and the famous hetærae,—not to mention all the works whose titles are lost to us.⁷ His educational treatises were still more many-sided; the world was full of the most profound inquiries set afoot by him. Only Seneca maintained that these inquiries used to deal with things that ought, if known, to be forgotten, and, if unknown, not to be learnt.⁸ Thus, one of his ethical lectures dealt with the question whether Anacreon was more debauchee or drunkard, in connection with which the

¹ Plin. Hist. Nat. i. 3, præf.

² Gellius, 5, 14, in Müller, 507.

³ Plin. H. N. 1, præf.

⁴ Ant. xviii. 8, 1; Ap. 2, 3.

⁵ Sen. Ep. 88.

⁶ Gell. 5, 14.

⁷ The titles of his books in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3, 506.

⁸ Ep. 88.

further question came up as to the precise state of Sappho's virtue. The birth-place of Homer and the birth-place of Laïs the courtesan were equally subjects for his wide research.¹ He made most amazing investigations into the customs of the scarabæus, the length of the intestine in the ibis, and the various effects of erotic herbs and antidotes to poison.² In Ithaca, he cross-examined the inhabitants as to the varieties of games at draughts which the suitors of Penelope might possibly have played.³ To learn why the second is the ring-finger, he turns to the Egyptian priests; they, skilled in dissecting and embalming corpses, assure him that a delicate nerve leads directly from the ring-finger to the heart.⁴

Such an inquirer naturally found himself rewarded in time with the most splendid results. He can name species of fish which grunt when sung to,⁵ and stags that have four antlers.⁶ He can give an accurate list of rivers in every country in which the heaviest objects float;⁷ he has discovered the islands of the blest, contrary to the opinion of all earlier investigators, in an Egyptian inland sea;⁸ he has satisfactorily examined the habits of the immortal sacred ibis and the divine Apis.⁹ His name is actually to be found to-day graven on the colossus of Memnon.¹⁰ In his *Ægyptiaca*, he makes play with the names of Egyptian kings, as scholars do to-day with dynasties of Pharaohs; and asserts most precisely that Moses left Egypt in the first year of the seventh Olympiad while Amasis was king of Egypt, during the reign of Inachus at Argos, and at the very time when queen Dido cut up the bull's hide to mark out the city of Carthage.¹¹

¹ Vid. Frag. 32, in Müller.

² *Ælian* H. N. 10, 29; *Plin.* H. N. xxxiv. 102, 6; xxx. 2, 6.

³ *Athenæus*, p. 16, F. ⁴ *Gellius*, 10, 10. ⁵ *Plin.* H. N. xxxii. 2, 9.

⁶ *Ælian*, 11, 40.

⁷ *Plin.* H. N. xxxi. 2, 18.

⁸ *Eustathius* on *Odyss.* 4, 563; p. 1509, 25 in Müller, Frag. 3, 511.

⁹ *Ælian* 10, 29.

¹⁰ Cf. *Friedländer*, *Darstellung* &c., 2, 97. The inscription runs, ΑΠΙΩΝ ΠΑΕΙΣΤΟΝ . . . ΗΚΟΥΣΑ ΤΡΙΣ.

¹¹ *Contra* Ap. 2, 2; Müller, 3, 509.

The Homeric question, however, owed most to him, and two quarters of the world listened breathlessly to the announcement of his discovery that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were completed before Homer prefixed the introduction to the former, beginning it with the word *MHNIN*, because *MH* signifies forty-eight, whereby the poet at the outset laid down the number of his poems as equal to the first two letters.¹ "Eight-and-forty sing, O Muse, of Achilles, Peleus' son!" was therefore the deeper meaning of the line—a direct answer, withal, to the vexed question how Homer could begin his epic with so hateful a word.

Spoiled by his extraordinary success, the travelled charlatan gradually became one of the most shameless rogues who ever deluded the Greek demos. There was no marvel he had not seen with his own eyes. He seemed to renew the age of Homer, when all the news was brought by a wandering stranger. "When I was at such-and-such a place," came to be his favourite introductory phrase, and he always happened to be an eye-witness of the wonderful events of his time. On the occasion of the famous story of the slave *Androcles*, who was thrown in the arena to a lion which he had relieved of a thorn while both were free, and which now fawned at his feet, *Apion*, of course, was present in the theatre and had one of the best places.² Similarly at *Dicæarchia*, he was an eye-witness of the friendship of the dolphin with the fisher-boy, at whose grave on the sea-shore the fish afterwards pined to death.³ He saw pictures by *Apelles*, such speaking likenesses that physiognomists could tell from them the year of the sitter's death.⁴ He found in the Egyptian labyrinth a colossus of *Serapis* made of pure emerald and not less than nine ells high.⁵ In the same land of wonder he saw the ibis that changes its colour from dark to light red with the waxing and waning moon, and has the exact shape of a bleeding heart when it puts its head under its wing.⁶

¹ Seneca, Ep. 88.² Gellius, 5, 14.³ Ib. 7, 8.⁴ Plin. H. N. xxxv. 10, 36.⁵ Ib. xxxvii. 19, 2.⁶ Ælian, H. N. 10, 29.

But whoever would know the man in all his height ought to hear his treatises on psychomancy, where he describes magicians who served dishes that vanished before the mouth of the guest, while they had a way of paying their hosts with an obol that always came back to them.¹ To what lengths he dared go with his public is best shown by his story how he once conjured up the shade of Homer to ask him which was his real birth-place. The shade appeared to him, and imparted the vexed secret, but forbade Apion to reveal it.²

Every feature of this pleasing portrait shows that Apion was eaten up with vanity, and developed a prepossession as to his personal value quite at variance with fact. Thus Josephus says of him, he reproached the Jews with having produced no great men, and named among the Greeks Socrates, Zeno, Cleanthes and the like; then, "what is most extraordinary, he adds his renowned name to the list, and felicitates Alexandria on possessing such a citizen as himself. This is in entire harmony with the statement of his auditor Plinius Secundus, that Apion prided himself on securing immortality to the man to whom he dedicated a volume."³

It was a foregone conclusion that such a character should, sooner or later, become ridiculous, and scorned by the better class of every age; but the people of Alexandria admired the "great cymbal" none the less for this. They named him the victorious, the laborious, the new Homer;⁴ not only were they jubilant over the success of his speeches, but they entrusted the most weighty affairs of state to this empty rhetorician. In the quarrel between the two Jewish and the three Greek quarters,

¹ De Mago, Frag. 28, in Müller.

² Plin. xxx. 2, 6. The same story is found in Philostratus, *Heroic*, p. 319, 3, but there the spirit of Protesilaus gives as the reason of his prohibition that otherwise the rest of the cities would give up paying honours to the divine Homer.

³ H. N. 1, 20.

⁴ Sen. Ep. 88; Plin. xxxvii. 5, 19; Suidas, l. c.

Apion was the head of the Alexandrian embassy to Caligula, and was spokesman of the great city in this vital question.

This was the man who, impelled by his deep-seated desire of being on the crest of the wave in everything, flung himself into the tide of hostility to the Jews, and placed his eccentric learning, his recklessness of abuse and levity of imagination, at the service of the persecution which was preparing in Alexandria. He had already bespattered the Jews with mud enough in the volume of his "History of the Nations"¹ which deals with Egypt; now he devoted a special book of his encyclopædic work to the Jews. Of all works of the sort, this was the most ignorant, silly and unclean, but therefore dangerous, for it was on a level with that class which takes an active share in such persecutions, and so pleased them beyond all things. Of course this book itself is only a product of the struggle;² but the danger to the Jews lay in the oratorical, not the literary, attacks of the Sophists. The gist of them in this book can be gathered with certainty by considering Josephus' refutation.

According to Josephus, the first part of the work related to the exodus and banishment of Israel from Egypt; the second, to the complaints of Alexandria against the Jews; and the third, to their law and worship in the temple. The author had already developed the profoundest learning on the first of these questions in his great *Ægyptiaca*. "Moses," so this book states, "was, as I heard from aged Egyptians, a priest of Heliopolis. Although he owed obedience to the laws which were his heritage, he transferred prayer under the open sky to walled rooms (*proseuchæ*) such as there were in the city, and made them all face the east wind, for so lies the city of the sun. Instead of obelisks, he erected pillars, at the foot of which was set the

¹ This is the name of the whole work in Suidas.

² Jos. Contr. Ap. 2, 6, shows that Apion's book also had special reference to the refusal of the Jews to erect pillars in their synagogues bearing busts of the emperor.

model of a boat,¹ on which the shadow of the top of the pillar rested, so that its course continually followed the sun's through heaven." It is not clear what purpose Apion saw in this—whether he thus made Moses the inventor of the sun-dial, or whether he had a vision of some phallic pillar from Phœnicia or the worship of Baal. At all events, some odious allusion lurked in this aspersion.

Proceeding to the exodus, Apion explains the origin of the sabbath in his own offensive way. "After a six-days' march the Jews got sores, and therefore had to rest on the seventh day, even after happily reaching the land now called Judæa. They called the day Sabbath, after an Egyptian word they had kept, for the Egyptians called the smart of sores sabbathosis." After this profound explanation, our sophist advances another—why the Jews never allowed any one to visit the holy of holies, and why Pompey found it empty when he entered it in spite of them. "In their sanctuary," he says, "they have an ass's head set up, which they pray to, and this is the whole of their worship." As in his time this head was of pure gold, Apion is able to recount all kind of perils to which this precious relic was exposed, until it was finally melted down by Antiochus Epiphanes. It was this king also, according to Apion, who came upon traces of human sacrifices amongst the Jews; for in exploring the temple he discovered a Greek fattened for sacrifice. "They do this every year," the sophist informed his shuddering audience. "They kidnap a foreign Greek, and fatten him for a year; then take him into a wood hard by, kill him, offer up his body with their accustomed rites, taste his vitals, and at the sacrifice of the Greek take an oath to hate all Greeks. Then the rest of the unfortunate man's body is thrown into a pit."

It may be imagined with what rage the honest Greek of Alexandria received the news that beyond the nearest boundary he might be kidnapped by the Jews at any moment, and eaten

¹ ἐκτίπωμα σκάφης.

up after preliminary fattening. The most positive contradiction of Apion by Josephus did not even prevent a man like Tacitus from repeating most of these tales.¹ Indeed, though Tacitus was at least acquainted with Josephus' history of the Jewish war, there is no doubt that Apion was his authority for his picture of early Jewish history. Who but the Alexandrian grammarian could have conducted those learned researches, reproduced by Tacitus, into the truth of the question whether the Jews were originally settled in Crete, and were called Idæans, from Mount Ida; or whether in the reign of Isis the surplus Egyptians had overflowed into the neighbouring lands under the leadership of Hierosolymus and Judah; or whether they were more probably wandering Assyrians, driven by famine into the valley of the Nile—a point on which the learned editor of Homer did not fail to remember how it is said of Bellerophon in Il. 6, 184,

“And next he fought the famous Solymæ,
A harder fight he never fought with men.”

Apion, however, only details these opinions to decide for none of them, but concludes, with an impressive blow on the tribune, that the ancestors of the Jews had been driven out of Egypt for their leprosy.

There are other statements in Tacitus suggestive of Apion's touch; for example, the explanation of the worship of the jackass, viz. that the Jews were nearly perishing in the desert when a herd of wild asses disclosed a spring of fresh water, and this was why they now chose the head of their favourite animal as an idol.² On the other hand, they avoided the swine, because, like themselves, it was subject to skin disease.

According to Josephus, our orator also discussed the fable, given above, of the way in which they came to observe the

¹ Hist. 5, 2—5.

² The fact that Ap. 2, 7, is supplemented in various points by Hist. 5, 3, makes Tacitus' direct use of Apion's book very probable. Matters omitted by Josephus are therefore to be supplied from Tacitus. Thus the statements about animal sacrifices and pork in Hist. 5, 4, correspond to Ap. 2, 13.

sabbath. "But as idleness suited the Jews," continues Tacitus, quite in Apion's tone, "they also devoted the seventh year to doing nothing."¹ Their unleavened bread, again, is a memorial of the corn stolen on their exodus, for the fugitives had no time to prepare it; their fasts are to preserve the memory of the great famine which brought their ancestors to Egypt.²

Across this medley of stupid misunderstanding and wilful perversion, the intention of provoking the populace to acts of hatred is discernible at times with most damaging clearness; as, for example, when complaint is made to the Egyptians of the way in which this hateful nation profanely kills the sacred animals, or when the Greeks in their turn are warned not to consider the Jews as servants of Bacchus by reason of the golden vine in the temple, "for Liber's rites are glad and merry, while the Jews' rites are morose and gloomy."³

Such attacks are further envenomed by the odious representation of all the encroachments the Jews were credited with in Alexandria. Their usurpation of quarters of the city which did not belong to them, of the citizenship to which they had no claim, and of the privileges refused to them by Germanicus; their character for rebellion from the time of Physcon to Antony and Cleopatra; their lack of men to put themselves at the universal service of mankind;—all these charges were detailed to the Greeks by the aggressive sophist, who finished by playing his usual trump card: "If the Jews wish to be citizens of Alexandria, they must honour the gods of Alexandria; if they wish to honour Cæsar, they must sacrifice to Cæsar's genius."⁴

These charges had lost none of their sting after half-a-century; they were repeated by a man like Tacitus in spite of Josephus' refutation. Judge, then, of their effect in the mouth of an aggressive, clever and fluent sophist, upon an audience with a thousand causes of hatred against the Jews. This was how these attacks obtained the dignity of an epoch-making event.

¹ Tac. Hist. 5, 4.

² Ib. 5, 4.

³ Ib. 5, 5.

⁴ Contra Ap. 2; 4, 5, 6.

The tide of hostility to the Jews, provoked by a hundred importunities of the restless people, accelerated by a hundred dangerous calumnies, and momentarily checked, but not repressed, by the stern hand of the proconsul Flaccus, at its next flood burst through the artificial barriers. On its crest rode the skilful pilot Apion, who now raised himself to be the head of the Alexandrian embassy to the imperial court, the representative of the second city in the empire. But this period of revolution came with the death of Tiberius, who was to show the Roman empire for the first time how eventful for the monarchy circumstances might make the death of the monarch.

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